David Hume
(1711-1776)
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Theory of knowledge:
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Theory of knowledge must be prior.
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We
must suspend knowledge claims:
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that
material atoms exist.
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that
one thing actually causes another.
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that
a substantial soul or mind exists.
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that
God exists. Agnostic not atheist.
Hume & Buddha
compared
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Internal experience also.
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“Experientialism” rather than empiricism
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Both
are doggedly consistent empiricists.
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Theory of knowledge first,
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Both
rejected the concept of.
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Both
have a bundle theory of the self.
Buddha vs.
Hume
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Buddha: one can perceive.
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There is no tabula rasa (John Locke),
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Fact
and value fused: “They who know causation know the Dharma.”
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Hume
separated the “Is” from the “Ought.”
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Buddhists have ESP;
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Hume
would reject.
Are moral
propositions analytic?
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“The
sun always sets in the West.”
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“Helping the injured is always good.”
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Aquinas: the first is.
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“Helping the injured is NOT always good.”
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Hume: this is not necessarily absurd.
The real
difference between moral and synthetic propositions
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Synthetic propositions:
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Moral propositions: A moral sentiment of approval or disapproval.
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Analytic propositions are limited to logic
Moral
rationalism vs. moral voluntarism
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Moral rationalism:
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Examples:
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Moral voluntarism:
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Confucius, Buddha, and Hume
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Not
all moral voluntarists are ethical subjectivists.
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Not
all ethical objectivists are moral rationalists. Exception:
An argument
for voluntarism
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“The
passions make us equal.”--G. E. Lessing
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Does
reason make us equal?
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Collective rational knowledge through the generations.
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Similar knowledge of “things of the heart”?
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Great literature and romance novels.
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Gender difference here?
A critique of
moral rationalism
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If
morality is derived from reason, then
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If
women live more in their passions than men,
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Reductio ad absurdum?
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Undermines the freedom of the will?
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What
reason dictates is what the will must do? The demons in the New Testament.
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Immanuel Kant: “freedom . . . is the ability to be governed by reason.”
What is a
moral sentiment?
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disinterested, as opposed to most self-interested feelings;
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deals with character and motive;
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learned through years of moral education;
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other emotions do not necessarily deal with character and motive and are not
learned.
The proper
role of reason
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"Reason judges either of matters of fact or of relations.”
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The
example of not repaying a debt.
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The
abortion issue is a factual problem, not a moral problem.
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Does
a jury judge matters of morals or matters of fact?
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What
does the classical murder mystery do?
Is reason
really impotent?
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"Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is
utterly impotent in this regard."
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In
determining matters of fact and relations among facts, reason can
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tell
us
•
figure out
Remember: reason
is only the mediate not immediate cause of our actions.
Benevolence &
Justice
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For
Hume benevolence is
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It
receives the.
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It
produces the greatest.
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Other virtues may produce envy, etc.
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Justice is not as high a virtue. Why?
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Because it can be suspended more often than benevolence. Utopias and great
crises.
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Benevolence and “gang of ruffians.”
Hume’s
utilitarianism
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"Vicious actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden [by God's command],
but forbidden because they are hurtful."
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Divine ethical subjectivism vs. humanistic ethical subjectivism.
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Benjamin Rush:
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“Good” being defined as pleasure; “evil” is pain.
The “Is” vs.
the “Ought”
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The
fusion of fact, value, and the aesthetic in Plato and Aquinas.
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Plato’s high forms:
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Aquinas: the highest reality (=God)
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Greek atomism:
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Hume: No moral rationalist has "been able to advance a single step in [logical]
demonstrations."
Functional
concepts
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If I
want to go to
Boise,
then I will not drive north, east, or west (at least all the way).
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If I
want to go to
New Delhi,
I do not buy a ticket to Calcutta.
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If I
want to live, I ought to eat food.
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If I
want to have a good life, then I ought to avoid the vices.
“Is” implies
“Ought”
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In
teleological systems ends are internal (not external) to means.
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The
previous examples:
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Lisa
Bellantoni: "Functional concepts allow us to factually evaluate objects as good
according to how well such objects work."
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Therefore, contrary to Hume, it is not always wrong to
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Ethical naturalism is defended.
The oak tree
“parricide”
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An
oak tree sapling grows up and shades out its “father” that later dies.
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Facts and relationship of facts analogous to a son murdering his father.
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If
morals are rational conclusions from facts, then the sapling is just as guilty.
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Is
not the son’s conscious desire to kill a morally relevant fact?
Are moral
sentiments “secondary” qualities?
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If a
tree falls in the forest and there are no perceivers present, is there any
sound?
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Hume: vice and virtue are secondary qualities, the same as sounds, color,
smells, flavors, texture, heat and cold.
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Not
qualities in objects (Plato’s Good or God), but
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Hume’s pride: this is a major discovery of moral "science."
A critique of
Hume
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Confucius: false dichotomy of reason and the passions.
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Does
Hume derive an “ought” from
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Do
not values grow out of basic psychological facts of our lives?
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Is
there not a continuity between basic likes and dislikes and then develop into
virtues and vices?
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The
Buddha: “What one feels, one perceives; what one perceives one reasons about. .
. .”
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Hume’s condemnation of “monkish” virtue is biased and culture bound.
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Just
as his racism based on empirical differences.
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Hume
says that morality is just like beauty. The beauty of a circle is not a
rational property but comes from our sentiment.