THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274)

Just as Augustine was influenced by Plato, so was Aquinas influenced by Aristotle.

FAITH                                              vs.                                              REASON

Revealed Theology                                                            Natural or Philosophical Theology

Incarnation*                                                                         existence of God

Trinity                                                                                   attributes of God

Creation out of nothing                                                         immortality of the soul

Beatific Vision of God (seeing God face to face)                 prove the highest good

Certainty of individual redemption                                        prove the basic laws of morality

*"A great mystery unintelligible to pride"--Augustine

Aquinas, in contrast to Augustine, is a Christian humanist. With Augustine's divine illumination theory, all truths are revealed truths; whereas for Aquinas humans can arrive at most truths on their own power their the use of natural reason. But both agree that if reason and faith conflict, faith is always superior. Aquinas stops being a humanist right at this point. 

THEOLOGICAL EUDAIMONISM: A CRITIQUE

A central doctrine of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity is the promise of an eternal life of bliss for the righteous. In philosophical terms, such a view has been called "theological eudaimonism," which means that humankind's highest good is eternal happiness made possible and fulfilled by God's power. This view is sometimes contrasted with the humanist view of "rational eudaimonism," a belief that autonomous humans are responsible for and capable of producing their own happiness here on earth. Good examples of the latter are Plato and Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas is the good example of a theological eudaimonist.

The standard argument for rational eudaimonism is that human beings, in contrast to other animals that simply seek to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, have unique faculties--reason and moral will--which definitely make them more than just pleasure-seeking animals. The fact that most humans do indeed seek pleasure (psychological hedonism) does not mean that they ought to seek it as their highest good (ethical hedonism).

The theological eudaimonist also agrees with the proposition that human beings have a "special endowment," so special in fact that the highest human desires cannot be fulfilled in this earthly life. The argument can be best formulated analogically: humans desire peace, some peace is attained; humans search for justice, and injustice decreases; humans seek knowledge, and knowledge expands; human beings want eternal happiness, therefore this too must be fulfilled.

There appear to be ways in which all natural appetites are fulfilled in some fashion. The theological eudaimonist in William Halverson's A Concise Introduction to Philosophy phrases the ultimate implications of this premise: "Consequently, it is inconceivable to me that nature should have endowed us with a set of appetites if there were no ways for them to be satisfied. If our hunger for eternity-the deepest hunger of all--should turn out to be the one hunger for which there is no satisfaction, it would be a cruel trick."

Aquinas phrases the argument in more specific Aristotelian terms: "An act leading to an end must be proportionate to the end. . . . Eternal life, however, is an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature. . . And therefore the human person, through those things that are natural to him, cannot produce meritorious works that are proportionate to eternal life, but to attain to this, he needs a higher power, which is the power of grace" (Summa Theologica I-II 109.5, Jean Porter trans.).   Aquinas begins with Aristotle's telelogy, but ends up rejecting his humanism.

An analogical argument can be formulated using the premise above.   Humans desire peace and some peace is attained; humans wish for justice and some justice is achieved; humans want knowledge and some knowledge is obtained; and human desire eternal life, and . . . .  There might be a number of serious problems with this argument, and we will go over them in class.

THEOLOGICAL AGAPEISM

Quite apart from the difficulty of proving eternal life is the question whether this is indeed the correct highest good for Christians. Could the theological eudaimonists be confusing the goal with the reward? Another reading of the New Testament, especially the very words of Jesus, offers another highest good: agap‘, which means self-sacrificial love. (Other Greek ideas of love: eros: physical love; philia: brotherly love [philos + sophia = wisdom: philosophy as the brotherly love of wisdom].) We must be self-sacrificing and Christ-like, even if it does not lead to eternal life. This is the message of the Protestant Reformation (Luther and Calvin): we are not saved by deeds but by grace. Theological eudaimonism could easily degenerate into a barter system of religion and ethics: "OK God, I'll be good, if you grant be eternal life." Nothing could be farther from the ethics of Jesus, who condemned the Pharisees for this type of morality.

Rational Agapeism: reason requires that under certain conditions one ought to sacrifice one’s life.

Michael Scriven: if it is one-on-one, then one counts the value of the person. If there are more than two people, all persons then count as equal.

If Martha can save the lives of two people only by sacrificing her life, then she is morally required to.

Selfish society subjected to a series of natural catastrophes

Three soldiers from this society in a fox hole

All three dead from a grenade

Altruistic society subjected to the same calamities.

Three soldiers from this society in a fox hole

Only one dead from the grenade

A two person advantage

THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

In addition to the virtues listed by Plato and Aristotle, Christian theologians add three "theological" virtues: faith, hope and charity (and the last, says Paul, is highest of the three). Greek virtues become vices if there is no love of God and no seeking of faith, hope and charity. These virtues are gifts of God not human achievements. Sinful people, under their own power, will never succeed in the classical Greek virtues. Indeed, they may turn into vices instead. The theological virtues prepare us for the "unseen" (the future), not the "seen." (See Hebrews 11.) The focus of Christian ethics is different from the Greeks: one must obey and love God, for all things, including happiness come from him. Without God, all virtues become selfish acts; pride is the source of moral evil. In contrast to Greek ethics, pride is a vice and humility has taken its place as an important virtue.

THE CREATOR GOD: DIRECTOR OF ALL THINGS

God bestows reality on all things by his will, as opposed to the Greek view that things have their own reality. The Christian God decides to create the world, whereas the Greek gods are not creators. The world has no natural necessity; it is not coeternal with God as it is in Aristotle. In the same way that we are masters over the things under our will, so is God the Lord of all under his will. Does this means that Aquinas supports complete divine determinism? If God has perfect dominion and nothing escapes his will, does that mean that free will is impossible? Aquinas wants to argue both ways: first: "Everything produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent;" and second: "But each thing attains its end by its action, which needs to be directed by Him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act." It is never clear if Aquinas ever reconciles divine determinism with an agent's free action.

Human beings are created in God's image, which means that we share intelligence and conscience with God. Aristotle's rational soul, which is a natural development is made into a special creation by God "upon man's completion of being." Aquinas seems to want a combination of divine direction and self-direction. If our self-direction is good, then we are granted the highest good: eternal life.

HIGHEST GOOD IS CONTEMPLATION OF TRUTH (=GOD)

Every agent aims at an end (chap. II). This teleological analysis of nature is derived from Aristotle. Every rational agent seeks the good; indeed, all action seeks perfection. Action of a sculptor or a writer or a philosopher--intention is to make the product as perfect as possible. Every action is an actualization of a certain potentiality. This is straight-forward Aristotle.

Rational souls (intellectual agents) determine their own ends. They are self-determining. Natural agents (i.e., agents without reason, such as animals and plants) do not determine their own ends. They have no rational wills. Their ends are willed by another. A rational soul does not determine itself "except under the aspect of good." The supreme good is God, so the end of all rational souls is to seek God (chap. XVII).

AQUINAS' CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was initially correct that all human theoretical occupations seek "contemplation of truth" as their end. Ultimate human happiness consists in wisdom, based in contemplating divine things. Aristotle called this "first philosophy" or "theology." But in Aquinas we have a specially providential God who knows and relates himself to the world. In Aristotle we have a God totally absorbed in his own perfect contemplation. Aristotle's God is not related to the world and cannot be providential towards it. Furthermore, Aristotle did not realize the depths and effects of human sin, so he was wrong to think that humans could reach happiness by their own efforts.

"General" vs. "Special" Providence: Aristotle and Epicurus argued that there was no providence or plan of God. Aristotle said that God had no direct relationship with the world, and Epicurus said that what the gods do is not related to what we do. Plato and the Stoics believed in general providence, or the idea that God cares for and guides all beings in the world, but with no favorites or preferential treatment.

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, all fall into the category of special providence, in which God does miracles and will save only those who consciously turn to him. For most Christian theologians, moral laws come under general providence. No special revelation is necessary to understand the difference between good and evil.

GOD AS GIVER OF MORAL LAW

Moral law stems from God's Supreme Reason, like a ruler who governs a perfect community. God's law is not subject to time, so it is atemporal, eternal. It is not subject to "space," either, so it would not need to be "practiced." Can God's reason be practical as well as theoretical? Aristotle would have said "No," but Aquinas says "Yes." Aristotle's God does not relate to the world in any way (no providence), but Aquinas' Christian God relates to the world in all ways.

The moral law can relate to a person in two ways: Active: "as in him that rules and measures" (internal agent). Passive: "as in that which is ruled and measured" (external agent). All things partake in God's eternal law, with presumably only God taking the supreme active part.

"The rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, by being provident for itself and for others." Only rational creatures have ethics and social philosophy.

By the light of natural reason, we can discern good and evil. No special revelation is necessary for ethics. Even pagans have consciences and can tell right from wrong. (See Ro. 2:14-15.) Is this the reason that moral codes like the 10 Commandments are not unique to the Judeo-Christian religion? Presumably, yes. Natural moral law is based on and is verified by natural inclinations in the human soul.

A LOGICAL PROOF OF ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM

Aquinas derives moral laws by logical analysis, and if he is correct he has proved ethical objectivism. The following are examples of certain self-evident truths:

"Humans are rational beings" (?) "analytic"

"The will is free" (?) propositions

"All circles are round" "self-evident"

"Murder is always wrong" (?)

Note: (?) means that one doubts Aquinas' claim here.

"Gold is found in Siberia" is an example of a "synthetic" proposition

The point is that the predicates ("are rational beings," "is free," "are round") can be found, by analysis, in the subject. In other words, the definition of humans is "rational beings," the definition of will is "free," and the definition of circle is "a round thing." However, the definition of gold is not "something found in Siberia." One cannot demonstrate or prove "analytic" propositions; one accepts them as self-evident or true by definition.

The Law of Contradiction (never "A" and "non-A" in the same time, place and manner") is an analytic, self-evident truth. You cannot demonstrate it, you just assume it. In other words, a chair ("A") and a podium ("non-A") cannot be in the same time, place and manner.

Good is the end of practical reason so the first Law of Morality is that a rational creature should pursue good and avoid evil. All ethical precepts are based on this. For example, "Thou shalt not kill!" If one negates the "not" in the predicate, one gets an immediate absurdity, "Thou shalt kill!" Thus the 6th Commandment is proved by the Law of Contradiction.

Summary of Argument: Aquinas is relating three areas of philosophy: logic, metaphysics (theory of reality), and ethics.

Logic and Formal Reason: Never A and non-A in the same time, place and manner.

Metaphysics and Speculative Reason: Being and non-Being always exclude one another. The law of noncontradiction operating at the level of reality.

Ethics and Practical Reason: The Good (Being) and evil (non-being) always exclude one another. The law of contradiction working at the ethical level.

Thomas Aquinas is generally considered a solid supporter of natural law theory and the rule ethics that this view implies.  Indeed, Aquinas' logical proof for the first law of morality is, even with its problems, a veritable tour de force.  Aquinas' argument is brilliant and elegant, but many of our moral intuitions undermine the necessity of this law.  Interestingly enough, one does not have to leave the Roman Church to find counter arguments.  It is a supreme irony that the Doctrine of Double Effect, profoundly influenced by Thomistic intentionism, sanctioned what Aquinas never would have permitted--namely, to proceed, under certain conditions, with good intentions even though one was aware of evil consequences.  In other words, pursuing good does not always exclude evil.

Aquinas undermines any form of moral absolutism by allowing the virtues to complement moral law.  Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that most of the passions are already directed toward the good; they simply need to be disciplined and finally perfected by grace--an obvious break with Aristotle.  Aquinas and the Buddha, however, were more aware of the dangers of disordered desires--lust for Aquinas in particular and craving for views for the Buddha. More significantly, Aquinas acknowledged the role of prudentia in concrete appropriation: "persons are in different conditions with respect to their passions.  And, therefore, it is necessary that the rightness of reason in the passions be established with respect to us, who are moved with the passions." Here we can hear the echo of Aristotle's definition of a moral virtue: "Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by phronesis. . . ."

This means that Aquinas' moral laws are only formal truths, abstract ideals whose content can only be supplied by individuals acting out of their own passions and in their own situations.  Jean Porter gives Thomistic ethics a contextual pragmatic reading: the virtues will have an open-ended quality that "will give them sufficient flexibility to be applied to persons in different conditions." Thomistic mindfulness, described by Josef Pieper as "the ability of the psyche to listen in silent attention to the language of reality," is especially important for the affective virtues that are self-referential.  Justice, for example, involves not only self-knowledge but knowing the interests of many parties.  Fortitude, "holding to one's true good in the face of danger or death," is uniquely self-referential.  Porter's analysis allows a stronger conclusion: the virtues do not merely complement moral rules; rather, they provide otherwise empty rules with particular moral content.  In short, they provide personal meaning and empower the proper appropriation of general moral laws.

CONSCIENCE MAY GO WRONG

Reason is not always to be trusted; conscience, as the moral dictate of reason, may err. "If erring reason tells a man that he should go to another wife, the will that abides by that reason is evil, since this error arises from ignorance of the divine law, which he is bound to know." If he mistakes another woman for his wife, then he is excused, because it is an involuntary a due to antecedent ignorance. See the Swiss film The Return of Martin Guere for an intriguing story on this point.

Because of original sin, reason is easily confused. That is why divine revelation is so important, because it guides reason. For Christian theologians this was the primary failure of Greek philosophy.

Aquinas is dead set against consequentialism, which says that the goodness of any action resides in the consequences of the action rather than the intention behind it. If a person foresees evil consequences, then he or she must desist. This is Aquinas' view, but Catholic Church and its canon law, although initially inspired by Aquinas' strong emphasis on intentions, went much further with its doctrine of double effect. There is a three page handout on this doctrine, but in effect it holds that even if one is aware of an evil consequence (the second effect), it is still morally OK, if certain conditions are met, to go with the first "effect": the original good intention.

THE FOUR CRITERIA OF THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT (DDE)

1. The action in itself must be good.

Fourth criterion added in 19th Century. Any problems with it?

APPLICATIONS OF THE DDE

This is how the doctrine operates with regard to therapeutic abortions:

1. One may use medication to save pregnant mother's life, even if it is known to produce miscarriages. The intention is good, even though evil consequences might follow.

2. One may remove the cancerous womb of a pregnant woman because of same reason.

3. One may draw off amniotic fluid if the intention is to save the mother's life.

4. If the fertilized egg implants itself outside the uterus (an "ectopic" pregnancy), then it can be removed surgically. Check this website for more on ectopic pregnancies.

Another example of allowable action under DDE: A doctor may prescribe pain-killing drugs to terminally ill people even though the drugs may hasten their death.

Think about how to use the doctrine in the following examples:

1. What about bombing military targets in civilian areas?

2. What about a medivac crew picking up the wounded in Vietnam?

3. What about political or religious martyrs?

The philosophy of "intentionism" rather than consequentialism is reflected in current definitions of murder, for example: "involuntary manslaughter" vs. "voluntary manslaughter" (2nd degree murder) vs. "premeditated murder" (lst degree).