STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC by J. M. E. McTaggart
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC
1. The logical connection of categories
2. The form of this connection is progressively modified
3. The dialectic is a process of reconstruction
4. Which takes place by alternate production and removal of contradictions
5. An objection to this raised by Hartmann
6. In what sense the dialectic may be said to be objective
7. The imperfection of finite things does not involve, for Hegel, the objective
reality of the dialectic as a process
8. The dialectic does not violate the law of contradiction
9. The importance of the idea of negation is only secondary
10. The relation of the dialectic to ordinary thought
11. Hartmann's criticisms of this relation
12. The same continued
13. The dialectic must prove its validity to the understanding
14. The relation of the dialectic to experience
15. The relation of the dialectic to experience further defined
16. The basis upon which the dialectic works is the nature of experience
17. The postulate which it assumes is the validity of the category of Being
18. And the denial of this postulate is contradictory
19. The argument of the dialectic is transcendental
20. The epistemological result of the dialectic
21. The negative effects of this
22. Its positive effects
23. We are not entitled to consider pure thought as independent of experience
24. The relation of Hegel's epistemology to Kant's
25. The ontological result of the dialectic--ambiguity of the phrase
26. Hegel's deduction of Nature and Spirit from the Logic
27. This deduction does not treat pure thought as independent of experience
28. The importance of the ontological result of the dialectic
29. Comparison of Hegel with his immediate predecessors in philosophy
CHAPTER II: DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DIALECTIC
30. Introductory
A.
31. Trendelenburg's view that the dialectic is per se sterile, and gains its
advance by illegitimate appeals to experience
32. The errors involved in this view
33-43. Passages from the Encyclopaedia bearing on this view
44. The true relation of the dialectic to experience is not made clear by
Hegel
45. Reasons for this
46. Hegel's assertion that the dialectic is without presupposition
B.
47. The relation of the Absolute Idea to experience
48. The Absolute Idea transcends contingency, but not immediacy
49. Hegel's definition of the Absolute Idea
C.
50. Professor Seth's view as to the ontological claims of the dialectic
51. Hegel's description of the transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit
52. The interpretation placed on this by Professor Seth
53. Who confuses two charges--that Hegel tried to synthetically deduce Nature
and Spirit from thought, and that he tried to deduce Existence from Essence
54. But the first of these does not involve the second
55. Hegel would have been wrong in trying to do the first
56. But the arguments in support of the theory that he did try are untenable
57. And Hegel says himself that his deduction is of a different nature
58. There is a deduction, but it is not purely synthetic
59. The treatment of Contingency in the Logic as bearing on this question
60. The second charge--deducing Existence from Essence. We cannot do this
61. But if the deduction of Nature and Spirit is purely analytic, this second
charge must fall to the ground
62. The meaning of the phrase "absolute" as used by Hegel of his own
philosophy
63. Hegel's treatment of Kant's objections to the ontological argument
64. It depends on the different definitions of God adopted by Hegel and Kant
65. Professor Seth's assertion that Hegel depreciates the individual
66. And that his Absolute Spirit is a mere abstraction
CHAPTER III: THE VALIDITY OF THE DIALECTIC
67. Introductory
A.
68. Mr Balfour's criticism of transcendental arguments
69. Which rests on a confusion of the different senses in which we may be said
to be conscious of an element in experience
70. The same subject continued
71. The justification of the Reason to the Understanding. The longing for the
Absolute is not merely ethical or emotional
72. The Understanding demands a complete explanation of the universe
73. Which it cannot itself supply
74. Since many of its categories lead to contradictions
75. And this must lead to scepticism; not, as Hartmann suggests, to
separation between thought and being
76. The Reason can supply such an explanation
77. Which the Understanding must therefore accept
78. The Understanding and the Reason are not separate and unconnected
faculties
B.
79. We are justified in assuming the validity of the category of Being as a
starting-point
80. As to the process--first from a synthesis to the new thesis
81. The process from thesis to antithesis. Neither sterile nor empirical
82. The consideration of the categories in detail is impossible here
83. The process from thesis and antithesis to synthesis
84. Hartmann's objection to the possibility of this
85. Trendelenburg's objection that the dialectic is merely a history of
subjective knowledge
86. But, although it only retraces abstractions, it gives new knowledge
87. And reverses the order of explanation current in science
88. Nor is it merely a process of subjective thought
89. The dialectic does not displace the finite sciences, but does not depend on
them
90. Though an advanced state of the finite sciences may be an aid in
discovering the dialectic
91. The idea of Motion--according to Trendelenburg introduced empirically in
the category of Becoming
92. But in reality it is deducible by pure thought
93. Nor does Becoming specially involve time or space
94. Nor is it, if taken correctly, much more concrete than Being
C.
95. The ontological validity of the dialectic. The denial of the thing-in-itself
is justifiable
96. Mr Schiller's objection that thought may be inadequate to reality
97. Unjustifiable, since reality itself can only be known to us by thought
98. Transition from Logic to Nature and Spirit
99. Thought can never be self-subsistent, but must have a given datum
100. The transition might have been made differently. Importance of this
101. Lotze's criticism of "the identity of Thought and Being." Ambiguity of
this phrase
102. Lotze seems to take it as meaning that Being is identical with what is
thought about Being
103. In this sense Hegel did not hold the doctrine
104. He held it in the sense that Being is identical with what it thinks:
--perhaps he was mistaken
105. The essence of Idealism is the assertion that Being is rational, not that
it is Thought
CHAPTER IV: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD
106. Introductory
A.
107. Hegel's own expressions on this subject
108. As the process continues the categories become less stable and self-
contained
109. And the antithesis marks an advance from the thesis
110. This second change is connected with the first
111. The first is explicitly mentioned by Hegel. The second is not
112. The change seems to be continuous from category to category
113. Such a change in the method of the dialectic is antecedently probable
114. And it is antecedently probable that it will be continuous
115. The change consists in combining the search for completeness and the
search for harmony, which were originally separate stages
116. Hence the change does not destroy the validity of the process
117. The subordinate importance of negation in the dialectic is thus made
still clearer than before
B.
118. Hegel asserts that the dialectic process is an adequate analysis of the
Absolute Idea
119. But this we now see reasons to doubt
120. Hegel's own premises lead us, on this point, to reject his conclusion
121. The dialectic thus becomes, in a sense, subjective
122. Owing to an inevitable characteristic of our thought
123. It does not give a fully adequate account of its own nature
124. This does not diminish its power of demonstrating that the Absolute Idea
alone is completely valid of reality
125. Nor of determining the relative truth of the different categories
126. Nor are we left ignorant of the nature of the Absolute Idea
127. The essential and unessential elements in the process
128. The dialectic process may be looked on as primarily continuous. This is
confirmed by the inequality of the subdivisions of the Logic
129. And by the possibility of discovering direct dialectic connection between
divisions which are not the lowest
130. The effect of this with regard to any error in the detail of the dialectic
C.
131. The triad of Logic, Nature, and Spirit
132. This transition is made by a triad of the Notion-type
133. But it could be made by a triad of the Being-type
134. This confirms the view taken above of the change of method
135. The alternative adopted by Hegel was on the whole the best
136. But the other has some advantages
137. Which Hegel's does not share
138. The same continued
139. Conclusion
CHAPTER V: THE RELATION OF THE DIALECTIC TO TIME
A.
140. Difficulties in the way of taking the development of the dialectic in time
as ultimately real
141. Such a process in time must be finite in length
142. And the question would arise: Why did it begin where it did?
143. Which cannot be avoided by referring it to a timeless basis
144. Nor by the suggestion that time only begins when change begins
145. Nor by arguing that the idea of finite time cannot be contradictory, since
that of infinite time is impossible
146. We must rather suppose that the idea of time is not ultimate
147. The lower stages of the dialectic cannot exist by themselves, since they
are contradictory
148. And we saw above that the dialectic must be a process of reconstruction
149. Hegel's own language is against the theory of development in time
B.
150. But the rejection of this theory involves that the universe is now perfect
151. Which involves us again in serious difficulties
152. Hegel's answer that evil is a delusion is unsatisfactory
153. Since on his theory a delusion could never be completely rational
154. The suggestion that the universe is perfect sub specie aeternitatis
155. It is more effective than Hegel's own answer
156. And must not be confounded with the theory that imperfections of the
parts disappear in the whole
157. But it was not Hegel's own view--nor will it solve the difficulty
158. Which seems to be insoluble
159. And naturally so, since it is, in fact, the problem of the origin of evil
C.
160. Can any other theory extricate us from the difficulties which are
involved in the assertion that the universe is eternally perfect?
161. Not the theory that it is fundamentally irrational
162. An absolute dualism is impossible
163. And, if possible, would not solve the difficulty, supposing one side
predominated
164. Or supposing both were exactly balanced
165. We should succeed no better with the theory that reality is totally
indifferent to reason
166. Or indifferent to the higher categories
167. And to take refuge in scepticism proves equally impossible
168. Our difficulty does not arise from a reductio ad absurdum
169. And we have no more right to reject the dialectic than we have to reject
the arguments against it
170. We may hope for a synthesis of the opposed positions
171. Since they are opposed as contraries, not as contradictories
172. But we do not know of what nature such a synthesis could be, nor have we
any positive evidence for its existence
173. We should have such evidence if we knew that the detail of the dialectic
were correct throughout
174. Conclusion
175-178. Note on Mr Schiller's paper "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process"
CHAPTER VI: THE FINAL RESULT OF THE DIALECTIC
A.
179. Hegel makes the highest stage in the nature of Spirit to be Philosophy
180. His account of this
181. Philosophy must be considered to be merely a state of knowledge
182. Philosophy, as we have it at present, is clearly not adequate for this
position
183. And Hegel never attempted to deduce facts from the nature of pure
thought
184. Nor will it suffice to make philosophy end by proving the necessity of
philosophy
185. Taking a wider meaning of philosophy--we shall never be able to dispense
with immediate data
186. But a perfect system of knowledge is conceivable, in which contingency
vanishes
187. Such an ideal is remote, but not contradictory
188. It would leave no question unanswered, except Why is the universe as a
whole what it is?--which is an unmeaning question
B.
189. Even such knowledge, however, is not a complete expression of Spirit
190. For volition is not reducible to knowledge
191. Though both of them may perhaps be synthesised in a higher unity
192. Nor are pleasure and pain reducible to knowledge
193. Though, like volition, they are inseparable from it
194. But can knowledge, as such, be even part of the true nature of Spirit?
195. It postulates complete unity and differentiation between subject and
object
196. The This in knowledge
197. Which is essential to knowledge, and which knowledge must always regard
as alien
198. The This prevents knowledge reaching complete unity and differentiation
199. Thus knowledge can never express quite adequately the harmony of the
universe
200. Nor does the possibility of self-knowledge get over the difficulty
201. This defect is the reason why we cannot cease to ask, Why is the universe
as a whole what it is?--though we know the question to be unmeaning
202. We find some support for this view in the Logic
203. Since philosophy there comes under the subordinate category of Cognition
204. Hegel's treatment of the last stages of the Philosophy of Spirit is
imperfect
205. Philosophy should rather be part of the antithesis--not the synthesis
206. Conclusion
CHAPTER VII: THE APPLICATION OF THE DIALECTIC
207. Introductory
208. The application of the dialectic to determine the nature of ultimate
reality
209. The practical importance of this
210. The application of the dialectic to the interpretation of the facts round
us
211. This is the part of Hegel's system which is now most generally received
212. But it seems doubtful if it is valid
213. The first difficulty--we cannot recognise theses, antitheses, or syntheses,
except in relation to one another
214. Thus we shall require points independently fixed to begin from or end at.
We have such in the Logic
215. But not in the applications of the Logic
216. The terms of which, till seen in relation to each other, only differ
quantitatively
217. The initial point of the Philosophy of Nature, and the final point of the
Philosophy of Spirit, are exceptions
218. Attempts to fix the extreme points in the Philosophies of Nature, Spirit,
and Religion,
219. in the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Law
220. and in the Philosophy of History. A criticism by Lotze
221. The reason of the exceptions mentioned in Section 217
222. The second difficulty. In Religion, History, Law, and Philosophy, the
dialectic process is affected by external influences
223. And, in another manner, in Nature and Spirit
224. We know that there is a dialectic process in facts, but are unable to
trace it
225. The third difficulty. The extent and intricacy of the subject-matter
226. These difficulties can be avoided by taking abstract qualities, rather than
actual facts, as the terms of our dialectic
227. As in Hegel's treatment of Innocence, Sin, and Virtue
228. Or of the conception of Dying to live
229. But the main practical interest of philosophy lies in upholding the
abstract assertion that reality is rational and righteous
230. For this cannot be done at all, except by philosophy
231. Nor is this view unduly abstract