CHAPTER XI
OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS

BY MANNERS, I mean not here decency of behaviour; as how one man
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his
teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals; but
those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace
and unity. To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this
life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no
such finis ultimus (utmost aim) nor summum bonum (greatest good) as is
spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man
any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and
imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the
desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being
still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the
object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one
instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire.
And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend
not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented
life, and differ only in the way, which ariseth partly from the
diversity of passions in diverse men, and partly from the difference
of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce
the effect desired.
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all
mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that
ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a
man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained
to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he
cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present,
without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is that kings,
whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at
home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there
succeedeth a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in
others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or
being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the
mind.
Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power inclineth
to contention, enmity, and war, because the way of one competitor to
the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the
other. Particularly, competition of praise inclineth to a reverence of
antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to
these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of
the other.
Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a
common power: because by such desires a man doth abandon the
protection that might be hoped for from his own industry and labour.
Fear of death and wounds disposeth to the same, and for the same
reason. On the contrary, needy men and hardy, not contented with their
present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military
command, are inclined to continue the causes of war and to stir up
trouble and sedition: for there is no honour military but by war;
nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new shuffle.
Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a
common power: for such desire containeth a desire of leisure, and
consequently protection from some other power than their own.
Desire of praise disposeth to laudable actions, such as please
them whose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn,
we contemn also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same.
And though after death there be no sense of the praise given us on
earth, as being joys that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable
joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is
not such fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from
the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to
their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine;
and anything that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is
pleasure in the imagination.
To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater
benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love,
but really secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a
desperate debtor that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly
wishes him there where he might never see him more. For benefits
oblige; and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation,
perpetual thraldom; which is to one's equal, hateful. But to have
received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines
to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful
acceptation (which men call gratitude) is such an honour done to the
obliger as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive
benefits, though from an equal, or inferior, as long as there is
hope of requital, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the
receiver, the obligation is of aid and service mutual; from whence
proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most
noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is
pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.
To have done more hurt to a man than he can or is willing to expiate
inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge or
forgiveness; both which are hateful.
Fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his
life and liberty.
Men that distrust their own subtlety are in tumult and sedition
better disposed for victory than they that suppose themselves wise
or crafty. For these love to consult; the other, fearing to be
circumvented to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the
precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of
force is a better stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety of
wit.
Vainglorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are
inclined only to ostentation, but not to attempt; because when
danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have
their insufficiency discovered.
Vain, glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the
flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action,
without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of
themselves, are inclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of
danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the
way of safety they will rather hazard their honour, which may be
salved with an excuse, than their lives, for which no salve is
sufficient.
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of
government are disposed to ambition. Because without public employment
in counsel or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And
therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence
seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.
Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to
lose the occasions and fittest opportunities of action. For after
men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if
it be not then manifest what is best to be done, it is a sign the
difference of motives the one way and the other are not great:
therefore not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by weighing of
trifles, which is pusillanimity.
Frugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man unapt to
achieve such actions as require the strength of many men at once:
for it weakeneth their endeavour, which to be nourished and kept in
vigour by reward.
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have
it; because the former is seeming wisdom, the latter seeming kindness.
Add to them military reputation and it disposeth men to adhere and
subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having
given them caution against danger from him, the latter gives them
caution against danger from others.
Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advice and authority of others.
For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own,
must rely on the opinion of some other whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.
Ignorance of the signification of words, is want of understanding,
disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not,
but also the errors; and which is more, the nonsense of them they
trust: for neither error nor nonsense can, without a perfect
understanding of words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth that men give different names to one and
the same thing from the difference of their own passions: as they that
approve a private opinion call it opinion; but they that mislike it,
heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has
only a greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth that men cannot distinguish,
without study and great understanding between one action of many men
and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one
action of all the senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many
actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are
disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a
multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the
persuasion of one.
Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity,
law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the
rule of his actions; in such manner as to think that unjust which it
hath been the custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and
approbation whereof they can produce an example or (as the lawyers
which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it) a
precedent; like little children that have no other rule of good and
evil manners but the correction they receive from their parents and
masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men
are not so; because grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom
to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn,
receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting
themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them: which is
the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually
disputed, both by the pen and the sword: whereas the doctrine of lines
and figures is not so; because men care not, in that subject, what
be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or
lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any
man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion,
that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a
square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the
burning of all books of geometry suppressed, as far as he whom it
concerned was able.
Ignorance of remote causes disposeth men to attribute all events
to the causes immediate and instrumental: for these are all the causes
they perceive. And hence it comes to pass that in all places men
that are grieved with payments to the public discharge their anger
upon the publicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other
officers of the public revenue, and adhere to such as find fault
with the public government; and thereby, when they have engaged
themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme
authority, for fear of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.
Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to
believe many times impassibilities: for such know nothing to the
contrary, but that they may be true, being unable to detect the
impossibility. And credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in
company, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance itself, without
malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them,
and sometimes also to invent them.
Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to inquire into the causes
of things: because the knowledge of them maketh men the better able to
order the present to their best advantage.
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect to seek the cause; and again, the cause of
that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last,
that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is
eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make
any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined
thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have
any idea of Him in their mind answerable to His nature. For as a man
that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the
fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily
conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there which men call
fire and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it
is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see
it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their
admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which
men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind.
And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of
things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of
what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are
inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of
powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and
in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected
good success, to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own
fancy their gods. By which means it hath come to pass that from the
innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world
innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible is the
natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion;
and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do,
superstition.
And this seed of religion, having been observed by many, some of
those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish,
dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it, of their own
invention, any opinion of the causes of future events by which they
thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto
themselves the greatest use of their powers.