CHAP. XV.

Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power,
considered together.

Sec. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these
separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about
government, having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding these
distinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss
to consider them here together.
Sec. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is
nothing but that which parents have over their children, to
govern them for the children's good, till they come to the use of
reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed
capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature,
or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern
themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as several
others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and
tenderness which God hath planted in the breast of parents
towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not
intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the
help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But
happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why
it should be thought to extend to life and death, at any time,
over their children, more than over any body else; neither can
there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the
child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his
parents, any farther than having received life and education from
his parents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude,
assistance and support, all his life, to both father and mother.
And thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government, but
not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that
which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at
all to the property of the child, which is only in his own
disposing.
Sec. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which
every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the
hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the
society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust,
that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of
their property: now this power, which every man has in the state
of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such
cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for
the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature
allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in
others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most
conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind.
So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's
hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of
his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no
other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to
preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties,
and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power
over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to
be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties
to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting
off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they
threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is
lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and
agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the
community.
Sec. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute,
arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life,
whenever he pleases. This is a power, which neither nature
gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man and
another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an
arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a
power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the
aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the
state of war with another: for having quitted reason, which God
hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common
bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and
society; and having renounced the way of peace which that
teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust
ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting from
his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is
their's, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be
destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that
will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild
beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither
society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and
lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power,
which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of
any, but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be
made with a man that is not master of his own life? what
condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to be master
of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master
ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a
right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as
compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute
power, and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into
conditions with his captive.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious
brute that is destructive to their being.)
Sec. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal
power to parents for the benefit of their children during their
minority, to supply their want of ability, and understanding how
to manage their property. (By property I must be understood
here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in
their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the
second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of
their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their
properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power to
lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all
property.
Sec. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and
extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will
plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short of that of
the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and that absolute
dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil
society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with
property. Paternal power is only where minority makes the child
incapable to manage his property; political, where men have
property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have
no property at all.