CHAPTER XVIII
OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION

A COMMONWEALTH is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do
agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man,
or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to
present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their
representative; every one, as well he that voted for it as he that
voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements of
that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his
own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.
From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights
and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is
conferred by the consent of the people assembled.
First, because they covenant, it is to be understood they are not
obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And
consequently they that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being
thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be
obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission.
And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without
his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited
multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to
another man, other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to
every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their
sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done; so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty
to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is
injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign be
killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own
punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his
sovereign shall do; and because it is injustice for a man to do
anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also
upon that title unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for
their disobedience to their sovereign a new covenant, made, not with
men but with God, this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with
God but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person, which
none doth but God's lieutenant who hath the sovereignty under God. But
this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the
pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an
unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.
Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is
given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to
another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach
of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his
subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his
subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with
his subjects before hand is manifest; because either he must make it
with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must
make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one
party, it is impossible, because as they are not one person: and if he
make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants
after he hath the sovereignty are void; because what act soever can be
pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of
himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the
right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one or
more of them pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at
his institution, and others or one other of his subjects, or himself
alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no
judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the sword
again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his
own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It
is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent
covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by
covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of
understanding this easy truth: that covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any
man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied
hands of that man, or assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty,
and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the
strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is
made sovereign, then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed
in the institution: for no man is so dull as to say, for example,
the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the
sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the
Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the
reason to be alike in a monarchy and in a popular government
proceedeth from the ambition of some that are kinder to the government
of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of
monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a
sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that
is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly
be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the
congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared
thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what
the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand
thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does
contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of
the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he
must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war
he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by
any man whatsoever.
Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all
the actions and judgements of the sovereign instituted, it follows
that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury to any of his subjects;
nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that
doth anything by authority from another doth therein no injury to
him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a
Commonwealth every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth;
and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign
complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore
ought not to accuse any man but himself; no, nor himself of injury,
because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that they
that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice or
injury in the proper signification.
Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that
hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any
manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of
the actions of his sovereign, he punisheth another for the actions
committed by himself.
And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence
of them all, and whosoever has right to the end has right to the
means, it belonged of right to whatsoever man or assembly that hath
the sovereignty to be judge both of the means of peace and defence,
and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for
the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at
home, and hostility from abroad; and when peace and security are lost,
for the recovery of the same. And therefore,
Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and
consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be
trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall
examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the
actions of men proceed from their opinions, and in the well
governing of opinions consisteth the well governing of men's actions
in order to their peace and concord. And though in matter of
doctrine nothing to be regarded but the truth, yet this is not
repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. For doctrine repugnant
to peace can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against
the law of nature. It is true that in a Commonwealth, where by the
negligence or unskillfulness of governors and teachers false doctrines
are by time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally
offensive: yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth
that can be does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the
war. For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take
up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still in war; and
their condition, not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of
one another; and they live, as it were, in the procincts of battle
continually. It belonged therefore to him that hath the sovereign
power to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines,
as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil
war.
Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of
prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may
enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of
his fellow subjects: and this is it men call propriety. For before
constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men
had right to all things, which necessarily causeth war: and
therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and depending on
sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public
peace. These rules of propriety (or meum and tuum) and of good,
evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil
laws; that is to say, the laws of each Commonwealth in particular;
though the name of civil law be now restrained to the ancient civil
laws of the city of Rome; which being the head of a great part of
the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law.
Eighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of judicature;
that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies which may
arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. For
without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one
subject against the injuries of another; the laws concerning meum
and tuum are in vain, and to every man remaineth, from the natural and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and
contrary to the end for which every Commonwealth is instituted.
Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and
peace with other nations and Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging
when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be
assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy money upon the
subjects to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the
people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength
of an army in the union of their strength under one command; which
command the sovereign instituted, therefore hath, because the
command of the militia, without other institution, maketh him that
hath it sovereign. And therefore, whosoever is made general of an
army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.
Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all
counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and
war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the
common peace and defence, he is understood to have power to use such
means as he shall think most fit for his discharge.
Eleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding
with riches or honour; and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he
hath formerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he
shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the
Commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves, what respect they look for from others, and how little
they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them,
emulation, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of
one another, and diminution of their strength against a common
enemy; it is necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate
of the worth of such men as have deserved or are able to deserve
well of the Commonwealth, and that there be force in the hands of some
or other to put those laws in execution. But it hath already been
shown that not only the whole militia, or forces of the
Commonwealth, but also the judicature of all controversies, is annexed
to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belonged also to
give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of place and
dignity each man shall hold, and what signs of respect in public or
private meetings they shall give to one another.
These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty, and
which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly
of men, the sovereign power is placed and resideth. For these are
incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money, to dispose of
the estate and persons of infant heirs, to have pre-emption in
markets, and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by
the sovereign, and yet the power to protect his subjects be
retained. But if he transfer the militia, he retains the judicature in
vain, for want of execution of the laws; or if he grant away the power
of raising money, the militia is in vain; or if he give away the
government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with
the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said rights,
we shall presently see that the holding of all the rest will produce
no effect in the conservation of peace and justice, the end for
which all Commonwealths are instituted. And this division is it
whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand: for
unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can
never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the
greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the
King and the Lords and the House of Commons, the people had never been
divided and fallen into this Civil War; first between those that
disagreed in politics, and after between the dissenters about the
liberty of religion, which have so instructed men in this point of
sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see
that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally
acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue, till
their miseries are forgotten, and no longer, except the vulgar be
better taught than they have hitherto been.
And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows
necessarily that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms
renounced and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to
him that grants them, the grant is void: for when he has granted all
he can, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as
inseparably annexed thereunto.
This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to
the sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them that
say of sovereign kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater
power than every one of their subjects, yet they be universis minores,
of less power than them all together. For if by all together, they
mean not the collective body as one person, then all together and
every one signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by all
together, they understand them as one person (which person the
sovereign bears), then the power of all together is the same with
the sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd: which
absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an
assembly of the people; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet
the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be
greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty
is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and
prince are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the
servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the
subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some
more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his
presence, they shine no more than the stars in presence of the sun.
But a man may here object that the condition of subjects is very
miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular
passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands.
And commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fault of
monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or
other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form
of Commonwealth; whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same: not considering that the estate
of man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to the
people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and
horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute
condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a
coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors
proceedeth, not from any delight or profit they can expect in the
damage weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour consisteth their
own strength and glory, but in the restiveness of themselves that,
unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for
their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace
that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need,
to resist or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by
nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions
and self-love) through which every little payment appeareth a great
grievance, but are destitute of those prospective glasses (namely
moral and civil science) to see afar off the miseries that hang over
them and cannot without such payments be avoided.