CHAP. XII.

Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative
Power of the Common-wealth.

Sec. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right
to direct how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed
for preserving the community and the members of it. But because
those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force
is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore
there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being,
not having always business to do. And because it may be too
great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for
the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also
in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the
law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private
advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the
rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and
government: therefore in well
ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so con
sidered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands
of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or
jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have
done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the
laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to
take care, that they make them for the public good.
Sec. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a
short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a
perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is
necessary there should be a power always in being, which should
see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in
force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often
to be separated.
Sec. 145. There is another power in every common-wealth,
which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to
the power every man naturally had before he entered into society:
for though in a common-wealth the members of it are distinct
persons still in reference to one another, and as such as
governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest
of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it
before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of
mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between
any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed
by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body,
engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this
consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of
nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its
community.
Sec. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all
persons and communities without the common-wealth, and may be
called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be
understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
Sec. 147. These two powers, executive and federative,
though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one
comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society
within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the
management of the security and interest of the public without,
with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet
they are always almost united. And though this federative power
in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the
common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by
antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so
must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those,
whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the
laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct
their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be
done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left
in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power
committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for
the advantage of the common-wealth.
Sec. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative
power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet
they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in
the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the
force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in
distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and
federative power should be placed in persons, that might act
separately, whereby the force of the public would be under
different commands: which would be apt some time or other to
cause disorder and ruin.