Abstract

This paper discusses the increasing focus on issues pertaining to ‘human security’, and the emerging role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the development of multidimensional peace-building activities. In the changing international environment in which local, regional, and global level actors and norms have accrued enhanced legitimacy, a new generation of multi-dimensional peace-building activities has developed aiding in the development of ethical norms, utilizing peacekeeping, traditional mediation, conflict resolution/ transformation, increasingly through transnational organizations and NGOs. These are emerging in the context of low intensity conflicts, the re-emergence of ethonationalist and identity based conflicts, and to respond to urgent humanitarian crises. It is in this context that the peace-building role of NGOs in conflict and complex emergencies may be usefully located and assessed as part of a socio-political fabric engaged in sustainable approaches to ending conflict. Conflict resolution/transformation and peace-building approaches to understanding conflict and methodologies for addressing it are being utilized by NGOs. This is in conjunction with more formally constituted methods and actors, in order to stabilize local environments in a local, regional and global normative context, as well as in the context of an emerging global civil society. This may enhance the legitimacy of NGOs (and their regulation) and may also increase the effectiveness of peace-building in the international system.

1. Introduction

Increasingly, peacemaking, humanitarian and peace-building tasks are being delegated by states and intergovernmental organizations to NGOs that have humanitarian, developmental, human rights, educational, and conflict resolution orientations. These actors are forming a vital role in the development of new approaches to ending conflict, particularly in the context of their growing links with transnational organizations and their professed interests in human security issues. These interests appear to be constituted by their civic nature both at the local and international level; and though they may express partisan interests the amelioration of the root causes of conflict appears to be their over-riding objective. There has been an increasingly normative reaction in the conduct of both local and international politics, relating to the wider existence of political communities, an ‘international society’ and a ‘global civil society’. This means that the development of the international system in the contemporary environment can be seen as the development from a Westphalian states-system in which it is assumed that states have access to all the tools required to manage all aspects of security, to a somewhat idealized view of a post- Westphalian model in which a multiplicity of actors, private and public, are involved in addressing the many different aspects of international-social conflict.[2] In this ‘post-Westphalian’ system, however, identity, representation, and human security issues are priorities, displacing, though not replacing the hegemony of the state as sole authority and actor. As a consequence space is emerging for far more dynamic approaches to ending conflict than ever before. The Westphalian system is characterized by inflexible versions of sovereignty which block responsibility for humanitarian issues beyond state borders, and focus on state sovereignty and interests in a narrow sense, providing little space in which actors, official or private, could address the roots of conflict. Indeed, this Westphalian system often replicates conflicts over identity and representation by focusing on state rather than human security. Currently, it can be argued that the international system is in a late-Westphalian phase, driven mainly by western actors, in which the understanding of the multiple nature of conflict and the need to address its many issues, actors and levels directly has become very apparent. This has necessitated a move towards multidimensional approaches to ending conflict. Humanitarian intervention of an unofficial and official nature is clearly increasing. This paper argues that it is in this late Westphalian context, via their focus on human security derived from a world view provided by conflict resolution approaches, that NGOs derive increasing levels of legitimacy, at both the local and global level. This legitimacy is also the basis on which they gain access to areas in conflict zones that would normally be marginalized or denied to formally constituted peacemaking actors. As the UN Secretary General has pointed out, NGOs promote and provide access to a global civil society. Understanding in particular the role of NGOs in constituting global civil society may enable peace-building approaches to tap into the relative success that NGOs have had in micro-political environments, and the macro-political changes which are also occurring.

Two clearly defined generations of mono-dimensional activities have emerged so far in an attempt to settle or resolve conflict. International mediation and classic forms of peacekeeping, derived from traditional diplomacy are described in the typology put forward here as ‘first generation’ and operate at the level of the state in a Westphalian international system characterized by state-centric notions of sovereignty and self-interest via a communitarian world view. Conflict resolution/transformation approaches, which here are described as ‘second generation’, operate at the level of civil society and developed out of a need to find a process which could facilitate the ‘resolution’, rather than management, of intractable conflicts. They were derived from a grass-roots movement that decried the state-centric and power-political leanings of high politics as described by dominant theories of the international system. It is in the context of conflict resolution approaches that a conceptual framework for NGOs can be found based on their emphasis on norms relating to human needs and human security derived from local and global emergent civil societies. Space has been provided for their activities because of the general realization that conflict is multidimensional and therefore requires multidimensional responses. These responses have seen the development of peace-building approaches based on a hybrid of conflict management approaches. First generation approaches include peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation. The second generation, involving conflict resolution, includes bottom-up strategies to making peace, and the contributions that NGOs can make, in parallel, to state, international and regional organization based efforts.

In order to illustrate these points, this paper provides looks at the inadequacies of first generation approaches, followed by an examination of the contribution made by second generation approaches to ending conflict. It then looks at the role of NGOs before investigating the normative implications of global civil society and the potential of NGOs to contribute to broader forms of peace-building based on more comprehensive definitions of human security. It is argued that NGOs can through the lens offered by conflict resolution/transformation and peace-building approaches to conflict, provide a cross-over point between the forces of globalization and fragmentation, and between global and local civil societies. This takes the debate beyond the proposals for preventative diplomacy and peace-building contained in Agenda for Peace and subsequent UN documents on the reform of approaches to ending conflict. This may represent a new generation of multi-dimensional peace activity that promotes broad cultures of pluralism, negotiation, and interdependence in civil society, operating at all levels (local, state, regional and global), including IOs, ROs, states, and NGOs in the context of a more cosmopolitan view of international society.[3]

2. Inadequacies of First Generation Approaches

First generation approaches are based upon the tradition, norms, and culture of western diplomacy and operate at the level of the state in the context of an assumed Westphalian international system. As such, first generation peacekeeping operations (like UNFICYP, for example) are based on state interests while international mediation and negotiation represent stylized and formal communication between official and sovereign representatives, based upon zero-sum interests. Such interests can be manipulated and coordinated, but only through the use of coercion, in the presence of ripe moments, mainly engendered by hurting stalemates of the external provision of large incentives, of which the settlement of the Egypt Israel conflict at Camp David, or the more recent settlement at Dayton, are good examples. In this high level process there is little room for unofficial actors, whose separate legitimacy tends to be unrecognized and subsumed by officialdom. Thus, it is an inflexible process best suited to state-centric types of conflicts that seem to have declined.

The very obvious weaknesses of first generation approaches have been highlighted by the emergence of ethnic actors, identity claims, humanitarian and development issues, all of which are now often components of conflict and complex emergencies. First generation traditional peacemaking activities therefore attempt to operate in the realms of traditional diplomacy in which the state holds [a somewhat contested] thrall.[4] International mediation therefore aims at outcomes based on the intricacies of potentially fragile status quos. Mandell has argued that mediation could influence the creation and internalization of new norms for conflict management,[5] but this is unlikely if such norms are limited to the local and are not derived from a global or regional dialogue. Power-based mediation, because of its mono-dimensional nature, can do little more that manage short-term strategic interactions, particularly given the fact that under the auspices of a state sponsor, or of the UN, it must observe the norms of international law and international society. Thus, it often falls victim to the tensions between the two. Because mediation is constructed as a mono-dimensional activity it lacks co-ordination with other peacemaking activities at other levels, and falls victim to the ethical void that traditional diplomacy depicts the Westphalian international system as being indicative of. It is merely assumed that citizen interests will trickle up to form the national interest, which will influence the formation of foreign policy. Clearly, such assumptions do not accurately mirror the issues and actors engaged in intractable conflict or complex emergencies, and therefore the whole process of diplomacy tends to become ensnared upon the need for official legitimacy, recognition, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

In general therefore, first generation approaches depend upon the application of substantial external coercion and rewards.[6] International mediation has become subject to ‘devious objectives,’[7] fallen victim to the asymmetries caused by the state-centricity of diplomacy and has become obscured by a plethora of suspect and dubious international practices. These aim at keeping a status quo that may not necessarily be perceived by antagonists, in any form of conflict, as ‘just’. The fact that mediation is subject to a failing credibility has significant ramifications for regions where the international community does not have sufficient interests at stake to intervene decisively as it did, eventually, in Bosnia, Kosovo, or in the Middle East. There may well be emerging regions and conflicts which, returning to a Cold War philosophy, the international community are willing to isolate and stabilize, but have abandoned attempts to bring a greater harmony to- zones of intractable conflict. Intractable conflict tends to be defined as such because disputants have located their argumentation and bottom-line negotiating positions on what they consider to be legitimate aspects of the international system: often the role of the third party becomes one of mediating between two [partly ambiguously] legitimate sets of principles inherent in a flawed international system- for example, self-determination and sovereignty and the continuing controversies over the issue of legitimate intervention, which draw on different approaches to international law and ethics.[8]

First generation approaches to ending conflict tend to be overpowered by the tension between the relative interests and leverage of sponsor-states, third party states and actors and the disputants themselves, situating the practice firmly in the realm of traditional diplomacy and power politics. It is this stumbling block that the international community has attempted to address since the end of the Cold War.

3. Second Generation Approaches: Conflict Resolution

The field of conflict resolution provides an alternative approach to conflict and moves away from the Westphalian view of the international system by rejecting reductionism’s de-emphasis of civil society. Initially it was drawn from several strands, including Mitrany’s ideas on functional integration among countries to create a common interest in peace, and Haas’ empirical analysis of how this had occurred in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951.[9] The elevation of ethnopolitics, and the inclusive and exclusive politics of group representation as a competitor of the state-centric system created areas which traditional diplomacy could not address, as they tended to resist efforts towards a compromise. Conflict resolution approaches developed in reaction to the ‘balance of power’ conflict management techniques associated with positivist Realpolitik approaches. This approach sees conflict outcomes as not determined by power in the long run, as power is difficult to define and conflict viewed as subjective, but attempts to understand conflict in terms of human needs, which are inexhaustible, but often are not allocated correctly. As these needs are not negotiable and are distinct from interests, their suppression can lead to conflict because their pursuit is said to be ontological drive common to all.[10] While interests are subject to negotiation, cultural values and universal needs are not. While they may be suppressed, they will always reappear. The suppression of these needs tends to lead to protracted conflicts, and the coercive mediation derived from traditional diplomacy and first generation peacemaking of the sort which state-backed mediators or the even UN engages in is said to ‘promote protracted conflict, even after a settlement...’[11] According to Burton, techniques for the resolution of conflict should reflect the needs of the actors within the ‘world society’.[12] Therefore, opportunities for individuals at all levels to communicate with each other in the context of a supportive framework are essential to avoid conflict.

Initially, conflict resolution approaches were developed through an analysis of the process of mediation, in which the process was ‘to explain conflict, its origins, and its escalation sometimes by reference to other conflicts, sometimes by analytical means, but within the context of a continuing discussion between the parties.’[13] Conflict is approached as a socio-biological problem to be solved, in which the third party must establish conditions in which the disputants attempt first to define and identify their conflict, before solving it. A de-escalatory mechanism is therefore introduced by focusing on a super-ordinate goal,[14] encouraging the two sides to look at each other's needs in an objective fashion. They can therefore explore each other’s fears and hence acknowledge their legitimacy, leading to the possibility of a win-win situation. Enemy images are deconstructed in the context of a global set of common needs or norms, the suppression of which provides a significant imperative for conflict and which are therefore a serious obstacle to conflict management and a reduction of tensions.

This perspective on conflict, and the methodology which is derived from it for solving conflict, is thought to remove the critical difficulties inherent in first generation peacemaking where the common argument is made that involvement is crippled by the intensity of the dispute, the resources or lack of that the third party has access to, and the type of issues at stake for the disputants.[15] It is in this context that the international system dictates that third parties must view their role as one of conflict management as opposed to resolution in order to bring about compromise through bilateral and trilateral negotiations. As the logic of the Westphalian international system is believed at this level to be zero sum, the relationships between disputants and third party are similarly based and as Mitchell has pointed out, intervention is crippled by its own logic.[16] This knot can, according to the conflict resolution perspective be untied by a bottom up approach in which individuals who have certain influential positions in the conflict environment are provided with an alternative and positive-sum understanding of their conflict, which through a trickle-up effect, will eventually play a role in the official peacemaking process. This brief analysis of the basis of the conflict resolution debate illustrates an important critique of first generation approaches to peacemaking which may replicate conflict, rather than manage it; the shift towards a post Westphalian world seems to be partly derived from this understanding.

Yet this is not without flaw. Conflict resolution’s contributions may fail to have a significant impact in intensely politicized environments where the impacts of nationalist discourses are intense. They cannot, at least in the short term, overcome divisions brought about by war and institutionalized by peacekeeping forces, though they may be important in promoting a new and less exclusive view of security at the grass roots level.

Problem-solving workshops aimed at protracted internal and international conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Moldova, and the Middle East, have increasingly come into use. In the case of the 1993 negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO representatives conducted in Oslo, conflict resolution approaches and traditional forms of negotiation where interchanged at different stages of the negotiations. The Tajikistan Dialogue provides another example in which a wide range of Tajiks where brought together in 1993, after a vicious civil war had erupted after the Soviet Tajikistan had become independent. A series of meetings resulted which entailed five separate stages,

(a) deciding to engage in dialogue to resolve mutually intolerable problems; (b) coming together to map the elements of the problems and the relationships that perpetuate the problems; (c) uncovering the underlying dynamic of the relationships and beginning to see ways to change them; (d) planning steps together to change the relationships; and (e) devising ways to implement their plan.[17]

As with the Oslo Accords, some of the Tajiks from different factions also participated in the official negotiations. In Moldova, conflict resolution workshops have blurred the distinction between unofficial and official diplomacy. These examples also illustrate the fact that problem-solving workshops tend to extend themselves into a series of meetings involving similar participants over a several months or years. This has occurred with the emergence of conflict resolution groups in Cyprus and the Middle East as well; sometimes the groups are organized by the same conveners involving the same participants while it is also common for participants to go on to join other workshops and groups. This kind of institutionalization of conflict resolution practice is extremely important in developing awareness at the civil and semi-official level, and does contribute in a variety of ways to the unofficial level. As Kriesburg has argued, ‘…in large-scale conflicts various intermediaries and approaches generally need to be combined to be effective. If they are well coordinated, their effectiveness enhances the efforts of any one approach.’[18]

It has been argued that though conflict resolution approaches may not replace formal diplomacy, they are important in preparing the ground and complementing the overall settlement process;[19] therefore, conflict resolution should therefore be seen as sub-strategy with a contingency model, which attempts to co-ordinate complementary interventions.[20] However, this carries the danger of merely moving the debate back towards coercive mediation and traditional diplomacy. Consequently, conflict resolution activities need to be reframed to consider including all those activities of NGOs relating to local stabilization. What conflict resolution offers is a plethora of theoretical and practical approaches to developing peace in conflict environments, and which can be exploited at several levels in order to channel global and regional norms of interdependence, human security and democratization into unstable local environments. It is here that the contribution of NGOs to the process of conflict resolution in civil society may be critical. NGOs can play an important role in facilitating a linkage between a global and civil society and thus resolving one of the most serious problems of the conflict resolution genre related to the trickle-up (and down) effect; this can also contribute to the diplomatic process of peacemaking in the realms of official diplomacy. NGOs that conduct humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and conflict resolution activities contribute to the objectives that second generation approaches have delineated. Indeed, conflict resolution has always been undertaken by NGO-type, independent, actors. Conflict resolution approaches also provide a methodology for NGO activity; it identifies the post Westphalian space they fill and in which they operate.

3. NGOs and Peace-building.

In response to the inadequacies of first generation approaches, it has been argued that settlements need to be based upon just political orders which promotes democracy and human rights, new norms, participatory governance structures, civil society, international tribunals, and truth commissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and moderate local political leadership play a role in this method.[21] This is based on conflict resolution perspectives of conflict, and requires deep access into local environments, something that requires grassroots processes rather than top down approaches. NGOs can often provide this because of their unofficial and human security oriented focus. State centric approaches cannot operate at this level. What this means is that first generation approaches fail in many conflicts because the structural asymmetry between state and non-state actors make compromise unlikely.[22]

The emergence of INGOs and NGOs as actors on the local and international scene since the 1960s has therefore partly been a normative response to the flaws of the international system, and its perpetuation of injustices relating to human needs/security, humanitarian intervention, and human rights vis-à-vis the inflexible perceptions that states have held with respect to territorial sovereignty. INGOs have been a high profile response to the inadequacies of the international system, while NGOs have often been a low profile response to the exploitation of power by political entrepreneurs in domestic environments, and to intractable conflicts, economic inequality, and humanitarian abuses. Their emergence is indicative of the need for a basis from which all actors can approach a much broader range of security issues in a post Westphalian context, as the logic of state-centricism in the Westphalian context provides a serious impediment to compromise and concessions in anything other than a zero-sum manner- which has often been transposed from inter-state to communal relations.

The search for new approaches implicit in Agenda for Peace including preventive diplomacy, and the UN’s wide utilization broader forms of peacekeeping complemented by peace-building approaches to stabilize conflicts, saw the realization that the NGO community can play a vital, role. This is part of a framework in which traditional concepts of security are being significantly redefined.[23] Boutros Ghali’s proposals for peace-building and preventative diplomacy offered an avenue through which existing techniques of peacemaking could be developed and enhanced. The concept of preventative diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building has moved some way in recognizing that the international community could do more to prevent conflict and that ‘…comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people…’ are needed to provide security for individuals and citizens in cases where states can not do so alone.[24] Furthermore, the point was also made that under a fully functioning Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional actors could play a significant role. Boutros Ghali’s ideas represented an important change of emphasis and provided opportunities for the reconfiguring of peacemaking activities through the contribution of activities that also focus on the citizen or individual, requiring the help of NGOs. It was argued that if "… UN efforts are to succeed, the roles of the various players need to be carefully coordinated in an integrated approach to human security."[25] Boutros Ghali recognized the assistance that NGOs could provide for UN peacemaking efforts, though he also recognized that ‘…government are central…’ to peacemaking.[26] Consequently, NGOs require procedures that will not compromise their independent status, but allows their action to be coordinated with the UN.[27] What this implies is that NGOs must be bound to the rules and norms of the Charter, once again, however, underlining the tensions between independent actors, the UN system and its member states.

Yet it is no surprise that NGOs have become a vital part of the emerging multi-level and multi-dimensional approaches to peacemaking. The international community’s response to the complex emergencies that have emerged with the end of the Cold War has involved heightened roles for IOs and ROs and a turn to various types of NGOs to provide humanitarian aid as well as to work on early warning, preventative peace-building, conflict resolution and reconciliation type projects. Both large and small NGOs have the ability to contribute to peacemaking, as well as to the reframing of state sovereignty and economic and social structures of oppression at the global, regional, and local level,[28] particularly in the emergence and identification of social and political space that attracts them. It is the space between officialdom, state and human security, which NGOs have begun to fill; no other actor has this potential in world politics. As Natsios, has argued the emergence of numerous centres of power ranging from the civil to the global has in part prompted this turn,[29] particularly as NGOs have access to local civil societies and their authority structures. This has prompted the international community and the UN to try to develop the role of NGOs in preventing, managing and resolving conflict.[30] In some cases, NGOs may now substitute for local government, and encourage the development of civil society in a post Westphalian context, through conflict resolution techniques.[31] The increasing legitimization of NGOs at the local, state, regional and global level, means that their agendas are more widely propagated; it also means that civil society has a linkage with global civil society as NGOs are legitimized in international organizations like the UN. NGOs are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns and therefore are themselves relatively free of claims to sovereignty, enabling them to work in normative frameworks that may not be tainted by official and systemic interests. NGOs tend to have the advantage of familiarity with the local conflict environment and close contacts with grassroots movements and therefore have been ascribed with the ability to play a preventive role. They can also play an important role through the gathering of supplementary information in areas of tension pertaining to human rights and their abuses. This is part of their peace-building role of strengthening civil society and the social system through the ability for small-scale projects (the training of local leaders, etc.). This means that NGOs are able to aid in the creation of the general conditions that enhance peace-building, promoting peace constituencies, which include cross-cutting segments of different sectors of civil society involved in the development of sustainable peace.[32]

An important question relates to the goals of NGOs. Such NGOs engaged in humanitarian and conflict resolution activities must address the question of impartiality in the context of their objectives. But as with traditional forms of conflict management in complex and intractable conflicts, the asymmetry of the legal environment in which conflict occurs means that even impartiality can be perceived as evidence of bias. For example, if a legally constituted government still exists it will regard any assistance given to non-state actors or rebels as evidence of bias; paradoxically in situations where a government no longer exists and the state has collapsed it may be easier to play a neutral role, although of course, asymmetries still exist between competing actors or warlords who may thus tend to see the roles of NGOs and mediators alike as biased.

Despite this, NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and commitment in local environments to respond rapidly to emerging signs of trouble. In such situations they provide essential services, aid, and have the capacity to inform the public both at the national and global level in order to mobilize opinion.[33] While the erosion of regional and local self-help capacities, and state sovereignty, and the possibility that NGOs may actually aid one of the disputants indirectly have been put forward as criticisms of NGO activity in complex emergencies,[34] the role of NGOs in conflict resolution and prevention is undeniably vital to the emerging practices of peacemaking in intractable conflict. NGOs can try to empower parties to deal with conflict constructively, monitor and lobby for human rights and the protection of minorities, and enact capacity-building and protective measurements for disadvantaged or endangered groups. NGOs, consequently, can play an important role in the creation of ‘peace-constituencies’.[35] Humanitarian NGOs may be open to manipulation in conflict environments by disputants, as Abiew and Keating have recently argued;[36] yet this is an indirect offshoot of their concern with normative issues like justice and human freedoms and rights. This, I would argue, is far less likely to be colored by interests which overlook such rights than state-centric activities and this is why NGOs carry extraordinary local and global levels of legitimacy particularly with citizen groups. While states may still dominate the legal sphere, this entails a certain amount of cynicism that NGOs are less susceptible to. The problem is to retain the advantages of their unofficial status without incurring the wrath of sovereign actors that fear interventionary practices becoming institutionalized upon their territory, while guarding against the corruption of NGOs themselves. Thus, linkages between transnational organizations (which are themselves torn between normative concerns and the state-centric interests of the international system) and NGOs are highly significant with respect to peacemaking in contemporary world politics. NGOs contribute to the process of conflict resolution by addressing aspects of conflict which official actors cannot reach; this is also supported by their role in humanitarian, developmental, media, and education issues in which NGOs contribute to the stabilization of civil society through identifying and acting upon the human needs frameworks, the communicational, and psychological, deep-rooted aspects of conflict. Citizen diplomacy can also become NGO diplomacy in which multi-dimensional efforts address the local, civil, regional and global aspects of the conflict, incorporating both an understanding of global norms and global civil society, the traditional international system of Westphalian states, and local identity, civil, and representational needs in the wider context of political and economic interdependence, regionalization and globalization.

Conflict resolution approaches have illustrated the need for local expertise and access to be built into peacemaking processes- something that NGOs can nurture. NGOs seem to have solved some of the conceptual problems of conflict resolution by becoming a vehicle for broad activities to occur at the civil level, but in the context of the world society perspective engendered by conflict resolution approaches. NGOs can emphasis the significance of cross-cutting forces working from the global to the local and vice versa, which have proven significant in an global system which many may still perceive to be neatly compartmentalized, but no longer is. Thus, NGOs can aid local actors in their awareness of how their existence, knowledge, and actions are constituted by their role in society, and also their role in a global society. The point is to negotiate a shared ‘reality’ upon which further negotiation processes can be built into the fabric of local and regional systems in a global, post Westphalian context. NGOs can also aid if necessary by bypassing the state, or government or administration if it does not conform to basic common norms shared by all interdependent political communities. They provide a conduit through which, by exploiting the methodology of conflict resolution approaches, local environments can be pacified in a global context of human needs/ security, democratization, regionalization and globalization. Natsios has argued that the evolving international system will demand expanded roles for NGOs in complex emergencies,[37] and that they are the best early warning system for impending conflict; clearly the presence of international NGOs in conflicts tends to restrain human rights abuses and thus also serve as a preventive function. It is the level of legitimacy which an NGO accrues in its local environment which is paramount, however, and this is directly related to the work it does (based on a human needs/ security framework) in employing conflict-resolution models as part of an overall peace-building approach. This includes blending private and official actors, and addressing the local, regional, and global aspects of international social conflict.[38]

4.1 Linking Civil Societies

With the re-emergence of international social conflicts and complex emergencies in the post cold war environment there seemed to be a general rush to exploit the willingness and local expertise of NGOs. This is because an alleviation of the worst effects of conflict did appear to occur by such use, but, it also is a way of delegating responsibility from international society to actors which had a greater ability to gain access to the civil societies involved. With some exception, the general assumption has been made that the objectives of NGOs coincide with the normative concerns that have received greater emphasis since the end of the Cold War. This, however, represents a contradiction (noted by Boutros Ghalis in Agenda for Peace) in that the system of sovereignty has often been used as a cover for humanitarian abuses and oppression by states, which international organizations and international law have been unable to respond to in a convincing manner because of the framework on non-intervention. Similarly, the rule of law in the local environment has often been used to impose ethnic, religious, and linguistic constraints, presenting NGOs and third parties with a dilemma about which framework should take precedence as a basis for their activities. Obviously, the legal and normative structures of non- intervention have been influential, though increasingly, a normative view has taken precedence when human security has been threatened- even by states (though only in selected conflicts).

This has partly been because NGOs alone tend to have access and the ability to address the social level of international social conflicts, but also because they have been perceived to provide a generally ethical perspective of politics and can, through undertaking low level, inexpensive, and unobtrusive peace-building efforts, contribute to a broader peace. It is clear that there currently exists a possibility in the current and changing environment of globalization and fragmentation for the involvement of IGOs, NGOs, non-state and state actors, to facilitate the development of 'ethical actors' and 'ethical regimes' in local stabilization projects (though agreement on what constitutes the ‘ethical’ is still a major barrier). This may occur in the context of the shifts which are emerging vis-à-vis sovereignty, non- intervention and human rights. As some actors in the international community move to strengthen human rights regimes through the creation of institutions which deal with human and minority rights, sovereignty and its associated regime of non-intervention have slowly lost its pre-eminence. It is in this context that a new generation of peace-building activity can emerge to which NGOs can make contributions. This is in the context of the attempt to attain post-Westphalian norms based on the dominance of human security and needs over, or in parallel with, state security, sovereignty, global and regional integration, reducing isolationism and particularism. Though this is a grand project, if it is to be undertaken at all, the role of NGOs is clearly vital as they are the only actors able to operate within societies torn by conflict on a broad range of social and economic issues that may be part of the overall conflict environment.

IOs, ROs and NGOs therefore can contribute to the emergence of ethical regimes which lie behind these shifts in the international system; it is here that their work can be located conceptually in order to promote the legitimacy of their roles. Their efforts at post-conflict regeneration and stabilization should promote an awareness of this development, particularly in the case of situations where states or dominant actors are operating outside of this emerging post-Westphalian system. NGOs make an important contribution in the realm of civil society because they have access to groups and organizations that may bear some responsibility for intractable conflict and ethnic tension. Through a conflict resolution methodology which focuses on human needs and is therefore ethical in nature, NGOs can try to play a role of undercutting nationalist and stereotype perceptions which perpetuate debates (though this must be implemented without incurring the wrath of those who stimulate such debates). In intractable and ethno political conflicts hatred stems from the control of information to a large extent; NGOs can play an important role here. While local actors in civil society may try to prevent this, NGOs can retain their access through co-operation with high level diplomatic frameworks for stabilization or a solution and through concurrent and complementary work with international and regional organizations. This involves co-ordination, but it allows NGOs to bring norms of interdependence, co-operation and human rights to local civil society in a manner which high level official and unofficial mediators and actors cannot do if they are caught up in the legalistic framework of international and state-centric debates. This can be achieved by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the local environment and allows NGOs a chance to influence the attitude of extremist local actors and organizations towards moderation. A note of caution must be added here, however, as such a role may well become heavily politicized by the tension between sovereignty and intervention. Even more problematic is that such a role depends upon a commitment on the part of international society to human security that must be reinforced by the provision of the necessary resources. At the moment, both an international consensus about the reprioritization of human security over state security is lacking (exemplified, for example, by the lack on consensus in the UN Security Council over intervention for humanitarian reasons in the Balkans) and consequently so are the resources. Despite this lack of consensus at the international level, NGOs continue to play a crucial role in addressing the social aspects of international-social conflict. The lack of consensus at the international level, however, serves to politicize the role of NGOs and thus to undermine their potential.

With so many actors at different levels of the international system, global civil society and civil society, motivated through self interest or a notion of the greater good to intervene in complex emergencies, this means that some co-ordination may be required to avoid overlapping and counterproductive efforts, which result in inefficient operations. The main point is to develop a multi-sectoral, multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to conflict prevention and resolution. Conflict transformation requires that coalition-building occurs to create cross-cutting cleavages involving a wide variety of constituencies which can then find channels through which their activities can be coordinated. Information can then be shared and strategic planning and evaluation can occur. It is well known that one of the most difficult problems of conflict prevention is translating early warning intelligence in political will and action.[39] However, the limited mobilization that has already occurred is indicative of the need for political will for conflict resolution and the importance of mutual co-operation and codes of conduct. These are all indicative of the growing integration of local and global civil society, and beyond into a post Westphalian international system.

There is a clear need to mobilize the political will of IGOs, national governments and NGOs to act in time to prevent major humanitarian crises and acts of genocide. In line with Boutros Boutrous Ghalis’ call for preventative diplomacy, calls have been made (going as far back as Kenneth Boulding and the founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution) for the creation of an early warning system in order to recognize patterns human-rights violations at an early stage. Diplomatic pressure can to be applied with the sending of observation missions and with the deployment of armed forces as a last resort. Because of their unique access NGOs can support and stimulate an effective response, and contribute to a multi-level and multi-dimensional peacemaking and/ or building operation. NGOs have a vital role to play both in these operations and also in building up a consensus about why these operations are required, through their ability to network and lobby, filling the gap between civil society and global society, exploiting cross-cutting cleavages. This requires that NGOs have greater access to governments and regional and international organizations. However, NGOs need to increase their credibility at these levels, including in areas pertaining to their legitimacy, efficiency, effectiveness, and conduct. Much more work needs to be done on the practical choices, and the political and ethical choices that confront NGOs, relating to their roles and impartiality, and the possible knock-on effects of their activities. As with any activity that brings new resources into a conflict environment, there is the possibility that some of these resources may become part of the conflict itself. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that there is often a lack of international consensus amongst dominant state actors about what should be done and how far they are responsible to intervene to bring about a sustainable peace, particularly in conflict zones beyond of their own direct interests.

Human rights abuses by states, the oppression of minorities, and the suppression of their claims for representation, democratization, education and development tend to be highly politicized in local environments and therefore need to be addressed at a level at which states are marginalized. This is particularly so if states themselves cannot find a consensus on what should be done and commit themselves to facilitate its achievement. Given that states control the majority of the world's resources this is extremely difficult, but it may well be easier to mediate the interests of those engaged in intractable conflict via NGOs (directly or indirectly) and regional and international organizations, with state actors and interests remaining indirectly involved. This would ultimately aid in the channelling of norms of an ethical nature for peace, representation, democratization and development into local environments. It is therefore important to consider the links between local and international actors and their relationship with NGOs, particularly as their work in the field of peacemaking and peace-building impinges upon the sphere of influence of states and international organizations. NGOs which are dedicated to monitoring specific laws or specific institutions, lobbying, peace-building and early warning, play a valuable role, which needs to be expanded in order to curtail the credibility gap of traditional tools and methods of peacemaking, and to increase the effectiveness of the international system and community in responding to conflict. However, one difficulty lies in the fact that while NGOs can play a vital role in building civil and therefore global civil society, if their legitimacy and resources are enhanced by increased co-operation with states and international or regional organizations, they may either be forced to take on board the interests of states in the traditional diplomatic system or states may withdraw their support. An important question, therefore, relates to whether NGOs can help states and international organizations iron out difficulties in the peacemaking apparatus of the international system pertaining to intractable conflict, or whether states and NGOs are on a collision course with each other.

A tentative answer to this is that post-Westphalian norms may increasingly parallel those of local civil society, particularly in the context of emerging ethical regimes of a humanitarian nature and NGOs have played and can play a vital role in enhancing the parallel development of global civil society and local civil societies, thus reducing the impact of Realpolitik at the state level.[40] It is important to note that evidence suggests that among NGOs a consensus appears to be emerging that conflict prevention is likely to be more effective if it operates in a multi-dimensional and ‘multi-track’ level in which local actors, external NGOs, governments and international organizations undertake complementary actions.[41] Such multi-dimensional approaches, however, require concerted and consistent co-ordination, and many critics have attacked NGOs, international organizations and governments for their failure to sustain their initiatives. In particular governments and NGOs have been accused of a tendency to search for media attention, focusing on post- rather than pre- violence interventions.[42] It is clear, however, that peace-building strategies that bring together IOs, ROs, states, and NGOs are more effective, despite the conceptual and practical conflicts that exist between them.

In this context it is important to examine how NGOs can operate to transport and emphasize norms of peaceful coexistence in failing regions and locales, or in areas where violence has already flared. Frost has argued that there exists a settled body of norms which include the preservation of the society of sovereign states, the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, peace as a settled norm, collective security arrangements for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, the preferability of democratic institutions, and the protection of human rights by both states and the international system.[43] This argument is predicated on the grounds that international order requires the preservation of the system and society of states itself, the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, the goal of peace among the member states of society as the normal condition of their relationship, and the common goals of all social life, [44] in which states achieve the limitation of violence following a common code in which violence is legitimated only under certain circumstances. The development of a post-Westphalian version of international society has seen the extension of the societal aspect of this school of thought and the construction of new versions of human, rather than state, security, spanning much broader issues, new claims to sovereignty based on identity and human rights, and subsequently greater recognition of the diversity of actors and issues in conflict.[45] It is increasingly possible to see a pattern of some similarities between global and civil norms, or between the universal and the local within the post Westphalian context. What this indicates is that those actors with access to the global and civil levels have enhanced levels of legitimacy, particularly in areas of interest where the importation of such norms could enhance human security- in particular at the local level. The need for a plurality of ‘just’ communities emphasizes the need for political delegation to actors that have an acute awareness of, legitimacy in, and access to local conflict environments. However, care must be taken that this is not seen as a mandate to impose outside norms and conditions that may only exacerbate conflict. Here NGOs can make a major contribution to preserving particularist local values in the context of ‘universalist’ IO or RO peace operations, which may lack local normative or cultural sensitivities. In turn this means that the root of conflicts are more likely to be addressed because NGOs fit themselves in between each level of analysis in the sequence of kin, city, state, regional and international organizations, facilitating and monitoring activities all these levels of analysis in a private capacity. This is crucial to peace-building as NGOs have the ability to operate in this manner in these positions providing access, independent monitoring and facilitation. In this way they form a sort of cartilage between the different levels of the international system regardless of the issue area in which they operate; they promote a practical and normative exchange between them.[46]

To play an enhanced role, NGOs need access to resources and the full range of actors in global society. There has been an increase in the number of NGOs, (though this tends to be dominated by agendas from the North) and frameworks have emerged for NGO access and participation at the global level, as well as at the governmental level, though often NGO activity has again been curtailed by state-imposed limits. Within the UN, for example, there is evidence that there exists a deepening society of global NGOs. Yet, states only provisionally accept NGOs' contributions to UN conferences as many governments refuse to see their claims to sovereignty over issues, within their sphere of interest, eroded by such activity. Although the support of civil society is generally considered to make an important contribution to peaceful social transformation, some have argued that ‘…this concept often was equaled with the support of the NGOs in developing societies by Western donors which, without a sufficiently social basis, only created a fragmented and artificial society.’[47] It has also been argued that conflict prevention and transformation NGOs lack sufficient legitimacy with respect to their influence and their own internal structure. Despite this NGOs are often perceived as more, rather than less, legitimate because of their conceptual location on the intersection between the norms of global and civil societies.

5. Conclusion: NGOs and a Third Generation of Peacemaking Activity

Given the fact that the first two generations of approaches to ending conflict are clearly mono-dimensional, both in their understanding of conflict and the methodologies they provide to manage and resolve it, there has been a recognition of the need for multidimensional approaches to conflict, particularly as the end of the cold war had provided greater room for maneuver for peacemakers and peacekeepers in the new international environment. This can be charted in the through the development of UN peace operations from Cambodia through to the fiascos of Somalia and Bosnia, the failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda and the UN’s bypass over NATO intervention in Kosovo. At the high point of euphoria in the post cold war environment, attempts were being made to construct massive peace operations that included measures for military pacification and disarmament, political democratization, humanitarian tasks, human rights monitoring and reconstruction. Clearly, official political or military actors could not fulfil the wide range of tasks here and NGOs seemed to be in an ideal position for the UN to out-source these tasks to.

There were deep-rooted factors involved in these developments. Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace had presented a far broader definition of security than had been hitherto common in the diplomatic arena, calling for early warning systems, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building operations to become engaged in addressing the ‘…deepest causes of social injustice and political oppression…’ Indeed, the rhetoric about security shifted from the state to the human (for a brief time, at least). Accordingly, what was required was a coordinated strategy that spanned preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping/ enforcement, and post- conflict peace-building as part of a general commitment to a broader notion of peace and security. This involved a long term commitment to post-settlement environments including disarmament, the repatriation of refugees, the restoration of order, election monitoring, the protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions, and ‘…promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.’[48] Thus, the peace-building process enveloped a spectrum of actors from governments to NGOs, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public.[49] Conflict was to be viewed partly through the human needs and ethical prism that conflict resolution offers.

In the late Westphalian context many existing regional multilateral organizations have developed mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as in the OSCE, OAU, and OAS.[50] Their close geographical proximity to conflicts, and their ability to bring pressure bear on the parties to a conflict, the methods and norms they espouse are often more acceptable to the parties in dispute than methods and norms imposed by external forces.[51] Added to this, the role of a network of NGOs (perhaps, as proposed by International Alert) that would work with the UN and ROs, can provide early warning and play a role in formulating and implementing responses to conflict.[52] For example, Lund proposes a ‘stratified, multilateral regime’ of prevention, which has the organizational dynamics and normative principles of third generation approaches to peacemaking and peace-building in this context:

‘…actions to prevent conflicts would be undertaken first in terms of direct involvement by local

actors such as the disputants themselves, but with the indirect support of other actors outside the

arena of conflict, acting through their representatives present at the local level, such as the

ambassadors of major or medium-sized states. Only if greater resources and muscle seem

necessary to bring the parties to an agreement would higher level actors become directly

involved-in the first instance at the regional level and in the second at the global level. Thus, each

of the three levels- local, regional, and global-would come into the foreground as necessary.[53]

This framework mirrors the levels of analysis used here (local, state, regional and global), and also the three generations of peacemaking activity, from high level diplomacy to conflict resolution, and increasingly to peace-building methods which incorporate all of levels of analysis. Lund rightly points out the clear sensitivities aroused by direct intervention by third parties in the local environment and calls for the strengthening of ROs in this respect supported by ‘global-level actors’.[54] It is in this context that NGOs can become active in the area of human security in a private, non-threatening capacity.[55] In doing so a channel is created between local and global civil society which is vital for the resolution of intractable conflicts and the abatement of complex emergencies.

In the emerging post-Westphalian environment the potential and space for NGOs to utilize the reprioritization towards human needs and security rather than state security has created the opportunity for peace-building to function on many levels in a multidimensional manner, without threatening to overpower particularistic normative or cultural systems, but in the context of a global [civil] society. Conflicts may now be discussed and redressed in the context of local, regional and global debates and NGOs seem to provide crucial linkages between the local and global for this to occur.

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[1] Oliver Richmond is a lecturer in the Department of IR, University of St. Andrews, UK. His book Mediating in Cyprus was published by Frank Cass in 1998 and he has published several articles on ethnic conflict, the UN, the Cyprus problem, and on approaches to peacemaking. A co-edited book entitled The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development (Macmillan: with James Kerlindsay) was published in 2001, and another will follow called Beyond Peacekeeping? The United Nations and Human Security in Post-Westphalian International Relations (Macmillan: with Edward Newman). A research monograph entitled Maintaining Order, Making Peace will also be published soon. He can be contacted on opr@st-andrews.ac.uk.

[2] Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, & Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, 1999, p.77.

[3] This in itself is not entirely unproblematic: it raises issues of intervention and sovereignty, and most importantly it raises the neo-liberal question of whether such activities are based on universal or local norms.

[4] Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan, Boundaries in Question, (London; Pinters) 1995, p.5. See also Murray Forsyth, "The Tradition of International Law", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics, (Cambridge University Press 1992), p.39.

[5] Brian Mandell, "The Limits of Mediation: Lessons from Syria-Israel Experience, 1974-1994", in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation, (London: Boulder 1996), p.136.

[6] See T. Princen, 'Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?', Journal of Peace Research, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, Vol. 28, No.1, Feb. 1991; and also T. Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, (Princeton UP 1992).

[7] See Oliver Richmond, "Devious Objectives and The Disputants’ View Of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework", Journal of Peace Research, Vol.35, No.6 (1998). For a detailed discussion of the Cyprus case as a specific example of this see also, Oliver Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the UN (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

[8] See Dorothy V. Jones, "The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Op.Cit., pp.54-55.

[9] See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (OUP 1943); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (Stanford University Press 1958).

[10] E.A. Azar , "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in J Burton & EA Azar, International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, (Wheatsheaf Books, 1986) p.29.

[11] H. Miall (ed.), The Peacemakers, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1992) pp.234-237.

[12] J. Burton, Conflict and Communication, (London: Macmillan 1969) p.161.

[13] J. Burton, Conflict and Communication, Op.Cit., pp.61-62.

[14] David Mitrany’s work on conflict provides an important contribution to the critique of traditional diplomacy, as does Groom and Taylor’s development of his work on functional institutions, which seem to point to an opening for the development of a new form of multidimensional peacemaking, as outlined below. See D.A. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, (London: Martin Robertson 1975); AJR Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, (London: Pinter, 1990).

[15] For example, see Mareike Kleibor: "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.40., No.2., June 1996, p.362.

[16] Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, (Pinter: London 1996) p.68.

[17] Louis Kreisburg, "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field", in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict, (USIP: Washington D.C. 1996). pp.67-68.

[18] Ibid., p.69.

[19] E.E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1990) p.26.

[20] For example, the International Negotiation Network has been involved in direct conflict resolution. It Secretariat at the Carter Centre assemblies academic analysis on conflicts appropriate for intervention. In the early 1990s in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia, it worked collaboratively with governments and NGOs and through the INN council comprised of eminent world leaders it networks between disputants and world leaders. As a consequence of its somewhat mixed experiences it has developed a third party assistance model based on broad academic analyses of conflict and appropriate multi-dimensional responses aimed at addressing all levels of the conflict, through official and unofficial political, social and economic strategies. Dayle E. Spencer & Willian J. Spencer, "Third Party Transformation: Experiences in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia", in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation, (St Martin’ Press 1995), pp.167-195. The Royal United Services Institute is currently involved in organising meetings between crucial Greek and Turkish military and political figures, both as a confidence building measure, to promote confidence and awareness, and to contribute to a reduction in regional tensions. NGOs are also becoming active in Cyprus, mainly in conflict resolution, where it is interesting to note that the formation of NGOs seen as a response to the inadequacies of high level diplomacy.

[21] Fen Osler Hampson, "Third Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict", Millennium, Vol.26, No.3, 1997, pp.736-740.

[22] For an elaboration of this, see Oliver P. Richmond, "Mediating Ethnic Conflict: A Task for Sisyphus?", Global Society, Vol. 13., No.2., 1999.

[23] David Held, Democracy and the Global Order, (Cambridge; Polity Press 1995) pp.266-286. For a discussion of the changing theoretical debates within International Relations Theory, see John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (eds), Op.Cit.

[24]Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations 1992), esp. pp.5-22.

[25] Supplement to Agenda for Peace, A/50A/60-s/1,3, January 1995, para, 81.

[26] Ibid., para. 82. He argues that ad hoc groups within the UN and regional organisations are also important.

[27] Ibid., para. 89.

[28] Francis Kofi Abiew & Tom Keating, "Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6., No.2., 1999, p.90.

[29] Andrew S. Natsios in I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, Op.Cit., p. 338.

[30] Pamela Aall, "Nongovernmental Organisations and Peacemaking" in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Managing Global Chaos, (Washington DC: USIP), 1996, p.434.

[31] Ibid., p.436.

[32] However, NGOs may complicate the conflict environment as with the decentralisation of conflict a wide array of actors become involved in micro and macro level interventions. For instance, four voluntary agencies (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, and the UN Development Program) and international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as donor-country foreign aid offices, donor-country diplomats, and military forces often constitute a complex response mechanism which suffers from low levels of co-ordination. Andrew S. Natsios, Op.Cit., p.339.

[33] See, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict, (Final Report). (Washington 1997) p. 114.

[34] See Eftihia Voutira and Shaun A. Wishaw Brown, Conflict Resolution. A Review of Some Non-Governmental Practices; A Cautionary Tale, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstituet 1995).

[35] See John Paul Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework", in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation, (Houndsmills; London 1995) p.201 – 222.

[36] Op.Cit., p.93.

[37] Andrew. S. Natsios, Op.Cit., p.343

[38] Ibid., p.352.

[39] The recent events in Kosovo have been part of a long and obvious process, going back in its most recent phase to 1988, and yet little concrete was achieved (before the intervention of NATO occurred). The plight of the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq has seen little concrete action (the no-fly zone included as it is only a stop-gap measure), and it took an intifada for the rights of the Palestinians to reach beyond mere international rhetoric. The case of East Timour provides little more reason for optimism.

[40] Global civil society can be defined as an association between economy and state, citizens, voluntary associations and social movements, and forms of public communication. See Fred Gale, "Constructing Global Civil Society Actors" in Global Society, Vol.12., No. 3., 1998, p.345. Citing Sandra Maclean, "Conflicting Boundaries? NGO Partnerships and the Development of Global and National Civil Societies in south Africa", Draft paper presented to the 37th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, p.345.

[41] Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, & Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, (Polity Press 1999) p.119. See also L. Diamond & J. McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, Washington, DC: Kumarian Press, 1996; K. Rupesinghe, General Principles of Multi-Track Diplomacy, (London: International Alert 1996).

[42] Hugh Miall et al, Op.Cit., p.119.

[43] Mervyn Frost, Op.Cit., pp.106-111.

[44] Cited in Mervyn Frost, Ibid., p.115.

[45] Alexis Heraclides, 'The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol.26, No.3, 1997), pp.680.

[46] This argument seems to complement an emerging debate amongst those interested in the development of a global civil society as to its nature with respect to the NGO community. For example, a recent article on this topic argues that the term ‘global’ represents a geographically diverse and balanced representation which includes non-state actors, while civil society represents a regularized participation in global interactions and NGO access to global forms of governance, in a environment with mutual behavioral expectations and a shared substantive understanding. Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochesteller, "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women", in World Politics, Vol.51., No.1., 1998, pp.3-4.

[47] Luis Roninger & Ayse Gynes-Ayata (eds.), Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, Boulder: London, 1994.

[48] Agenda for Peace, para. 55.

[49] Ibid., para. 84.

[50] However, recent Pakistani proposals to incorporate a conflict resolution framework into SARC met with rejection by India. See Hindustan Times, 24 September, 1999, p.1; 27 September p.18. India has also been reluctant to countenance the concept of humanitarian intervention.

[51] Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp.176-177. However, regional organizations also have some significant shortcomings relating to the financial, logistical, and human resources necessary for effective preventive action. They often lack professional experience in conflict resolution, and often find themselves constrained by their member states' determination to maintain their individual sovereignty.

[52] The distinct advantages this presents are related to their extensive grass-roots contacts and intimate knowledge of local environments; their ability to promote dialogue between disputants and to create forge a links between professional, commercial, and educational bodies that bypass governments and national boundaries Michael S. Lund, Op.Cit., p.179.

[53] Ibid., pp.180-183., & pp.185-188.

[54] Ibid., p.188.

[55] Ibid., p.192.