CHAP. IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has
been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why
will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire,
and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other
power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the
state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others:
for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the
greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition,
which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and
it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to
join in society with others, who are already united, or have a
mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name,
property.
Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's
uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under
government, is the preservation of their property. To which in
the state of nature there are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law,
received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of
right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all
controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain
and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed
by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it,
are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the
application of it to their particular cases.
Sec. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a
known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all
differences according to the established law: for every one in
that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature,
men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own
cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them
too remiss in other men's.
Sec. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it
due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom
fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice;
such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and
frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sec. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges
of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they
remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to
pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time
together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of
the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of
others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of
government, and therein seek the preservation of their property.
It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single
power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be
appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community,
or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And
in this we have the original right and rise of both the
legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments
and societies themselves.
Sec. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty
he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the
preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the
law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the
rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct
from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and
vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any
other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and
natural community, and by positive agreements combine into
smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the
power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both
these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call
it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any
common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sec. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he
thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind,
he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far
forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that
society shall require; which laws of the society in many things
confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sec. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives
up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ
in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single
authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of
the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a
new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the
labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community,
as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also
with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as
the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require;
which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of
the society do the like.
Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society,
give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in
the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far
disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall
require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no
rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an
intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative
constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther,
than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's
property, by providing against those three defects above
mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.
And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary
decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide
controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the
community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad
to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community
from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no
other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.