The Alley
Game:
An Evaluation of Power
Differentials and Personal Attributes
on the Decision to Confront,
Reward or Retreat from Aggression
Richard B. Tanksley,
Dr. Jack E. Vincent, Borah Professor of Political Science, University of
ABSTRACT
International relations theory has tried for a long time
to determine probable responses to aggression in situations involving "balanced"
vs. "imbalanced" power capabilities between competing actors. In spite of scholars giving "power
differential" a great deal of attention, both in
theory and research, there have, in fact, been disagreements as to the
most likely response of competing actors in this regard. Our research approaches this critical
issue by using a "survey" to determine the most likely response of respondents
to a hypothetical conflict situation called the "Alley Game." This is done, in part, by evaluating
various power combinations of the actors involved in the game. Respondents are asked what they would
do, if, in walking down an alley, they are confronted by an individual who
demands money before they can pass.
He also pushes the respondent in the chest to signal his intention to use
force if necessary. Various power
combinations (of those in conflict in the alley) are evaluated as to the
respondent's choice to "confront, reward or retreat." These power combinations include being
armed with a knife (or a gun) as well as variations in the physical size of the
aggressor. Our primary research
objective is to test Organski's view of the likely effects of balance of
power. That is, we wish to
determine whether there are more "confrontational responses" when power is
"balanced" than when power is "imbalanced." In addition, personal attributes are
also analyzed. These included age,
gender, military service and political orientation as well as other selected
personal or emotional characteristics.
The survey responses were coded into variables and using standard
statistical tests the data was analyzed. The statistical tests show significant
differences for many of the variables analyzed. They indicate that both power
differential (of the type that
supports Organski's theory) and selected personal attributes appear to be
important factors in assessing the likely response of the respondents in the
hypothetical Alley Game confrontation.
INTRODUCTION:
The goal of this research is to help identify variables
that may be associated with decision-making during confrontation. Both individual characteristics and
power differentials are examined through survey research depicting hypothetical
situations. The survey itself is
called the alley game. This game or
survey features scenarios where the respondent has an important meeting to
attend and to arrive on time they will have to pass through an alley. [1] In the alley, a man pushes the victim
(survey respondent) and demands twenty dollars before he will allow them to
pass. The initial choices for the
victim are: to push back, pay, or retreat.
The scenario is repeated with varying degrees of power differentials as
to the man’s size, or what type of weapon the victim possesses. For those that initially choose to push
back and possess a knife or gun, a second scenario is offered. In this latter scenario, the aggressor
pulls a large knife, and the victim is given a second set of choices: to either
pay, retreat or pull out their own weapon.
By comparing the means of the key variables, the size of the man, and
what weapons are present, various power differentials are analyzed. Additional respondent variables are also
scrutinized to reveal what characteristics might influence the respondent’s
choice to push back, pay, or retreat.
Thus, the alley game becomes a framework to investigate the balance of
power and other auxiliary theories.
Questions addressed include: what is the relationship of different
balance of power conditions to possible confrontational behavior? If power is balanced, what is the more
probable outcome, conflict, acquiescence or retreat? What role does gender, or personal
attitudes play in respondent’s choices to push back, pay or retreat? Obviously, these are important questions
that influence decision making in
regards to how a state or individual might respond to changes in the power
matrix, issues of deterrence and the prospects for peace. This question is also important since
theory and research by others has led to dissimilar conclusions. Organski asserts that the international
system is less likely to achieve peace when there is a balance of power
(Organski, 1968, p. 27). Morgenthau
& Thompson, reach the opposite conclusion stating that “ the balance of power and politics aiming at
its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor
in a society of sovereign nations” (1985, p. 167). Other determinants of decision-making
about conflict will also be discussed.
With this background information, predictions to a survey will be
presented along with its data, methodology, limitations and conclusions.
Concepts and Literature Review
Before going any further into this inquiry, it is
worthwhile to discuss several of the concepts that surround this issue. The term conflict is subject to a
variety of definitions. To most it
may refer to groups or individuals competing over scarce resources or disparate
goals. Lewis A. Coser defines
conflict as “a struggle over values and
claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents
are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rival” (Dougherty, &
Pfaltzgraff, 1999, p. 187).
Conflict
involves the interaction of people,
with
at least one party initiating a demand or
forcing the other party to make less desirable choices than it would make when
left alone.
The definitions of power and balance of power are more
elusive. While power is a central
concept within international relations, its usage has been subject to “definitional confusion” (Rothgeb, 1993,
p. 19). Often power is utilized to
portray a state’s resources or the capabilities of a state. This type of power is somewhat easy to
measure as it consists of economic, military and manpower that is available to a
state. Still, even with the
measurement of these resources, it is difficult to make an accurate and
realistic assignment of the relative importance of each asset. How the resources convert into the
ability to have one’s way is not so easy to evaluate (Rothgeb, p. 44). Morgenthau & Thompson also make this
point about how difficult it is to assess the power calculations of a nation [2]
(1985, pp. 223-235). Rothgeb’s
second conceptualization identifies power as a goal. It is not enough to just want power
without really defining what the actor desires. Lastly, power can be seen as a means to
control others or control the environment in which one is found (Rothgeb, 1993,
p. 23). This definition seems the
most consistent with other scholars.
Morgenthau & Thompson speak of power as man’s control over the minds
and actions of other men (1985, p. 32).
In other words, can the party obtain what they desire? If so, that is power. This is the power definition that is
used for this study. One person,
the aggressor, seeks to control the victim by demanding money. The victim, on the other hand, must
react with power, acquiesce or retreat.
The notion of a balance of power or equilibrium has been
around for thousands of years (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 4). As a term though, the balance of power
has been used indiscriminately to convey a multitude of situations. Sheehan [3]
examines several lists of meanings concerning the balance of power. Examples of such alternatives include
the existing distribution of power.
Conveying the balance in this way could essentially represent all
variants of the distribution of power (Sheehan, 1996, p. 16). This distribution can be at or near
equilibrium or there can be an imbalance that would suggest that one state or
alliance has a superior advantage.
In order to avoid confusion, the balance of power used in this study is
determined to be an equal distribution of power. This is consistent with Morgenthau’s “metaphor of two scales kept in balance by an
equal distribution of weights on either side, providing the mechanism for the
maintenance of stability and order on the international scene” (p. 223).
This type of definition is echoed by Organski as the balance of power rests on
the premise that “the various nations
group themselves together in such a way that no single nation or group of
nations is strong enough to overwhelm the others, for its power is balanced by
that of some opposing group” (Organski, 1968, p. 274). Often such a balance is seen as
structural or a “system” where a shift away from equilibrium leads to
countershifts. Such balancing
then occurs much like the equilibrium is found in free markets where the
quantity supplied will shift in response the quantity demanded (Spanner &
Wendzel, 1996, p. 109)
The survey depicts only a simple set of circumstances
and limits the victim’s choices should they seek retribution. Still, the victim can push back and
brandish a weapon when the option is available. It is noted that such a response is
fully justified whether an individual or state is involved. “Aggression justifies two kinds of response: a
war of self defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and
any member of international society” (Walzer, 1988, p. 161). Furthermore, “any use of force or imminent threat of force
by one state against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another
constitutes aggression” (Walzer, 1988, p. 161). Walzer also
suggests that aggression or war in the international context also has a domestic
analogy such as murder or robbery.
Thus, the word aggressor seems appropriate in this domestic context, with
the victim being justified to respond in self-defense. While it can be said that the victim who
confronts the aggressor is seeking justice, the word retribution is used more
specifically to indicate that the victim is seeking some type of
punishment. “The retributive urge also serves a purpose
in present day society, which is to give people a motive to ward off transgression” (Shavell,
2000). It is exactly this urge or
response to conflict that is scrutinized in this domestic hypothetical
situation. Of course, there may
also be implications at the state level as well.
Just as economic equilibrium is obtained differently
under different market structures, the structure of how any conflict is framed
can lead to different conclusions.
For instance, later work by Organski and Kugler looked at not only the
balance of power model, but also models of collective security and power
transition (1980, pp. 13-19). In
addition to other models or structures, specific determinants such as nuclear
capability, superpower status, geography, and
size, are said to contribute to how conflict is started and resolved
(Organski & Kugler, 1980).
Offensive and defensive capabilities are also discussed along with a
multitude of other variables that have been aggregated by research programmes
such as the
A survey of theoretical literature shows that the
expected outcome from a situation involving a balance of power is far from
consensus. While Organski provides
an insight into the definition of the balance of power, he dissents concerning
it’s usefulness, going so far as to label the
theory as having “erroneous
conclusions” (1968, p. 288). To
Organski and others, conflict is more likely when the powers are closer to being
equal. “In both domestic and international affairs,
as long as one group or one state has the preponderance of power there may be
peace, but it will be an imposed peace, with the terms defined by holders of
power” (Singer, 1972 p. 85).
Inversely, Morgenthau and others hold that the balance
of power does help to subdue conflict and prevents domination. Morgenthau and Thompson (1985) use
several examples of how the balance of power works, and deviations from
equilibrium result in conflict.
Historical examples that are cited, among others, include:
Several studies have tried to empirically demonstrate
whether the balance of power favored peace or aggression. Tindell and Vincent (1970) specifically
tried to assess balanced versus unbalanced power conditions on human
behavior. Their experimental study
simulated direct confrontation, as subjects were pitted one against the
other. Various conditions were then
applied where each subject was allocated a number of shocks that they could
apply to their opponent. The
results indicated that the game conditions did effect how the shocks were
distributed. When each side had an
equal number of shocks, fewer shocks were utilized and more cooperation
resulted. Inversely, when one
person had more shocks, the number of shocks that were distributed
increased. The number of shocks
were set at the beginning of this experiment. Thus, this experiment could be
considered static. Vincent and
It is important to note that the Tindell/Vincent and
Vincent/Schwerin studies allowed for more repeated confrontations. Shocks were available to be distributed
over a number of times. This was
not the case for this survey.
Respondents were not led to believe that another confrontation could
occur in the future by the same aggressor.
It is also important to note that the confrontation depicted in this
survey is limited to two powers.
While research on several powers would be more desirable, the entire
balance of power issue has some application within a two power context. As to the pattern of conflict,
Morgenthau sees the struggle for power (conflict) as originating from two
patterns: competition and direct opposition (1985, p. 192). This survey assumes a pattern of
competition that is in direct opposition with no third party
involvement.
Two extremes are offered concerning the level of
analysis. Organski notes: “that it could be argued of course, that
nations should not be our main concern, that it really is individual human
beings with whom we are dealing.
It would be an even greater
mistake, however, to treat national leaders as individuals representing no one
but themselves” (1968, pp. 15-16).
While the balance falls somewhere in between, there is a strong case that
much can be learned through individuals.
In a roundtable discussion, Fink asserts: “when one is studying crises, one of the most
profitable ways to go about it, at least as far as I’ve seen, is to deal with
the decision-maker as an individual in that time-stress situation” (Givens
& Nettleship, 1973, pp. 70-71).
Even simple game models such as “chicken” or the “prisoner’s dilemma” look specifically at
the behavior of individuals. With
this in mind, if certain attributes in individuals do lean toward aggression or
retreat, they are worthy of study.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff suggest that social science is
divided into two groups (1999, p. 189).
The micro group looks specifically at human beings and the origins of
conflict. Meanwhile, the macro
group looks at institutions.
Neither is wrong, and more recent attempts at merging the two approaches
should be applauded. Even works
such as Kenneth Waltz’s, Man, the
State and War, and other theories regarding international relations make
assumptions about the nature of man (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1999, p.
273). Thus, research such as this
study remains important and may be applicable, if not critical, in the study of
international relations.
The survey also provided a means to examine various
personal traits and their relation to conflict. While all of the traits were anticipated
to suggest more or less conflict, one in particular warrants further
discussion. Within the literature
of international relations is a debate about whether there is a gender
difference between men and women.
Specifically, will women will be more passive and less prone to violence,
with all things being equal, as opposed to their male counterparts (Caprioli,
2000, p. 51). Generally it is
suggested that as women are given more equality in making foreign policy
decisions, the results will be more pacifist. Caprioli particularly looks at whether
gender equality corresponds to less militarism and concludes that this is the
case. Other statistics have
shown that men engage in more risky behavior (Mitchell, 2001, p. 8). Dr. Mitchell (M.D.) writes this off as
more testosterone which: leads men to “react more aggressively when provoked.”
Coding Rules
In an attempt to predict what respondents would do in an
alley confrontation, a hypothetical questionnaire was written by Vincent et
al. A total sample of 83 was taken
among students, working adults and retirees from both
1.
Small, thin
2.
Just your size
3.
Much larger than you and very muscular
You are
walking through an alley to avoid a long walk in a large city, since you will be
late to an important meeting if you take the long way around. Suddenly a small,
thin man jumps in your way and demands $20 to pass. Before you can speak he
pushes you backward with considerable force. Between the three options listed,
which, would you chose?
The dependent variable was the victim’s response. Initially there were three
choices:
|
1. |
Push him out of the way
and proceed forward. |
(coded
1) |
|
2. |
Pay him the $20 so you
can pass. |
(coded
2) |
|
3. |
Retreat and take the long
way around. |
(coded
3) |
A second method of coding was also utilized. (The only difference is that pay or
retreat are coded equally).
|
1. |
Push him out of the way
and proceed forward. |
(coded
1) |
|
2. |
Pay him the $20 so you
can pass. |
(coded
2) |
|
3. |
Retreat and take the long
way around. |
(coded
2) |
In addition to the aggressor’s size, another independent
variable introduced was the type of weapon the victim had. These included:
1. none
2.
a large
knife
3.
a large gun
When the victim had a knife or gun, (conditions one
through six) those that pushed back were confronted with these
choices:
After you push
him, he pulls a large knife from his belt.
Between the three options listed, which, would you
chose?
First method
Second method
|
_____Pull a large gun
from your belt. |
(coded
1) |
(coded
1) |
|
_____Pay him the $20 so
you can pass. |
(coded
2) |
(coded
2) |
|
_____Retreat and take the
long way around. |
(coded 3) |
(coded
2) |
Again, both coding methods were proposed in order to see if there was a
difference in the pay or retreat options.
Initially it was thought that retreating was the least aggressive
option. In reality, some
respondents likely thought that paying was the least aggressive option. Due to this possible inconsistency, it
was very difficult to separate out the pay and retreat options. Therefore, most of the survey is
reported with retreat and pay coded equally. This not only adds parsimony but the
least aggressive option (pay or retreat) cannot be confused with the most
aggressive option (push back). This
method of coding also creates a dichotomous variable with the victim either
seeking retribution (pushing back) or not seeking retribution (paying or
retreating).
Altogether, this survey was intended to answer some of
the theoretical questions concerning the balance of power by using independent variables that
approximated different levels of potential power. In addition to variables that might
measure the balance of power, other characteristics were also included to test
whether personality traits and environmental influences might affect the
responses. More ancillary theory is
identified in the assumptions for each of these variables.
ASSUMPTIONS:
The assumptions used included the
following:
1.
Using the Organski interpretation of the balance of power, the situation
where the victim is most likely to push back (no weapon) would be when the
aggressor is of the same or lessor size.
2.
In the case where the victim is smaller, (no weapon) Organski would
predict that the chances of peace would be greater, thus the victim in this case
would either pay or retreat
3.
When a knife is present, the Organski interpretation would predict that
the victim would first push back since the weapon the victim possesses would
seemingly give them the edge. The
victim will most likely pull his knife on the aggressor (who has pulled a knife
out already) when the victim is the same size or larger than the aggressor. When the victim is of lesser size and
both have knives the victim is expected to retreat or pay.
4.
When the victim has a large gun, an Organski interpretation would predict
that the victim would push back. When the aggressor produces a knife, it is then
expected that the victim would produce a gun rather than pay or
retreat.
5.
It is expected that individuals who support the United Nations will also
be more likely to react like the U.N.
So what kind of reaction might we expect this to be? To the well informed, the U.N has a
number of different organs, functions, and bodies. However, as Falk admits: “it is the peace and security agenda that
serves as the prism through which the U.N. is judged by the media and the
public” (Falk, 1995). It is
predicted that this peaceful agenda of the U.N. is emphasized by its
supporters. Article 2.3, of the
U.N. Charter notes: “All Members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” (Simons,
1994, p. 269). While the U.N.
stands for justice, protection from any conflict is unlikely to be immediate, is
always multi-lateral and occurs only after all other measures have failed. Therefore, it is assumed that supporters
of the U.N. will be more likely to pay or retreat.
6.
Liberals, or those that believe in affirmative action, should also be
more likely to pay or retreat. Conservatives are expected to seek retribution
and they dislike affirmative action.
While these two measures are coded separately, it should be noted that some
multicollinearity exists between the affirmative
action and liberalism. Jackman and Muha for instance, suggest that “support for affirmative action policy is
often attributed to the more ‘liberal’ members of society” (Niemann & Dovidio, 1998, p.
783). This relationship is shown in Appendix B. This graph demonstrates that the strong
conservatives are least likely to support affirmative action. The survey did not provide formal
definitions of what constitutes a liberal or conservative. Ideally, tests could have determined
this with each respondent.
Researchers have identified various attitudes for what constitutes a
liberal or conservative (Knight, 1999, p. 61). Items that identify conservatives
include: preferring stricter law and order, greater
punishment for offenders, less equality, and even racial segregation (Knight,
1999, pp. 86-142). Others see
liberals as “more inclined to give than
to save” and more “generous-spirited” (McWilliams, 1995, p.
177 & 203). Liberals are more
likely to see the aggressor as a victim.
In discussing disorderly street conduct: “commentators with a hyper-equalitarian
outlook single-mindedly aim at redistributing wealth, status, and opportunity to
the poorest at hand-in this context, to a street person whose misbehavior has
annoyed other pedestrians” (Ellickson, 1996).
7.
Those that have a strong sense of standing up for what is right, should
view the aggressor as performing an unjust act and respond more
aggressively. This assumption is
based on Deutsche’s comments: “If each side in a conflict tends to perceive
its own motives and behavior as the more benevolent and legitimate, it is
evident that the conflict will intensify” (Duetsch, 1988, p. 137).
8.
Those who avoid conflict or who do not perceive that violence is an
acceptable solution to solving conflict should consistently pay or retreat. Pacifists would fall into this
category. Fitting in this group are
those that have a “non-resistance to violence by principle” [4]
(Aron, 1973, p. 367).
9.
Respondents that believe people are trustworthy should be more inclined
to pay. A similar question on trust
is surveyed in the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey
(Gleaser, et al., 2000). Researchers have found results are “difficult to interpret” due to varying
beliefs in what trust is or what constitutes “most people.” Glaeser,
applied trust to a game situation where a payout was involved and found that
those who self reported that they trusted strangers also gave higher payouts
than those who were less likely to trust strangers (The Economist, 2001 p. 8). In the Alley Game, the aggressor pushes
the victim and demands twenty dollars.
Those less likely to trust may have difficulty in taking the aggressor at
his word.
10.
Respondents that reported themselves as more submissive should have a
higher propensity to pay, or retreat. As mentioned in the introduction,
Morgenthau wrote of power as: “man’s
control over the minds and actions of other men” (1985, p. 32). Sympathy is likely to dilute man’s
ability to control others.
11.
Those that are more disposed to commit a felony should also be more
aggressive and push back.
12.
It is expected that older respondents will be more likely to pay or
retreat. Interaction with other
independent variables could provide even further explanations as an elderly
person may see themselves as potential targets and avoid confrontation for a
lack of trust.
13.
Based on gender research in international relations it is anticipated
that women are less likely to push back. It is noted however though that the
survey is gender biased since the hypothetical aggressor is always male. While
at first glance this seems to be a flaw, in the international arena most women
leaders will be confronted by a predominately male leadership circle on their
staff, in opposing governments, and within their own military. However, it is undetermined whether
females would respond differently than males when the aggressor was also a
female.
PREDICTIONS
Treatment
Conditions
|
Independent Variable |
Dependent Variable |
Direction As |
Dependent Variable |
Direction as |
|
|
(initial response) |
Predicted |
(After pushing back the |
Predicted |
|
|
|
|
aggressor pulls a
knife) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Victim is smaller (no
weapon) |
pay or
retreat |
Yes |
not an
option |
n/a |
|
Victim is the same size (no
weapon) |
push
back |
Yes |
not an
option |
n/a |
|
Victim is larger ( no
weapon) |
push
back |
Yes |
not an
option |
n/a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Victim is smaller (with
knife) |
push
back |
Yes |
pay or
retreat |
No |
|
Victim is the same size (with
knife) |
push
back |
Yes |
pull
knife |
No |
|
Victim is larger (with
knife) |