CHAPTER XXII
OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT POLITICAL AND PRIVATE

HAVING spoken of the generation, form, and power of a
Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And
first of systems, which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a
body natural. By systems, I understand any numbers of men joined in
one interest or one business. Of which some are regular, and some
irregular. Regular are those where one man, or assembly of men, is
constituted representative of the whole number. All other are
irregular.
Of regular, some are absolute and independent, subject to none but
their own representative: such are only Commonwealths, of which I have
spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are
dependent; that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to
which every one, as also their representative, is subject.
Of systems subordinate, some are political, and some private.
Political (otherwise called bodies politic and persons in law) are
those which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the
Commonwealth. Private are those which are constituted by subjects
amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no
authority derived from foreign power, within the dominion of
another, is public there, but private.
And of private systems, some are lawful; some unlawful: lawful are
those which are allowed by the Commonwealth; all other are unlawful.
Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist
only in concourse of people; which if not forbidden by the
Commonwealth, nor made on evil design (such as are conflux of people
to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end), are lawful. But when
the intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable) unknown,
they are unlawful.
In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited:
and that which prescribeth the limits thereof is the power
sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute sovereignty. And the
sovereign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute representative of
all the subjects; and therefore no other can be representative of
any part of them, but so far forth as he shall give leave: and to give
leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute
representative, to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the
government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the dominion,
contrary to their peace and defence, which the sovereign cannot be
understood to do, by any grant that does not plainly and directly
discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words are
not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the
contrary; but rather signs of error and misreckoning, to which all
mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that power which is given to the representative of a
body politic are to be taken notice of from two things. One is their
writ, or letters from the sovereign: the other is the law of the
Commonwealth.
For though in the institution or acquisition of a Commonwealth,
which is independent, there needs no writing, because the power of the
representative has there no other bounds but such as are set out by
the unwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses,
times, and places, as can neither be remembered without letters, nor
taken notice of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be
read to them, and withal sealed, or testified, with the seals or other
permanent signs of the authority sovereign.
And because such limitation is not always easy or perhaps possible
to be described in writing, the ordinary laws, common to all subjects,
must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases
where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore
In a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he
does in the person of the body which is not warranted in his
letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body,
nor of any other member thereof besides himself: because further
than his letters or the laws limit, he representeth no man's person,
but his own. But what he does according to these is the act of every
one: for of the act of the sovereign every one is author, because he
is their representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not
from the letters of the sovereign is the act of the sovereign, and
therefore every member of the body is author of it.
But if the representative be an assembly, whatsoever that assembly
shall decree, not warranted by their letters or the laws, is the act
of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose
vote the decree was made; but not the act of any man that being
present voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he
voted it by procreation. It is the act of the assembly because voted
by the major part; and if it be a crime, the assembly may be punished,
as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of
their letters (which is to such artificial and fictitious bodies,
capital) or, if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of
the innocent members have propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from
corporal penalties nature hath bodies politic. But they that gave
not their vote are therefore innocent, because the assembly cannot
represent any man in things unwarranted by their letters, and
consequently are not involved in their votes.
If the person of the body politic, being in one man, borrow money of
a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body (for no
letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's own
inclinations to limit lending), the debt is the representative's.
For if he should have authority from his letters to make the members
pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the sovereignty
of them; and therefore the grant were either void, as proceeding
from error, commonly incident to human nature, and an insufficient
sign of the will of the granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is
the representer sovereign, and falleth not under the present question,
which is only of bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to
pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himself: because he
that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the
qualification of the body, understandeth those only for his debtors
that are engaged; and seeing the representer can engage himself, and
none else, has him only debtor, who must therefore pay him, out of the
common stock, if there be any, or, if there be none, out of his own
estate.
If he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same.
But when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a
stranger; all they, and only they, are responsible for the debt that
gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that
made it due, or to the fact for which the mulct was imposed; because
every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment: for
he that is author of the borrowing is obliged to the payment, even
of the whole debt, though when paid by any one, he be discharged.
But if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is
obliged to the payment, out of their common stock, if they have any:
for having liberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he
votes it shall be paid; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be
absent, yet because in lending he voteth the borrowing, he
contradicteth his former vote, and is obliged by the latter, and
becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand
payment from any particular man, but from the common treasury only;
which failing, he hath no remedy, nor complaint but against himself,
that being privy to the acts of the assembly, and to their means to
pay, and not being enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly
lend his money.
It is manifest by this that in bodies politic subordinate, and
subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but
expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against
the decrees of the representative assembly, and cause their dissent to
be registered, or to take witness of it; because otherwise they may be
obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes
committed by other men. But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is
taken away, both because he that protesteth there denies their
sovereignty, and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign
power is as to the subject (though not so always in the sight of
God) justified by the command: for of such command every subject is
the author.
The variety of bodies is almost infinite: for they are not only
distinguished by the several affairs for which they are constituted,
wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times,
places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their
affairs, some are ordained for government; as first, the government of
a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all
resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part; and then this
assembly is a body politic, and their power limited by commission.
This word province signifies a charge or care of business, which he
whose it is committeth to another man to be administered for and under
him; and therefore when in one Commonwealth there be diverse countries
that have their laws distinct one from another, or are far distant
in place, the administration of the government being committed to
diverse persons, those countries where the sovereign is not
resident, but governs by commission, are called provinces. But of
the government of a province, by an assembly residing in the
province itself, there be few examples. The Romans, who had the
sovereignty of many provinces, yet governed them always by
presidents and praetors; and not by assemblies, as they governed the
city of Rome and territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were
colonies sent from England to plant Virginia, and Summer Islands,
though the government of them here were committed to assemblies in
London, yet did those assemblies never commit the government under
them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation send one
governor: for though every man, where he can be present by nature,
desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be
present, they are by nature also inclined to commit the government
of their common interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular, form
of government: which is also evident in those men that have great
private estates; who, when they are unwilling to take the pains of
administering the business that belongs to them, choose rather to
trust one servant than an assembly either of their friends or
servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the
government of a province or colony committed to an assembly: and
when it is, that which in this place I have to say is this: that
whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted, or whatsoever unlawful
act is decreed, is the act only of those that assented, and not of any
that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alleged. Also
that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof
they have the government cannot execute any power over the persons
or goods of any of the colony, to seize on them for debt, or other
duty, in any place without the colony itself, as having no
jurisdiction nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy which
the law of the place alloweth them. And though the assembly have right
to impose mulct upon any of their members that shall break the laws
they make; yet out of the colony itself, they have no right to execute
the same. And that which is said here of the rights of an assembly for
the government of a province, or a colony, is applicable also to an
assembly for the government of a town, a university, or a college,
or a church, or for any other government over the persons of men.
And generally, in all bodies politic, if any if any particular
member conceive himself injured by the body itself, the cognizance
of his cause belonged to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath
ordained for judges in such causes, or shall ordain for that
particular cause; and not to the body itself. For the whole body is in
this case his fellow subject, which, in a sovereign assembly, is
otherwise: for there, if the sovereign be not judge, though in his own
cause, there can be no judge at all.
In a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the
most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members; that
is to say, such a one as every one that adventureth his money may be
present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body, if
they will themselves. For proof whereof we are to consider the end for
which men that are merchants, and may buy and sell, export and
import their merchandise, according to their own discretions, do
nevertheless bind themselves up in one corporation. It is true,
there be few merchants that with the merchandise they buy at home
can freight a ship to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to
bring it home; and have therefore need to join together in one
society, where every man may either participate of the gain, according
to the proportion of his adventure, or take his own, and sell what
he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this
is no body politic, there being no common representative to oblige
them to any other law than that which is common to all other subjects.
The end of their incorporating is to make their gain the greater;
which is done two ways: by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home
and abroad. So that to grant to a company of merchants to be a
corporation, or body politic, is to grant them a double monopoly,
whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when
there is a company incorporate for any particular foreign country,
they only export the commodities vendible in that country; which is
sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but
one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth; both which is gainful to
the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell
abroad at higher, rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of
foreign merchandise, and but one that sells them at home, both which
again are gainful to the adventurers.
Of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to foreigners. For at home by their sole exportation
they set what price they please on the husbandry and handiworks of the
people, and by the sole importation, what price they please on all
foreign commodities the people have need of, both which are ill for
the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native
commodities abroad, and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the
place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to
the disadvantage of the foreigner: for where but one selleth, the
merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth, the cheaper: such
corporations therefore are no other than monopolies, though they would
be very profitable for a Commonwealth, if, being bound up into one
body in foreign markets, they were at liberty at home, every man to
buy and sell at what price he could.
The end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common
benefit to the whole body (which have in this case no common stock,
but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building,
buying, victualling and manning of ships), but the particular gain
of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with
the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the
assembly that shall have the power to order the same; and be
acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the representative of
such a body must be an assembly, where every member of the body may be
present at the consultations, if he will.
If a body politic of merchants contract a debt to a stranger by
the act of their representative assembly, every member is liable by
himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their
private laws, but considereth them as so many particular men,
obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one
dischargeth all the rest: but if the debt be to one of the company,
the creditor is debtor for the whole to himself, and cannot
therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be
any.
If the Commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood
to be laid upon every member proportionably to his particular
adventure in the company. For there is in this case no other common
stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.
If a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they only
are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose
assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other
crime but being of the body; which, if a crime, because the body was
ordained by the authority of the Commonwealth, is not his.
If one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the
body, but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by
the authority of the body; but only by authority of the
Commonwealth: for they can do it by their own authority, they can by
their own authority give judgement that the debt is due; which is as
much as to be judge in their own cause.
These bodies made for the government of men, or of traffic, be
either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be
bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of
their business. For example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign
assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns and other
several parts of their territory to send to him their deputies to
inform him of the condition and necessities of the subjects, or to
advise with him for the making of good laws, or for any other cause,
as with one person representing the whole country, such deputies,
having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at
that time, a body politic, representing every subject of that
dominion; but it is only for such matters as shall be propounded
unto them by that man, or assembly, that by the sovereign authority
sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall
be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is dissolved. For if they
were the absolute representative of the people, then were it the
sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign assemblies, or
two sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with
their peace. And therefore where there is once a sovereignty, there
can be no absolute representation of the people, but by it. And for
the limits of how far such a body shall represent the whole people,
they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for. For the
people cannot choose their deputies to other intent than is in the
writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed.
Private bodies regular and lawful are those that are constituted
without letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to
all other subjects. And because they be united in one person
representative, they are held for regular; such as are all families,
in which the father or master ordereth the whole family. For he
obligeth his children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth,
though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in
those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other
actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they
are subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate
sovereigns. For the father and master being before the institution
of Commonwealth absolute sovereigns in their own families, they lose
afterward no more of their authority than the law of the
Commonwealth taketh from them.
Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite
themselves into one person representative, without any public
authority at all; such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and
gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging and stealing;
and the corporations of men that by authority from any foreign
person themselves in another's dominion, for the easier propagation of
doctrines, and for making a party against the power of the
Commonwealth.
Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere
concourse of people without union to any particular design, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of
wills and inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the
lawfulness, or unlawfulness, of every particular man's design therein:
and his design is to be understood by the occasion.
The leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for
mutual defence, are in a Commonwealth (which is no more than a
league of all the subjects together) for the most part unnecessary,
and savour of unlawful design; and are for that cause unlawful, and go
commonly by the name of factions, or conspiracies. For a league
being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to
any one man or assembly (as in the condition of mere nature) to compel
them to performance, is so long only valid as there ariseth no just
cause of distrust: and therefore leagues between Commonwealths, over
whom there is no human power established to keep them all in awe,
are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But
leagues of the subjects of one and the same Commonwealth, where
every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are
unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and, in case
the design of them be evil or unknown to the Commonwealth, unlawful.
For all uniting of strength by private men is, if for evil intent,
unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the public, and unjustly
concealed.
If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of
men, part of the assembly, without authority consult a part to
contrive the guidance of the rest, this is a faction, or conspiracy
unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their
particular interest. But if he whose private interest is to be debated
and judged in the assembly make as many friends as he can, in him it
is no injustice, because in this case he is no part of the assembly.
And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express
law against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men's
manners are, justice cannot be had without money, and every man may
think his own cause just till it be heard and judged.
In all Commonwealths, if a private man entertain more servants
than the government of his estate and lawful employment he has for
them requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the
protection of the Commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of
private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized,
several numerous families have lived in continual hostility and
invaded one another with private force, yet it is evident enough
that they have done unjustly, or else that they had no Commonwealth.
And as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of
religion, as of Papists, Protestants, etc., or of state, as patricians
and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and
democraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary
to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out
of the hand of the sovereign.
Concourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness or
unlawfulness whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest,
the concourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at church, or
at a public show, in usual numbers: for if the numbers be
extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently
he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being
amongst them is to be judged conscious of an unlawful and tumultuous
design. It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to
be delivered to a judge or magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to
present it, it is a tumultuous assembly, because there needs but one
or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set
number that makes the assembly unlawful, but such a number as the
present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice.
When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they
accuse, the assembly is an unlawful tumult; because they may deliver
their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was
the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number
of other men, brought two of Paul's companions before the
magistrate, saying with one voice, "Great is Diana of the
Ephesians"; which was their way of demanding justice against them
for teaching the people such doctrine as was against their religion
and trade. The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was
just; yet was their assembly judged unlawful, and the magistrate
reprehended them for it, in these words, "If Demetrius and the other
workmen can accuse any man of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies;
let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to
demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called. For we
are in danger to be accused for this day's sedition, because there
is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse
of people."* Where he calleth an assembly whereof men can give no just
account, a sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this
is all I shall say concerning systems, and assemblies of people, which
may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body: such
as be lawful, to the muscles; such as are unlawful, to wens, biles,
and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours.

* Acts, 19. 40