CHAP. VII.

Of Political or Civil Society.

Sec. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his
own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under
strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to
drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding
and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was
between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between
parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and
servant came to be added: and though all these might, and
commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein
the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a
family; each of these, or all together, came short of political
society, as we shall see, if we consider the different ends,
ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sec. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact
between man and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in such a
communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to
its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support
and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary
not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to
their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and
maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
Sec. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and
female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the
species; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last,
even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the
nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained
even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the
nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and
provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker
hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior
creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed
on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer
than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam
being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on
grass, the male only begets, but concerns not himself for the
female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing.
But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the
dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her
numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as
well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass,
the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of
their common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to
prey for themselves, but by the joint care of male and female.
The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic
ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and
taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the
nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to
use their wing, and provide for themselves.
Sec. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only
reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer
conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is
capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again,
and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out
of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to
shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from
his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for
those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in
conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures,
whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time
of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of
itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual
anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates.
Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator,
who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for
the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made
it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more
lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so
their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better
united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common
issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of
conjugal society would mightily disturb.
Sec. 81. But tho'these are ties upon mankind, which make
the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other
species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why
this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and
inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either
by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as
well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in
the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should
always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of
any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be
perpetual.
Sec. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one
common concern, yet having different understandings, will
unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore
being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule,
should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's
share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to
the things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife
in the full and free possession of what by contract is her
peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life
than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from
that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a
liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their
contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves
in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country
they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the
father or mother's lot, as such contract does determine.
Sec. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained
under politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the
civil magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power of either
naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual
support and assistance whilst they are together; but only decides
any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them.
If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of
life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were
necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be no
matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed
no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring
no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society
put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state.
Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it;
nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual
assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to
conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract
which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist
with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could
shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society,
that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sec. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the
distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have
treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not
here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that
it is far different from a politic society.
Sec. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history,
but given to those of far different condition; for a freeman
makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain
time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he
is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family
of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it
gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater
than what is contained in the contract between them. But there
is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call
slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right
of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power
of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their
lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and
being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property,
cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society;
the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.
Sec. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family
with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants,
and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which,
what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and
number too, with a little common-wealth, yet is very far from it,
both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought
a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it,
absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power,
when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master
of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power,
both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are
in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a
family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be
any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of
life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress
of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no
absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited
one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other
society of men, differ from that which is properly political
society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political
society itself consists.
Sec. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title
to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the
rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any
other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power,
not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and
estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to
judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is
persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes
where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it.
But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without
having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order
thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society;
there, and there only is political society, where every one of
the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into
the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from
appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus
all private judgment of every particular member being excluded,
the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules,
indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having
authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,
decides all the differences that may happen between any members
of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes
those offences which any member hath committed against the
society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby
it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political
society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with
authority to decide controversies between them, and punish
offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who
have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the
state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for
himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it,
the perfect state of nature.
Sec. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set
down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions
which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of
that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it
has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members,
by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and
peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all
the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though
every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a
member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to
punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his
own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he
has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal
to the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to
employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the
common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed
are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his
representative. And herein we have the original of the
legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to
judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when
committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by
occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the
fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in
both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there
shall be need.
Sec. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so
united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power
of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and
there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done,
where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into
society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme
government; or else when any one joins himself to, and
incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he
authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative
thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society
shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as
to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of
nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on
earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the
commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates
appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men,
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal
to, there they are still in the state of nature.
Sec. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which
by some men is counted the only government in the world, is
indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of
civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to
avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature,
which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own
case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that
society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that
may arise, and which every one of the* society ought to obey;
where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to
appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there
those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every
absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul
contained in the same society; and the principal use of that
power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in
such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may
necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth
enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sec. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both
legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no
judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may
fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from
whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury
or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his
order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand
Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature,
with all under his dominion, as he is with therest of mankind:
for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and
common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of
controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the
state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with
only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an
absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature,
he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best
of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is
invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no
appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were
degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a
liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to
all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one,
who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted
with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and
wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there was
no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst
themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by
yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they
granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace,
tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men
always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might
be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek
their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto
others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good
means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in
reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to
his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much
as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly
affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would
be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be
ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which
consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon
him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i.
sect. 10.)
Sec. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's
blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but
the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the
contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the
woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne;
where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify
all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently
silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection
of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries
it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and
security it carries civil society, where this sort of government
is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation
of Ceylon, may easily see.
Sec. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other
governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law,
and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence
that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst
another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he
deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind,
who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a
true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe
all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more
than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or
greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from
hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only
for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out
of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the
profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what
fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and
oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce
be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death
only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will
grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual
peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be
absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has
power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To
ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side
where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of
faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of
nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but
one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should
still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased
with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think,
that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what
mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are
content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.
Sec. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's
understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they
perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the
bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have
no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him,
they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in
respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon
as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society,
for which it was first instituted, and for which only they
entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first , (as
shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of
this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a
pre -eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his
goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the
chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit
consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but
the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when
time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us)
sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing
innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of
another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure
under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no
other end but the preservation of * property) could never be safe
nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the
legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them
senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every
single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men,
to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had
established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the
force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of
superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the
miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society
can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what
he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or
security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not
perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or
member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state
of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I
have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to
affirm.

(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once
appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon
for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom
and discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found
this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they
had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which
it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man's will,
became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to
come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand,
and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl.
Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, cloth
therefore over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker,
ibid.)