HINDU VIRTUE ETHICS

Nicholas F. Gier

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus

University of Idaho

First published as "Toward a Hindu Virtue Ethics" in Contemporary Issues in Constructive Dharma, eds. R. D. Sherma and A. Deepak (Hampton, VA: Deepak Heritage Books, 2005), vol. 2, pp. 151-162. Note: This version contains a new third section.  Complete endnotes will be added at a later date.

Alaisdair MacIntyre, the philosopher who has done the most to reintroduce virtue ethics, argues that utilitarianism cannot distinguish between the clear qualitative difference  between the internal value of the virtues and the extrinsic value of ordinary pleasures, a difference crucial to what is called Acharacter@ consequentialism. Whereas it is virtually impossible to do the hedonic calculus for ordinary pains and pleasures, there is no question about the long term good consequences of the virtues and good character, as compared to the long term pain that the vices bring.  This means that recent attempts at founding the value of the virtues on their own grounds fails, because one cannot deny that the virtues were preferred, very early in human social development, primarily because of their good consequences.

In my book The Virtue of Non-Violence I have interpreted both Buddhist and Confucian morality as virtue ethics roughly similar to Aristotle and his doctrine of the mean.  As far as I know, Hindu ethics has not been read in this way.  Indeed, a recent anthology dealing with Indian ethics does not have a chapter on the subject. In my book I interpret Gandhi=s ethics of non-violence from a virtue perspective, but I was not sure, especially since Gandhi had so many non-Indian influences, if this would apply to any other aspect of the Indian tradition. Reading Bimal Krishna Matilal=s book Ethics and Epics was just the breakthrough that I needed to think about a more general Hindu virtue ethics.  Following an aesthetics of virtue, I will propose that the Hindu virtues are personal creations that are, as Aristotle maintains, Arelative to us,@ and that strictly deontological or utilitarian readings of the ethics of the Hindu epics are not supported. 

In the first section I will discuss the different roles that rules and virtues play in our moral lives, and I will demonstrate that the virtues have axiological priority.  The second section will present the outlines of a virtue aesthetics, which I will explicate in terms of Confucius and Gandhi.  In the third section I will demonstrate that dharma is best interpreted as virtue rather than duty. Drawing heavily on Matilal in the fourth section, I argue that there are good reasons to read the Hindu epics as a virtue ethics.  Matilal offers some wonderful insights about the true nature of karma and in the fifth section I combine these with my own discoveries about Buddhism to offer a non-fatalistic interpretation of the motto Acharacter is destiny.@ Finally, Matilal=s acute observations about Krishna gives me the link that I needed for a Hindu virtue aesthetics in the sixth and final section.

RULES AND VIRTUES

When one thinks of the question AWhich came first--moral rules or virtues?@ the obvious answer, I contend, is that virtues came first.  Moral imperatives are abstractions from thousands of years of observing loyal, honest, patient, just, and compassionate behavior, just as moral prohibitions have come from equally ancient experiences with the vices.  There is good evidence that the expression of moral rules requires a spoken language and one could argue just as persuasively that virtues manifested themselves in prelinguistic human beings. For example, strong circumstantial evidence for compassion among the Neanderthals can be joined with the hypothesis that their very high larynx made it impossible for them to articulate the basic vowels. Michael Spangle and Kent Menzel state that Aspoken language transformed our species and was a major factor in forging the human world as we know it.@^[1] They also argue for the existence of an Aacoustic trigger to conceptualization@ that gestural language obviously lacks.  While there is now a consensus that gestures are integral to all natural languages (remarkably, the blind gesture when they speak), it is generally agreed that they do not express abstractions very well.

It is even more clear that divine virtues precede divine law, because God=s virtues would remain even if God chose not to create a world.  The doctrine of the Trinity (Hindu, Buddhist, or Christian) allows the possibility that the divine virtues are not exclusively self-regarding. The Pauline view that the Law was created only to manifest human sin further proves its contingency and confirms the idea of a Alawless@ God before creation. For medieval nominalism the moral law characterizes what God has ordained (potentia ordinata) for a sinful world, and it is not part of God=s absolute power (potentia absoluta). 

Philosopher Leslie Stephen describes virtue ethics as follows: "Morality is internal.  The moral law. . . has to be expressed in the form, 'be this,' not in the form  'do this.' . . . The true moral law says 'hate not,' instead of 'kill not.' . . . The only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character."^[2]  In other words, people of good character and virtue require no reminder of what the rules are or what their duty is.  For John Stuart Mill the application of internal sanctions had much more moral value than the imposition of external sanctions, those that most often used by parents and societies to control human behavior. Mill=s argument is persuasive: a society of mature virtues would require few police, judges, and prisons thereby maximizing utility and supporting character consequentialism.

Generally speaking, the sanctions for virtue ethics are internal and self-regulating, whereas the sanctions for rule ethics, especially in its popular religious form, are external.  (Kant and contemporary Christian ethicists join virtue ethics in favoring internal sanctions.)  For the Greeks, the Roman Stoics, Buddhists, and the Confucians, virtue is its own reward, but popular Christianity appears to have made the incentive for good deeds eternal life in heaven, with eternal damnation for those who do not follow the rules.

One of the problems with rule ethics is applying the rules to specific cases.  The imperatives of virtue ethics--be patient, be kind, be generous, be compassionate, be courageous--better equip an individual to negotiate the obstacles of the moral life.  The virtue ethics approach is not to follow a set of abstract rules, but to develop an ensemble of behaviors, dispositions, and qualities that lead to human excellence and the good life.  Virtue ethics may not have pat answers to specific cases--no ethical theory could offer this--but it does prepare the moral agent for adaptation, innovation, and self-discovery. As Martha Nussbaum states: AThe good agent must therefore cultivate the ability to perceive and correctly describe his or her situation finely and truly, including in this perceptual grasp even those features of the situation that are not covered under the existing rule.@^[3]  Aristotle=s practical reason is the ability perceive Afinely and truly@ any situation, whereas Buddhists would call it the virtue of mindfulness and the Confucians would say that it is doing Awhat is appropriate@ (yi).

VIRTUE AESTHETICS IN CONFUCIUS AND GANDHI

Most Euro-American philosophy has unfortunately severed the time-honored connections between truth, goodness, and beauty.   A Chinese poet of the Book of Odes conceives of moral development as similar to the manufacture of a precious stone.  At birth we are like uncut gems, and we have an obligation to carve and polish our potential in the most beautiful ways possible.  The ren* person is a work of fine art, something wholly unique and distinctive.  Whereas the craft potter takes thousands of mugs from the same mold, the ceramic sculptor makes one singular work.  Ames and Rosemont=s inelegant translation of ren* as Aauthoritative person@ plays on the dual meanings of authority and creative authoring and leads to helpful translations such as Abecoming authoritative in one=s conduct is self-originating--how could it originate with others@ (Analects 12.1).  Ames and Rosemont also observe that li is Aprofoundly different from law@ because it can be personalized and stylized.^[4]

The Confucians were both dancers and expert musicians, and it is the performing arts that is the best model for a contemporary aesthetics of virtue. Confucian sages were moral virtuosos who used their yi to create their own unique style of appropriating the social patterns of their community (li). This achievement is both moral and aesthetic because it results in the embodiment of the good (li) and the personal creation of an elegant, harmonious, and balanced soul.  Confucius claimed to have the ability to read the character of composers by listening to their music.  It is also said that in his later years Confucius put the Book of Odes to music in the proper way, presumably based on a correlation between notes and virtues (9.15). 

For Confucius the beauty of the sage kings lies in their virtue; the beauty of any neighborhood is due to the goodness of its residents; a person without ren* could not possibly appreciate music; and a society without li and music would not be just; indeed, li cannot be perfected without music.  Gandhi once said that he could not Aconceive of an evolution of India=s religious life without her music.@^[5] He would also have celebrated the fact that the Analects reports that the fusion of li and music first came with the commoners and then was adopted by the nobility (11.1).

Although he was not at all as active in the arts as Confucius, Gandhi is committed to the same ancient unity of truth, goodness, and beauty.  More so than Confucius Gandhi is committed to prioritizing truth: "Truth is the first thing to be sought for, and Beauty and Goodness will then be added unto you."^[6] Gandhi's focus was also more on the inner beauty of the pure heart rather than natural or artistic beauty. "Purity of life is the highest and truest art. . . .The art of producing good music from a cultivated voice can be achieved by many, but the art of producing that music from the harmony of a pure life is achieved very rarely."^[7] Confucius would certainly have agreed with this statement.  Gandhi rejected the concept of art for art=s sake and its amoral aestheticism and there is no question that Confucius would have agreed with the proposition that art must be an ally of the good life or it loses its value.  While in England Gandhi experienced the controversy surrounding Oscar Wilde and he joined Wilde=s critics with the charge that he was guilt of Abeautifying immorality.@^[8]

From the standpoint of Heaven the Confucians would have agreed with Gandhi that its truth [cheng=sincerity] is most important, and its beauty and goodness follows second and third.  Gandhi may have subordinated beauty to both truth and goodness so as to forestall any philosophy of life that would place the acquisition of artworks before basic needs of the people.  Gandhi believed that for the masses to appreciate beauty it must come through truth.  AShow them Truth first and they will see beauty afterwards.  Whatever can be useful to those starving millions is beautiful to my mind.  Let us give today the vital things of life and the graces and ornaments of life will follow.@^[9]  In this passage Gandhi=s passion for justice appears to have led him to reduce beauty to utility.  He may, however, have a more sophisticated aesthetics in mind, one in which form follows function, one that is manifested in the exquisitely beautiful and simple Shaker furniture.  This is how Gandhi relates asceticism to aesthetics: AAsceticism is the highest art.  For what is art but beauty in simplicity and what is asceticism if not the loftiest manifestation of simply beauty in daily life, shorn of artificialities and make-believe?  That is why I always say that the true ascetic, not only practises art but lives it.@^[10] In a personal conversation with Gandhi=s grandson Ramachandra, a creative writer and philosopher in his own right, he described the way that Gandhi led his daily prayer services as a form of minimalist art.

Gandhi once asked a disciple if a Awoman with fair features was necessarily beautiful?@  The initial affirmative answer was quickly withdrawn when Gandhi followed with Aeven if she may be of an ugly character?@  For Gandhi beauty is always Aan index of the soul within.@^[11]  He also observed that although they say that Socrates was not a handsome man, Ato my mind he was beautiful because all his life was striving after Truth. . . ."^[12] M. Kirti Singh has remarked that Gandhi was perhaps as ugly as Socrates, "yet there was a rare spiritual beauty that shone in his face."^[13]  This is a moral beauty that comes from the courage of being true to one's self and being true to others.  Gandhi=s virtue aesthetics is best summed up in this passage: ALife must immensely excel all the parts put together.  To me the greatest artist is surely he who lives the finest life.@^[14]

DHARMA: DUTY OR VIRTUE?

The Sanskrit word dharma is generally understood as strict duty, a set of obligations by which all good Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists must live.  But, even with this conventional understanding, there are important distinctions that are sometimes overlooked. Brahmins, for example, have different duties than Vaishyas do, and the Jaina householder and the Buddhist layperson have less strict obligations than the monks.  From our comparative perspective it is significant to note that the Brahmin essentially shares the same goal as Aristotle=s wise man: the perfection of dharma leads to the contemplation of God. In most instances caste duties are explained as virtues, as in this list for Brahmins: Aassiduous work, the bridling of the passions, compassion, liberality, truthfulness, . . . discipline, generosity, righteousness, . . . [and] wisdom. . . .@^[15]  This dharmic virtue ethics is further explained by the development of character traits (lakshana) by which a person=s virtues can be known.

Rather than being abstract and deontological, dharma is Aradically empirical@ and particularized.^[16]  For example, beyond the relativism of caste virtue, there is also the fact that different virtues will be required for each of ashramas, and, furthermore, a particular virtue dominates each of the cosmic ages. Even though social customs stand third behind shruti and smriti on most Hindu textual lists, it could be argued that they are actually the true source of dharma.  For example, Apastamba’s Dharmasutra  clearly implies that customs are the source of dharma, and the Mahabharata supports this genetic interpretation: Adharma has its origin in good practices and the Vedas are established on dharma.@^[17]  Just as we have proposed a functional equivalence between Chinese li and Greek ethos, we can now see dharma as the Indian ethos. Dharma is like li in two other respects: it starts as religious rite (Arituals, study of scripture, and austerities@),^[18] and grew to pertain to every aspect of daily life.   For the Aristotle ethos becomes ethos ethike when the virtues are developed according to practical reason.  Matilal will help us make that connection later in this section.

Another instance of the priority of customs is the fact that the righteous king Ashould ordain (as law) whatever may be the usual custom of good, religious twice-born men, if it does not conflict with (the customs of) countries, families, and castes.@^[19]  The king was to honor local custom even though it might contravene smriti.^[20] This analysis supports the theory that laws are indeed abstracted from customs and the practice of the virtues and that a healthy flexibility and tolerance of different customs and virtues could flourish with such a concept of laws and rules.  A. Whitney Sanford has observed this with regard to Krishna worship: “Multiple centers not only exist but the local traditions are essential to the establishment and maintenance of traditions such as Krishna worship.” (JAAR March 05, p. 107)  One should not be surprised to learn that this type of polity existed in Sri Lanka as well. Stanley Tambiah explains:  AThe polities modeled on mandala-type patterning had central royal domains surrounded by satellite principalities and provinces replicating the center on a smaller scale and at the margins had even more autonomous tributary principalities.@^[21] Tambiah gives this type of polity the engaging name Apulsating galactic polities,@ and he believes that this form of political organization is better in integrating minorities and respecting their customs.

Frank Edgerton defines dharma as Apropriety, socially approved conduct, in relation to one=s fellow man or to other living beings.@^[22]  The best translation of the Chinese li is also propriety, and Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont draw an instruction lesson from the Latin proprius, A>making one=s own= as in >property.=@^[23] This parallels the Indian situation where a person is expected to match one=s own nature (svabhava) with one=s own dharma (svadharma).  As Austin Creel phrases it: AOne=s dharma is the total situation in which he finds himself; it is the law of his own being, the proper function of nature or constitution. . . . It is his appropriate function; it is the manifestation in social existence of his actual capacities.  Dharma in this sense is deemed not a external code but the inner law of a being.@^[24] In the broadest sense dharma corresponds exactly to the Greek arete, a thing=s basic nature and function.  The dharma/arete of a knife is to cut well, the dharma/arete of a race horse is to run fast, and for Aristotle the dharma/arete of human beings is to use practical reason by they came developed the virtues of the good life.  According to B. Kuppuswamy, Adharma does not consist in blind conformity to customs; a man=s behaviour should based on reasoning, should contribute to the welfare of humanity and should be guided by conscience.@^[25]

Even within the most duty bound roles one can easily conceive of a true Amaking one=s own.@  Even though the Confucians must have had a set choreography for their dances, one can imagine each of them having their own distinctive style.  The score for a violin concerto is the same for all who perform it, but virtuosi will play it in a unique way.  The best judges have the same law before them and yet one can detect the creative marks of judicial craft excellence.  Even the younger brother who defers to his elder brother will have his own style of performing this duty, one=s own dharma (svadharma). Kuppuswamy defines svabhava as Aone=s unique pattern of ability and temperament,@^[26] and this will determine one=s svadharma. Just as every Chinese makes a personal appropriation of li by means of yi, so does every Indian do the same with dharma.

VIRTUE ETHICS IN THE HINDU EPICS

In several of his essays Matilal finds hints of both utilitarianism and Kantianism in the Hindu epics.  A caricature of Kantianism is found in Rama, whose inflexibility with regard to duty leads to absurd and/or harsh decisions.  As Matilal quips: ARama=s dharma was rigid; Krishna=s was flaccid.@  Even though he was encouraged to do so by the sage Jabala, Rama, unlike Krishna, was not going to break a promise, even if it meant that he could regain his kingdom and avoid 14 years of exile. One of Rama=s lame excuses for shooting Valin in the back was that a person has no duties to animals, Valin being a member of Hanuman=s monkey army. (But recall that Kant said that mistreatment of animals was blameworthy at least as a reflection of the person=s character.) Rama=s extreme interpretation of a wife=s duty to her husband has led generations of Indian women to conform to an impossible ideal. Following Sita=s example, Indian women are required to stay with their husbands no matter what they ask of them and no matter how much they are abused.

The principle of utility is implied in Krishna=s justification of immoral means to prevent the evil Kauravas from winning the war. Yudhisthira once said that there are many dharmas and the only way to find the correct one is to follow the mahajana, which can be translated as Athe conduct of the good people.@ In this term Matilal finds a Aprimitive proto-utilitarianism,@ which is very clearly expressed in the common phrase Afor the sake of the happiness of many people, and for the sake of the good of many.@ Matilal acknowledges that the greatest attraction of utilitarianism is its monism, i.e., its assumption that all moral problems can be solved with a single principle.  He claims, however, that Adharma-morality is pluralistic,@ and he proposes that this view can be held without succumbing to irrationality. Matilal=s frequent mention of Apractical wisdom@ as the deciding factor in moral decision-making suggests that we should look at Hindu ethics from a virtue perspective.  I propose then that Athe conduct of good people@ be read as a call to emulate the virtuous among us.

If dharma is duty then Hindu ethics should conform to something like Kantianism, but Matilal demonstrates that is not really the meaning of dharma, a point that we have already argued in the previous section.  Matilal quotes Robert Lingat favorably when he maintains that dharma is never Aimposed@ but simply Aproposed@; and he paraphrases Louis Dumont idea that dharma Areigns from above without actually governing the world.@ Both of these descriptions are intriguing but vague, but Matilal at least concludes that dharma is Aopen ended,@ a crucial aspect of rules in virtue ethics.

The virtue interpretation of dharma comes into focus when we look at some very specific definitions and instances of its expression.  In the Varnaparvan of the Mahabharata King Nahusha asks Yudhisthira what dharma is, and he defines it as the virtues of truthfulness, generosity, forgiveness, goodness, kindness, self-control, and compassion.  Going completely against caste determinism, Yudhisthira contends that a shudra having these qualities would actually be a brahman, and if a brahman lacks them he would be a shudra.

As I have argued above, it was the virtues that came first and only afterward moral rules. This means that moral rules are actually abstractions from the practice of the virtues, just as moral prohibitions are abstractions from the practice of the vices. Therefore, no moral rule could Areign from above@ nor could it even Apropose@ without the specific moral content that action and the virtues provide. Interestingly enough, moral rules, even as abstractions, still preserve their normative force. Therefore, dharma can indeed Apropose@ as a general guide for action, but it must always be contextualized and individualized.

KARMA AND CHARACTER AS DESTINY        

Matilal=s greatest contribution to our understanding of Indian thought is his discussion of karma and how it has been misunderstood: AThe karma doctrine requires that man=s own >character= be his own >destiny.=@ This statement supports my thesis about a Hindu virtue ethics and also allows us to confront the challenge of fatalism. Matilal makes a strong case for separating karma from caste and suggests that the concept of karma is compatible with both reason and individual responsibility.  He argues that karma was originally introduced to solve the problem of evil and to answer the fatalism found in the Ajivaka school.  Karma=s connection to fatalism occurred only when it was linked to caste heredity.

The Buddha once said that Athey who know causation know the dharma,@ and I propose that this motto relates to character as destiny and also to Matilal=s thesis that karma supports moral freedom and responsibility.  (As Matilal observes, karma looks like fate only if one is ignorant of all the causal threads.) Those who know their own causal web of existence, especially noting how their actions affect themselves and others, will be able to develop the cardinal virtue of mindfulness.  If they know the truth (i.e., the true facts of their lives), then they will then know what to do. The truths they discover by means of this formula will be very personal truths, moral and spiritual truths that are, as Aristotle says of moral virtues, Arelative to us.@ Furthermore, the famous "mirror of dharma" is not a common one that people all look into together, as some later Buddhist believed, but it is actually a myriad of mirrors reflecting individual histories. Finally, we can see how character is destiny, and as long a compatiblist justification for moral freedom is accepted, we can say that those who are unmindful and do not develop the virtues are destined to experience the truth that the vices are their own punishment.

Seeing the law of karma as a psychological law allows us to avoid the both the extravagance and absurdities of the common view of it as a cosmic law with inscrutable laws of retribution. (It also means that we may also see, as some Buddhists do, the six realms of existence as a metaphor for the Aanimal,@ Aangelic,@ and Ademonic@ moments of one single life span.) Therefore, the law of karma can be conceived as the rather trivial truth that all actions have consequences. If we conceive of karmic causality as conditionality, we can now state the following conditionals concerning moral responsibility: AIf we act motivated by greed, hatred, or delusion, we are planting the seed of suffering; but when our acts are motivated by generosity, love, or wisdom, then we are creating the karmic conditions for abundance and happiness.@  Again, we see that character is destiny.

For the Buddhists, karma works at two levelsB-one immediate and one delayed. In any of our acts we can immediately experience the results depending on whether they were done, for example, out of love or hatred. (Only the truly obtuse person will claim to be unaware.) Later on, these seeds of our actions will produce their inevitable fruits and, following the principle of interdependent coorigination, these fruits will finally ripen. The ripening of karmic action is a pervasive metaphor in all Buddhist literature, and it supports very well the non-fatalistic motto that character is destiny.

KRISHNA AND THE AESTHETICS OF VIRTUE

Matilal summarizes very well my argument thus far: AA moral agent exercises his practical wisdom, and also learns from the experiences he passes through during his life.  He has an enriched practical wisdom when it is informed by his experiences of genuine moral dilemmas.  A moral agent needs also a character which is nothing but a disposition to act and react appropriately with moral concerns.@ This is precisely how Aristotle=s relative mean operates (right time, right place, right manner, etc.) and also how the Confucian concept of yi works as a personal appropriation of the norms of li.  Matilal=s insights allows me to do something that I thought that I could not do in my own comparative virtue ethicsBnamely, to add Krishna to the Buddha, Confucius, and Aristotle.

The problem of course is that Krishna appears to be the least virtuous person in this list and can hardly be seen as practitioner of the Middle Way.  Nonetheless, Matilal declares that his Adark Lord@ as a Aparadigmatic person . . . in the moral field,@ who Abecomes a perspectivist and understands the contingency of the human situation.@ both necessary elements of virtue ethics.  He also describes him, as opposed to the rigid Rama or Yudhisthira, as an Aimaginative poet@ in the moral realm: AHe is the poet who accepts the constraints of metres, verses, and metaphors.  But he is also the strong poet who has absolute control over them. . . . He governs from above but does not dictate.@  This guarantees that Krishna=s Aflexibility never means the >anything goes= kind of morality.@

If Krishna is not omnipotent in the Judeo-Christian sense, then Matilal cannot claim that Krishna has Aabsolute control over the metres@; nor is it advisable to have him governing them from above.  Nonetheless, the fine arts, I believe, give us a very rich analogue for the development and performance of the virtues. Most significantly, this analogy allows us to confirm both normativity and creative individuality at the same time.  A violin virtuoso does not leave out a note or instruction from the original score, but she offers a unique interpretation of the piece.  Even the best judges are praised for craft excellence in their very distinctive decisions based on an unchanging law.  Similarly, every younger brother appropriates li in his own way in respecting his elder brother. It is the virtues and practical reason that allows us to navigate the river of law with its constant flow and identity but also its shifting banks and channels.

Not only does practical reason guide us in choosing a mean relative to us, it also allows us to suspend the law when it is in danger of Abecoming an ass@ a la Dickens.  Dharma Agets fulfilled in novel and mysterious ways,@ so it may be expressed in violation of law or duty.  For example, the Pandava brothers were so concerned about retrieving some sacrificial sticks that they were punished for their ritualistic rigidity by a yaksha (disguised as a stork and symbolizing dharma). (Significantly enough, Yudhisthira, the only brother not punished, then discovers that dharma is the Aconduct of good people@ discussed above.) One of my favorite examples comes from the Confucian Mencius who said that li forbids any man from touching woman not directly related to him; but if your sister-in-law is drowning, then by all means you should extend your hand to save her.  When we look back at the Krishna=s suspension of the rules of war, his justification, compared to these examples, does not appear, at least for me, very compelling at all. I am particularly reminded of the incident in which Krishna tells Arjuna that he can attack Kuru Karna even though his chariot is stuck in the mud.