CHAPTER XVI
OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED

A PERSON is he whose words or actions are considered, either as
his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of
any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by
fiction.
When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural
person: and when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.
The word person is Latin, instead whereof the Greeks have
prosopon, which signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies
the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the
stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it which
disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard: and from the stage hath been
translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in
tribunals as theatres. So that a person is the same that an actor
is, both on the stage and in common conversation; and to personate
is to act or represent himself or another; and he that acteth
another is said to bear his person, or act in his name (in which sense
Cicero useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres personas; mei,
adversarii, et judicis- I bear three persons; my own, my
adversary's, and the judge's), and is called in diverse occasions,
diversely; as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar,
an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.
Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by
those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor, and he
that owneth his words and actions is the author, in which case the
actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods and
possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus in Greek
kurios; speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of
possession is called dominion so the right of doing any action is
called authority. So that by authority is always understood a right of
doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission or license
from him whose right it is.
From hence it followeth that when the actor maketh a covenant by
authority, he bindeth thereby the author no less than if he had made
it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of
the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly (Chapter XIV)
of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural
capacity is true also when they are made by their actors,
representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far
forth as is in their commission, but no further.
And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or
representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own
peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author,
nor consequently by a covenant made against or beside the authority he
gave.
When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of
the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he,
but the author breaketh the law of nature: for though the action be
against the law of nature, yet it is not his; but, contrarily, to
refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbiddeth breach of
covenant.
And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the
actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in
case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no
longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author is not valid
without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth knew
beforehand he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's
word, then is the covenant valid, because the actor in this case
maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is
evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when
the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only, there being no
author but himself.
There are few things that are incapable of being represented by
fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, a hospital, a bridge, may be
personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate
cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet
the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them
by those that are owners or governors of those things. And therefore
such things cannot be personated before there be some state of civil
government.
Likewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason
may be personated by guardians, or curators, but can be no authors
during that time of any action done by them, longer than (when they
shall recover the use of reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the folly he that hath right of governing them may give
authority to the guardian. But this again has no place but in a
state civil, because before such estate there is no dominion of
persons.
An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated, as were
the gods of the heathen, which, by such officers as the state
appointed, were personated, and held possessions, and other goods, and
rights, which men from time to time dedicated and consecrated unto
them. But idols cannot be authors: for an idol is nothing. The
authority proceeded from the state, and therefore before
introduction of civil government the gods of the heathen could not
be personated.
The true God may be personated. As He was: first, Moses, who
governed the Israelites, that were that were not his, but God's
people; not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moses, but in God's
name, with hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the Son of Man, His own
Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews
and induce all nations into the kingdom of his Father; not as of
himself, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy
Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the Apostles; which
Holy Ghost was a Comforter that came not of himself, but was sent
and proceeded from them both.
A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man,
or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of
every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of
the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the
person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but
one person: and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.
And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they
cannot be understood for one, but in any authors, of everything
their representative saith or doth in their name; every man giving
their common representer authority from himself in particular, and
owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him
authority without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what and
how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they
gave him commission to act.
And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the
greater number must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the
lesser number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the
greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to
destroy the affirmatives, and thereby the excess of negatives,
standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath.
And a representative of even number, especially when the number is
not great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is
therefore oftentimes mute and incapable of action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voices equal in number may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve
not. For when a cause is heard, not to condemn is to absolve; but on
the contrary to say that not absolving is condemning is not true.
The like it is in deliberation of executing presently, or deferring
till another time: for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing
execution is a decree of dilation.
Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies,
whereof every one has, by a negative voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no
representative; by the diversity of opinions and interests of men,
it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a
mute person and unapt, as for many things else, so for the
government of a multitude, especially in time of war.
Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called, which I
have before defined to be him that owneth the action of another
simply. The second is he that owneth an action or covenant of
another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the
other doth it not, at or before a certain time. And these authors
conditional are generally called sureties, in Latin, fidejussores
and sponsores; and particularly for debt, praedes and for appearance
before a judge or magistrate, vades.