THE SECOND PART
OF COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER XVII
OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION
OF A COMMONWEALTH

THE final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love
liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that
restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths,
is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented
life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath
been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible
power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the
performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of
nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and,
in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without
the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and
the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws
of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to
keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or
not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully
rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.
And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob
and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being
reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they gained,
the greater was their honour; and men observed no other laws therein
but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to
men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families
did then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater
families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon all
pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be
given to invaders; endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken
their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want of other
caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.
Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives
them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the
one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as is
sufficient to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement
to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our
security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison
with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient when the odds of the
enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the
event of war, as to move him to attempt.
And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application
of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another, and
reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they
are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but
also, when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other for
their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great
multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other
laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe, we
might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there
neither would be, nor need to be, any civil government or Commonwealth
at all, because there would be peace without subjection.
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last
all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by
one judgement for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For
though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a
foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common
enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another
part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their
interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.
It is true that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live
sociably one with another (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered
amongst political creatures), and yet have no other direction than
their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one
of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common
benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind
cannot do the same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for honour and
dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men
there ariseth on that ground, envy, and hatred, and finally war; but
amongst these not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures the common good differeth not
from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private,
they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth
in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of
reason, do not see, nor think they see, any fault in the
administration of their common business: whereas amongst men there are
very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public
better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one
this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction
and civil war.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice
in making known to one another their desires and other affections, yet
they want that art of words by which some men can represent to
others that which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the
likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of
good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at their
pleasure.
Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury
and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not
offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome when
he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom,
and control the actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men
is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no
wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make
their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power to
keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to
defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one
another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their
own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce
all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as
much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear
their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be
author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or
cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace
and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his
will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than
consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the
same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such
manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give
up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of
men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and
authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude
so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS.
This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak
more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the
immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given
him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so
much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he
is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual
aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of
the Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a
great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made
themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength
and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace
and common defence.
And he that carryeth this person is called sovereign, and said to
have sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject.
The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by
natural force: as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves,
and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them
if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving
them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree
amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men,
voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all
others. This latter may be called a political Commonwealth, or
Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by
acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Commonwealth by
institution.