C H A P. I I I.

Of the State of War.

Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and
destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a
passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another
man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he
has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to
the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins
with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being
reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of
nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or
has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that
he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under
the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that
of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey,
those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to
destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get
another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself
into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a
declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to
conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my
consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and
destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire
to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by
force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e.
make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security
of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy
to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is
the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me,
thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature,
would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that
state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away
everything else, that freedom being the foundation of all the
rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the
freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must
be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else,
and so be looked on as in a state of war.
Sec. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief,
who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon
his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in
his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from
him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into
his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to
suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not,
when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And
therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put
himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can;
for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever
introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sec. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the
state of nature and the state of war, which however some men
have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good
will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity,
malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another.
Men living together according to reason, without a common
superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is
properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design
of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war:
and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war
even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow
subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to
the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when
he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law,
which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to
secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of
no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a
liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not
time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law,
for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want
of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of
nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state
of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
Sec. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of
war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on
both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law;
because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past
injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is,
as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges
with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun,
continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the
other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and
desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he
has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay,
where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open,
but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and
a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the
violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is
hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever
violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to
administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however
coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end
whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an
unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever
that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who
having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the
only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sec. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no
appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is
apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the
contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into
society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an
authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded,
and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any
such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the
right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a
state of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The
Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day between the children
of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then
prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to
battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question
is put, who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide
the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that
the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no judge on
earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then
cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in
a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal
to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own
conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme
judge of all men.