The Epistemology of Monstrosity

I.                   The Problem Space

A.                 ‘Monster’ can do damage.

1.                 We employ the concept MONSTER in our daily lives, and we often do so with a view to marginalizing the thing we target.

a.                  “Bin Laden: a Known Monster Before 9/11” – headline from The Nation, 9-11-02.

b.                  “George Bush: World Class Monster”, VOX NYC.

2.                   This is done to incite, inflame, and mobilize.  ‘Monster’ is not a pretty word, or a polite word—it is used as a weapon to draw those who think like you close and repel those who do not think like you.  It is truly a fighting word.

3.                   Thus, the concept and its associated words are significant and, as such, should not be used lightly. 

B.                But this points to a problem: if we are to take care with this concept, surely we should know when it is appropriately applied and when it isn’t.  But is this really something that we can know?  And if so, under what conditions is it appropriate to apply the word?

C.                The Question: How do we know when we should use the term ‘monster’?

II.        ‘Epistemology’ Defined

A.                 We begin our consideration of this question by focusing on epistemology, which is the systematic study of knowledge.

B.                 What is knowledge?

1.                   Typically, if you know something, then you are committed to it—you are willing to affirm it with great confidence.  (This is what allows us to contrast it with opinion, or with belief.)

2.                   Further, you should have evidence that this thing to which you are committed is true.  Without evidence, you might get lucky and commit to a true thing, but luck and knowledge seem incompatible with one another.

3.                   Finally, it would appear that the thing you know must be true—it makes no sense to talk about “false knowledge.”

C.        If we are interested in the epistemology of X, then we are interested in what counts as knowledge about X.  This gives rise to a number of more specific concerns:

1.                  Under what conditions can someone be said to know about X?

2.                  What counts as evidence about X?

3.                  Is X the kind of thing that can be true absolutely?  Or is it only relatively true?

III.       What Do We Know about Monsters?

A.                To say that we are after an epistemology of monstrosity is to say that we are out to explain what is involved in knowing about monsters.  Put another way, an epistemology of monstrosity is a theoretical model of just what we know when we know about monsters.  To this end, we should begin by asking what is we know when we know N is a monster.

B.                 Given what we said above, knowing N is a monster is equivalent to:

1.                  Being committed to the claim that N is a monster.

2.                  Having evidence that N is a monster.

3.                  N is in fact a monster.

C.                But each of these conditions is problematic, and the epistemology of monstrosity involves work aimed at solving these problems.  Let’s take each of them in turn.

D.                Condition 1:  Defining terms…

1.                   What does the term ‘monster’ mean, exactly?  Surely unless we have a clue about this, we can’t hope to gain any ground here.

2.                   When you seek to define a term, you are out to determine all and only those conditions under which it is acceptable to apply it to things.  These are known as “necessary and sufficient conditions”. 

a.                   A necessary condition is one that must be satisfied in order for the term in question to be applicable.

b.                  A sufficient condition is one that, if satisfied, establishes the applicability of the term.

c.                   A definition is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. If you know the definition of a term, then you are able to apply it to all and only those things that are instances of the term, and this establishes that you understand the concept associated with the term.

3.         In the case of ‘monster’, a definition should tell us what is required to be a monster, and the full list of these requirements should (if we’re lucky) suffice for monstrosity. Ideas?  (Note that you can have an objective definition that includes subjective elements.)

E.                 Condition 2:  What counts as evidence?

1.                  Given our definition, what counts as evidence for the presence of monstrosity?

2.                  Questions about evidence:

a.                  Is this evidence empirical?  Is it conceptual?

b.                  If two people disagree about the evidence, is it the case that at most one of them can be correct?

c.                  Can something that is evidence at one time fail to be evidence at another time?

F.                Condition 3:  What is truth anyway?

1.                   In some cases, claims are true absolutely: “Squares have four sides.” In other cases, though, it isn’t so clear: “Kandinsky is a better artist than Klee.”

2.                   What is the situation with monstrosity?  If I say that someone is a monster, can this be true?

a.         Yes. 

i.                     Absolutely: if true, then it is true always and everywhere for everyone.  (In this case, it is difficult to be correct about monsters, but the benefit of being correct is significant.)

ii.                   Relatively: if true, then it is true relative to some particular perspective.  E.g., “true for me” or “true for US citizens”.  (Here it might be easy to be correct about monsters, but the benefit of being correct is paltry.)

b.         No. 

i.                     False: it cannot be true because there are no monsters.

ii.                   Incoherent: it cannot be true because there is no sustainable analysis of the concept MONSTER.

IV.       Related Issues

            A.        Monstrosity and Evil

            B.         Monstrosity and Heroism