IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

Kant's moral theory is focused the moral autonomy of persons, so returning to the issue of personhood is important.  For an interesting development in the issue of non-human persons, one of the April, 2000 issues of the Seattle Times reported about the Great Ape Project. Headed by a Seattle lawyer, the organization is arguing that the higher apes ought to be given all the rights that human persons have.

1755: Assistant Professor at the University of Königsberg, East Prussia, present-day Russian Republic.

1770: Promoted to full Professor.

1781: Critique of Pure Reason; 2nd edition 1787

1785: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

1788: Critique of Practical Reason (i.e., moral reason)

1793: Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. This book was condemned and Kant obeyed the censors and published no religious writing until 1797. Kant had stopped attending church at an early age and his religious rationalism did not please Prussian authorities, especially after the death of Frederick the Great.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF HUME

Kant's first book was a response to Hume's skepticism. If one takes the content of experience, one finds no necessity except custom and habit. But if one looks at the form of experience, then one finds necessity and universality. The forms of experience are not due to habit, but to a priori (prior) universals which guide experience in regular and predictable ways. While there is no choice but to follow the laws of nature, Kant argued that we do have the freedom to follow the laws of morality.

Kant thought that Hume was wrong: the basis of morality is not the empirical data of the sentiments, but a priori formal rules of human conduct. Kant obviously is an ethical objectivist. Moral rules do not depend on the will of humans or God, but are found in the very nature of the soul, a rational soul. We are back to Aquinas' moral rationalism, but Kant's God plays a lesser role in morality. There are universal moral rules that humans must follow.

KANT'S MORAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

Kant rejected all the arguments for the existence of God except for what is called the "moral" argument. The only indubitable evidence of God's presence is the existence of human conscience. Kant essentially reduces religion to "the recognition of all duties as divine commands." Kant abides by the assumptions of ethical objectivism: moral rules are eternal and uncreated and we must follow them to the goal of moral perfection.

This life on earth is not enough for complete moral perfection; nor is it enough time for the wicked to be properly punished and the righteous properly rewarded. Therefore, a divine being must exist with perfect goodness and power, to set up an afterlife in which true justice can be done and where the righteous can perfect themselves in God's presence. A passage below will explain this in more detail, but please note now the point of humans perfecting themselves rather than God perfecting humans.

Here is the earliest formulation of Kant's "moral" argument for God: "If no state of well-being follows his well-doing; then there would be a contradiction between morality and the course of nature. . . Why should I make myself worthy of happiness through morality if there is no being who can give me this happiness? Hence without God I would have to be either a visionary or a scoundrel. I would have to deny my own nature and its eternal moral laws. I would have to cease being a rational man" (Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 110).

KANT'S VIEWS ON RELIGION

For Kant religion is essentially reduced to morality. There are no special duties we owe to God that we do not already owe to our neighbor. In contrast to orthodox Christianity, there are no special theological virtues. For Kant, worship, prayer, religious ritual have no rational basis, and although he considered himself a Christian, he did not engage in any of these activities.

On prayer Kant had this to say: "Praying is a superstitious illusion...; for it is no more than a stated wish directed to a Being who needs no such information regarding the inner disposition of the wisher; therefore nothing is accomplished by it, and it discharges none of the duties to which, as commands of God, we are obligated; hence God is not really served" (Religion Within. . . , p. 183).

God himself is bound to the moral law: "Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize him as such. . . ." (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 25). "If [a scripture] flatly contradicts morality, then it cannot be from God (for example, if a father were ordered to kill his son who is, as far as he knows, perfectly innocent)" (Religion. . ., p. 87). This seems to be an indirect criticism of the sacrifice of Isaac, and the implication is that either the Hebrew writers got the story wrong (God did not call for the sacrifice), or the Hebrew God Yahweh is an immoral deity. Here Kant is judging the actions of God by a standard independent of scripture or theology. In other words, Yahweh does not compare with our ideal of moral perfection.

Kant's view of the Last Judgment seems to be the only orthodox part of his religion. In so far as he has redefined religion as the moral perfection of autonomous persons, he has eliminated most of the activities associated with traditional religion: sacrifice, ritual, worship, and prayer. As Kant states: "There are no special duties to God in a universal religion, for God can receive nothing from us; we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon Him."

According to Kant, our only duty is to follow our conscience--the divine command within--and fulfill this among our fellow men and women. Divine obedience, which has been mistakenly externalized by traditional religion as "courtly obligations" to God the king, has been completely internalized by Kant as obedience to conscience, being true to our rational selves.

In the following passage, Kant seems to declare Christianity obsolete, at least for rational thinkers: "Christianity. . . .enriched philosophy with more definite and purer conceptions of morality than morality itself could have previously supplied. But once these conceptions are found, they are freely approved by reason, which adopts them as conceptions at which it could quite well have arrived itself and which it might and ought to have introduced" (Critique of Judgment, II, p. 146).

It is then quite natural for Kant to focus on one particular meaning of the Kingdom of God in the New Testament. Luke's famous passage supports Kant's interpretation better in the King James translation: "The kingdom of God cometh not in visible form. Neither shall they say, Lo here; or lo there! For, behold the kingdom of God is within you" (17:21-2). Kant's reading of this verse is: "Here a kingdom of God is represented not according to a particular covenant (i.e., not Messianic) but moral (knowable through unassisted reason)." This is a key to understanding Kant's Kingdom of Ends, the third formulation of the categorical imperative. The biblical Kingdom of God has been replaced by an ethical commonwealth, which is essentially a moral abstraction. Only in his Religion. . . does he make it a reality, and then an earthly, pre-Judgment one.

Kant is a theistic humanist--more in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Some theistic humanism of the 18th Century, including some of our Founding Fathers, can be called "deism," a view of God in which divine intervention and special providence is eliminated or kept to a bare minimum. For example, George Washington never called the deity "God" but "Providence," a general divine guidance for humanity. Deists like Kant rejected formal rites or worship, especially prayer, as irrational and unnecessary. For these philosophers human destiny was pretty much in the hands of human beings themselves.

Kant on Human Happiness: "God wants mankind to be happy. He wants men to be made happy by men, and if only all men united to promote their own happiness we could make a paradise of Novaya Zemlya. God has set the stage where we can make each other happy. It rests with us, and us alone, to do so" (Lectures on Ethics, pp. 54-55). This contrasts sharply with Aquinas' theological eudaimonism, in which only God has the power to make us happy. Kant is a rational eudaimonist, like the Greeks.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE GOOD WILL (Henberg & George, p. 137)

The only truly good thing in the world is the good will. This does not make Kant a voluntarist, because this good will always are according to the dictates of right reason. A good will is that which any rational being ought to do regardless of self-interest or inclination.

None of the traditional virtues have any value unless they are connected to a good will. Kant agrees with Aquinas: intentions are more important than consequences. "Thus the good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness." E.g., moderation of the villain or the loyalty of a mafioso can be dangerous. The courage of the Nazi army was a virtue, but its intentions was evil. In each of these cases we may have the total lack of a good will. This is why Kantians are suspicious of "virtue" ethics. (See the last chapter in these Notes.)

Please note that a good will is not the same as "showing good will," as we often see in contemporary society. The good will shown at the doorstep by a fly-by-night magazine salesman may not have anything to do with Kant's idea of a good will inside that person.

Right Actions are rule-governed, are done from duty, and out of respect for universal moral law.

Wrong Actions are done in spite of, or contrary to duty.

Good Actions merely accord or coincide with duty.

A definition of duty: whatever one is forced to do according to a moral rule.

Note: Given Kant's terminology, should not the good will actually be called the "right" will instead?

GOOD WILL NOT GOOD BECAUSE OF WHAT IT ACCOMPLISHES (p. 138)

Kant's view is like the Stoics in that one's virtue is independent of one's achievements. The Stoics were more radical: one is virtuous despite achievements or without trying to achieve. Stoic indifference. Kant does not go this far. Good will is good by following rules: the dictates of moral reason.

REASON AS BASIS FOR GOOD WILL, NOT HAPPINESS (p. 138)

This goes against Aristotle's rational eudaimonism. This does not mean that humans ought not to be happy. Reason produces a good will and thus persons of good will deserve happiness as a reward. The highest good is the virtue which a good will produces and the happiness which the good will deserves. It is clear that Kant is a rationalist, not a voluntarist. Reason is the "governor of our will" (p. 138 middle).

Human beings are not naturally constituted for happiness through reason. Very inefficient if this were the case. We should have had an instinct for happiness. Only very disciplined person can effectively use reason to obtain happiness. Nature has forced us to use practical reason in our behavior. Aristotle has already shown us that we can't be precise or even sure of the results of practical reason. It has "weak insight" as opposed to theoretical reason.

DO NOT FALL INTO A HATRED OF REASON (MISOLOGY) (p. 139)

One will come to hate reason if one uses it to find happiness. We sometimes use it in a calculative way--a utilitarian way--always looking to the advantages we can gain rather than establishing the basis of all true happiness--namely, a good will. Those who use reason for happiness in life end up envious of those who merely follow instinct. The latter always appear happier in comparison. So reason should not be used in a utilitarian way--except in technology--definitely not in ethics.

A GOOD WILL ACTS FOR THE SAKE OF DUTY ONLY (p. 139 bottom)

Since Kant has argued that utilitarian calculations based on self-interest and advantage do not produce intrinsic value, we should act from duty and for duty only. We should do our duty even if it has painful consequences.

The only moral use of reason is to discipline the will to produce a good will. True happiness will come only in the afterlife. The good will, then, is a good in itself, not a means to other goods. In this life, virtue will be its own reward. Don't expect it to produce happiness. The good will will always suffer disappointments in this life.

The truly good will simply needs to be reminded of its duty ("cleared up"), rather than to be "taught" its duty. Sounds like Plato's recollection theory. There is a problem in explicitly teaching duty, because it might be said that doing your duty is to your advantage. The latter has no intrinsic moral worth.

For examples of right action, we must choose carefully, because we must not let self-interest lead us. One has a duty to maintain one's life. Suicide is forbidden by an eternal law that commands that a person's life is inviolable. A will that decides against life is always an evil will. The status of duty to one's own life is not clearly discerned if we just look at the normal life, because "the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth. . ." (p. 140 middle). But if your life has become hopeless and filled with despair, then your decision to persevere anyway reveals that you have decided from duty itself and not out of advantage.

KANT ON EUTHANASIA

Both passive and active euthanasia would be prohibited. Exceptions would the cases of Karen Ann Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan. During the last stages of their lives, they could no longer be called persons (viz., rational beings). Quinlan's brain had deteriorated to about one quarter its normal size, and oxygen loss had destroyed all of Cruzan's brain except for the brain stem. Later on in this work Kant states that irrational things have only "relative value as means." Although Kant was never faced with cases like these, a modern Kantian could say that these women were no longer persons with rights but simply things.

THE TRULY MORAL AND THE MERELY PRAISEWORTHY (p. 140, bottom)

"To be beneficent when we can is a duty." The case of the two philanthropists. One gives freely to others and gets much pleasure from her charity; the other, because she is depressed, loses all sympathy for others, but out of duty, she gives just as much as the first. Kant claims that we can be sure that only the second is acting from duty; we must suspect that the first is acting only in accordance with duty. In order to be a right action of moral worth, the beneficent action cannot stem from any self-serving inclination. It must be solely from duty. The pleasure the first gains, just like the pleasure most of us gain from preserving our lives, is a sign that the act may have been done from inclination, not from duty.

SUMMARY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES (p. 141)

First Ethical Principle: An act must be done from duty in order to have intrinsic worth.

Second: An act from duty derives its moral value, not from the results it produces, but from the principle by which it is determined. A positive result is not required (again like Stoicism). Only a good will which has follow a universal moral rule.

Third: Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. Inclination and respect are not the same. Only that which is the moral principle and discipline of my will, which many times overpower inclination, can be a proper object of respect. Only the universal moral law can engender true respect. "Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for the law" (p. 142).

This is how a good will is produced. Supreme and unconditional good is found only in a rational (good) will. Pleasure and happiness have no intrinsic value. Although the good will can enjoy these sentiments, there is no necessary connection between them as there is in Aristotle's rational eudaimonism. It is possible that both of these ends could come from an evil will.

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: FIRST FORMULATION (CI₁) (p. 142)

"I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."

Three criteria for CI₁:

1. Your maxim (i.e., a rule for action) must be universalizable.

2. The will cannot contradict itself or come into disharmony with itself in carrying out #1. Disharmony of the will is not a conflict of feelings nor is it a feeling of conflict with external laws. (All external laws must be tested by the CI.) It is a rational disharmony of the will that can be tested in the same way as we saw Aquinas use of the law of contradiction.

3. There can be no appeal to consequences, circumstances, self-interest, or inclination.

For example, think for a moment about not keeping a promise. No rational being would ever affirm not keeping promises as a universal law. Implied philosophical argument: If one made the moral imperative, "Thou shalt not keep thy promises," one immediately sees a contradiction and absurdity. Recall Aquinas' argument: some of the 10 Commandments are proved by the law of contradiction. Placing a "not" in the predicates leads to an immediate absurdity. Alternatively, universal moral laws are self-evidently true; they constitute analytic, necessary propositions.

Do I keep my promises just because it is prudent for me to do so-- i.e., to my advantage--or do I do it because it is always right? Kant argues that only the latter action has moral worth. For example, even though one certainly can and does lie on occasion, I simply can't will lying as a universal act. It would be absurd to do so. And the fact that I do lie on occasion in no way invalidates the categorical imperative that we ought not to.

To sum up: lying is not wrong because it makes us feel bad; lying is not wrong because some external authority tells you so; lying is not wrong because of its consequences; rather, lying is wrong because one cannot will lying as a universal law of human action. "Thou shalt lie categorically" is a self-contradictory and absurd statement. In short, it causes disharmony in the rational will.

SECOND FORM OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (CI₂) (p. 149-50)

Treat all persons as ends in themselves and never as merely means to ends. Examples to think about: prostitution, Baby Fae case, Baby M case and surrogate mothers.

Historical Note: Persons defined as rational beings (substances) goes back to the Christian philosopher Boethius (6th Century C.E.), who drew it from Aristotle. Persons are then the most valuable things in the cosmos. They are the moral agents of the universe. They are both responsible for their actions and are bearers of both rights and duties.

A problem with this formulation is that children would not be persons. It is necessary to make a further distinction between a "beginning" person, who would have basic rights but no duties, and an actual person who would have both a full complement of rights and duties. One would not be an actual person until the age of majority. See the Roland Puccetti article and review Gier's chapter on abortion.

CRITICISMS OF KANT'S HUMANISM

Persons are the ground for absolute worth, all other values are contingent upon the unconditional value of persons. Animal rights and environmental activists see dire consequences for such a human-centered view of the world. Animal rights activists are shocked by Kant's view that it is wrong to beat your neighbor's dog, not because it suffers pain, but soley because it makes your neighbor feel bad. Trees would have even less status in Kant's view: all non-persons are mere instruments for the will of persons.

Some conservative Christians reject Kant's humanism for very different reasons. For them the ground of absolute worth is God. Because of original sin, the image of God in humans--that which makes them persons--is "tarnished," "blemished," or totally removed as Luther believed. Humans, then, have no intrinsic value like Kant believes. Harold Brown of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School: "Only God has rights. We have duties." Another evangelical theologian Carl Henry agrees, citing Jewish legal studies which show that the Hebrew scriptures did not recognize inalienable natural rights. Recall the ancient psychology that viewed the center of the human self as God, a divine spirit or breath in us. "Not I, but Christ in me"; "Not I, but the Buddha essence in me." Both of these are theocentric (God-centered) views of human nature and rights.

This biblical view goes against our tradition of "classical liberalism" that all human beings have inalienable (cannot be taken away) rights. Kant and our Founding Fathers are the first great classical liberals. (For different reasons the utilitarians join the Hebrews in rejecting this idea of "natural" rights.) The classical liberals were inspired by the Stoic view of the natural nobility and equality of all human persons.

Here is the main difference between Kant and the Stoics: Kant has accepted the mechanical world-view of classical science and assumed atomism for autonomous, self-legislating individuals. The Stoics and other ancients held an organic view of the world and human society. We have seen that this view tends to undermine the view of autonomy, especially the strong view of classical liberalism.

CONNECTION BETWEEN CI₁ AND CI₂

First formulation of the Categorical Imperative is consistent with and mutually supports the second formulation. We have to assume that the others for which we calculate CI₁ are rational entities just like ourselves. Then it is clear that the CI will never allow me to use another person merely as means but only as an end itself.

If CI₁ focuses on individual ethics, CI₂ focuses on social ethics. CI₃, the next topic, is the political form of the CI.

THE THIRD FORM OF THE CI: THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (p. 151)

Before presenting CI₃, Kant reminds us (p. 150 bottom) that the CI is not derived from experience, i.e., empirically (as Hume would says), but from pure reason itself.

CI₃ is derived from first two forms of CI as "the idea of every rational being as a universally legislative will. . . Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)" (p. 151).

The kingdom of ends is a morally abstract domain ("only an ideal"), in which only rational beings are members. Only beings who can give themselves and live by universal moral law can be part of this purely moral kingdom. It is a political union in which any person could be sovereign, because any person would make the exact same laws that any other person would make. Therefore, there would be a complete harmony of wills, of ruler and ruled, which of course does not exist in present society. The kingdom of ends is an ethical ideal in which CI₁ and CI₂ would be perfectly practiced. Any moral legislation should use the kingdom of ends as the ideal model.

As an exercise, compare and contrast Kant's kingdom of ends with Plato's Republic and the Christian Kingdom of God.

"In the kingdom of ends, everything has either a value or dignity. Whatever has value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, whatever is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity"(p. 152) Only persons have dignity; non-personal things may be bartered, but persons cannot. The kingdom of ends is Kant's utopia; it is an internalization and "rationalization" of the Christian kingdom of God. There will be a complete harmony of rational wills, each choosing exactly the same moral laws. Each rational person then could be an absolute sovereign and we could trust him or her implicitly.

KANT'S FINAL ANSWER TO HUME (not in your text)

The foundations of morality must be fully a priori (based in reason, not experience); otherwise moral imperatives will lose their force. Moral relativism even moral anarchism, will be the result. Contrary to Hume, we need a metaphysics of morals; i.e., a theory of reality which assumes the existence of universal moral laws and a rational will which is the agent obligated by duty to fulfill those laws. Contra-Hume: "every empirical element. . . is highly prejudicial to the purity of morals." We don't want an ethics which is "a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it."

Note: What is ironic here is that Kant quoted favorably Hume's famous statement about racism. Was Kant's moral vision as pure as he thought? Was it free from all cultural and empirical prejudice? Kant's sexism was only milder than Aristotle's by a small degree. Do all of our "giants" have clay feet?

KANT'S VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT

Moral rationalism and the theory of retribution go hand in hand. This is not a theory of retribution that views God as an arbitrary judge punishing sinners. Rather it is a strictly philosophical view based on certain implications the ideas of free will and moral responsibility. The theory of retribution is oriented to a criminal act in the past for which persons must take full responsibility, primarily because they freely chose to do what they did. Kant feels so strongly in rational autonomy that he believes that rational agents, having somehow committed a crime, will voluntarily offer themselves up for punishment. Reason would demand that justice be done, and criminals should know that as well as any other member of society. In short, criminals get what they deserve; or more accurately for Kant: prison is what they should, as rational beings, will for themselves.

As Kant states: "If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself" (The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 101). The judicial implication of this is that robbers should lose their possessions and that murderers should lose their lives.

See the story "The Devil's Due" (Ethics Bluebook) for the contrast between Kantian retributivism and utilitarian views. Utilitarians believe that criminal remedies ought to be future oriented, not to the past act committed, but the future rehabilitation of the criminal for the greatest good for the greatest number in society. For them persons are simply ciphers in the utilitarian calculation, a point that is taken an absurd conclusion in "The Devil's Due."

A CRITIQUE OF KANT (Jones reading on reserve)

We act from duty because of habit and custom; i.e., we are used to getting rewards from doing it and reprimands for not doing it. Simple approval and disapproval. We get more approval for thinking of others first. That's why benevolence is a universal virtue of the highest rank.

Hume has already anticipated Kant and had offered an alternative to Kant's view: Hume agreed that a good will is a unique object of moral value; but its goodness lies in its benevolence, not its dutifulness. We do indeed act from duty, for this is because we see that doing so is to the benefit of others. This is Hume's proto-utilitarianism, because Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill will also say that the CI really based on utility.

The Categorical Imperative on truth telling is simply circular reasoning if there is no external standard. Kant would say that truth telling is a self-evident ethical principle, but the critics simply say this is the fallacy of circular reasoning of the form: "The virtue of truth telling is that it is always virtuous to tell the truth."

Once again we find ourselves back to Socrates' dialogue with Euthyphro: He wants to say that piety is a virtue because some external standard--the desire or will of the gods. But Socrates gives Kant's answer: piety is a virtue because its value is intrinsic (not extrinsic; i.e., doesn't depend on external standard or other values). Socrates is really saying no more than Kant is: piety is valuable because it is pious; or, in general, virtues are valuable because they are virtuous.

Question: Why do we stop at a red traffic light? By analogy from Kantian ethics, the answer should be "Because it is red." (Jones' analogy.) Just because it's red? That sounds absurd. The real reason must be a utilitarian one: "violations of red traffic signals are dangerous to life and limb, or alternatively will result in a traffic ticket." The CI dissolves into a "hypothetical" imperative. "If I don't stop on red, then this bad consequence will happen." The CI is merely a useful tool; it is merely prudential.

Kant contends, like Aquinas, that negating the predicate of a moral imperative will always result in a logical contradiction. But there is, according to Jones, nothing self-contradictory about a prospective suicide's willingness to will that all people commit suicide. It may be irrational in normal circumstances, but rational in extreme situations like facing radiation sickness after a nuclear holocaust. The CI becomes hypothetical, prudential, and utilitarian. The greatest utility of the CI: we shouldn't count our own ego any differently than other egos. But this Hume had already taught us with his emphasis on benevolence and suppressing self-interest.

Jones is much more sympathetic to the second formulation of the CI: always treat persons as ends, never merely as means. Jones agrees with classical liberalism in its essence: the reason we act morally to others is that we consider them to be beings of dignity and intrinsic value with inalienable rights. Bentham will even disagree here. Persons have no intrinsic worth; their value resides in their utility to themselves and to others.

Jones continues to defend Kant's second formulation. We act not out of duty or recognition of universal moral laws but out of respect for persons, so there is no right to assault, kill or rob them because of their status as persons. But there are situations in which even these can be overridden or suspended, e.g., killing in self-defense.

There is also a problem with the freedom of the will. It actually starts with Plato's ideal human, whose "aim is not to choose the right but to become the sort of person who cannot choose the wrong and who no longer has any choice in the matter. This is what he sometimes expresses as becoming like a god, for the gods, as he puts it in the Euthyphro (10d), love the right because it is right; they cannot do otherwise and no longer have any choice at all...." (G. M. A. Grube, trans. of Euthyphro). This is same critique that medieval voluntarists made of Aquains' moral rationalism.

Furthermore, "freedom. . . is the ability to be governed by reason." The moral will lives by the dictates of reason. This does not sound like freedom at all. If the will is truly free, it must be free from reason as well. Kant has eliminated the dictator God of the Divine Command Morality but simply replaced it with the dictator called reason. As one commentator phrases it: "A free will and a will subject to moral law are one and the same."