Article 2 (2009)

RESOLVING MILITIA CONFLICTS IN THE NIGER DELTA:  THE ROLE AND STRATEGIES OF MEDIATION[1]

BY

DR. IBABA S. IBABA*

AND

MR. PHILIPS O. OKOLO**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY, P.M.B 071

WILBERFORCE ISLAND

BAYELSA STATE

NIGERIA

Email:  *eminoaibaba@yahoo.com

         ** philipsokolo@yahoo.com

Abstract

This paper examines the role and strategies of mediation in the resolution of militia conflict in the Niger Delta.  It reviewed the context of the conflict and the resulting challenges and notes that mediation can facilitate negotiation, in addition to getting the commitment of the disputing parties to enhance peace building in the region. The paper is divided into five parts. The first is the introduction, while the second examines theoretical issues in the conflict and captures the different settings of the conflict. The third highlights the context of militia conflict in the Niger Delta and locates the conflict in grievances caused by domination and deprivation. The fourth analyses the role and strategies of mediation in the resolution of militia conflict. It rationalizes the choice of mediation for the resolution of the conflict on the basis of its win-win and compromise nature. Adjudication and Arbitration based on legal outcomes, the paper argues may exacerbate the conflict, given that the laws governing the Oil Industry and resource distribution have contributed to the conflict. The last part of the paper is devoted to conclusion.

Introduction

Oil based conflicts in the Niger Delta have thrown up a general state of insecurity and instability which manifests as killings, destruction of properties, kidnapping/ hostage taking and attacks on oil installations and equipments. In 2006 alone, 118 workers of oil multinationals were taken hostage in 24 attacks that led to four deaths. Similarly, the first half of 2007, recorded 33 attacks resulting to nine deaths and 129 hostages. (Ibaba, 2008:22).

In 2008, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND) attacked the nations most prized offshore oil facility, the Bonga Oil platform that produces about 10 percent  of the nations total oil production output. Subsequently the facility was shut down for days (the Nation, 07 04 08: 40). It is estimated that insurgency in the Niger Delta cost the country $58.3 billion in oil revenue, an average of 300, 000 barrels per day in oil production since 1991(Sunday Independent, 13 07 08: 9) other accounts estimate the losses in oil revenue to $6.8 billion between 1999- 2004 and $ 4.4 billion per annum since 2005(Watts, 2007: 639).

This clearly endangers the national economy and security. But as Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz (2007) have also noted, it threatens American energy security. This suggests that other countries that depend on oil supplies from Nigeria are also at risk. The February 17 2009 attack on the Presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea by Niger Delta Militants (http://allafrica.com/stories/200902180155.html) also draws attention to the implications of the conflicts on regional security.

Scholars have blamed the conflicts in the Niger Delta on a number of factors which include: Alienation and disempowerment (Joab-Peterside, 2005; Nna, 2001; Okoko and Nna, 1997) and the militarization of democracy. (HRW; 2005). Other factors include human rights violation (Aaron, 2006^a; Ibeanu, 2008); the failure of corporate social responsibility by oil multinational (Ikelegbe, 2008; Aaron, 2008); Corruption and accountability failures in governance (Enweremadu 2008; Peel, 2005) and the country’s federalism that is characterized by inter-segmental imbalance and ethnicity based political domination ( Naanen, 1995; Ibaba, 2005)

The attention of scholars have centred on the causes and effects of these types of conflicts:

i)                    Oil Company – Community;

ii)                  Intra - Community;

iii)                Inter – Community;

iv)                Inter – ethnic; and

v)                  Militia groups – State

However, the literature appears not to have adequately captured the role and strategies of mediation in the resolution of these conflicts.  This paper intends to close this gap, as it explores the path to the resolution of militia based conflicts through mediation.

Protests and agitations in the Niger Delta began in the mid 1980’s and have passed through distinct phases.  Owugah (1999:5-8) has identified four phases.  He notes that:

The first phase could be roughly put between the early and mid 1980’s.  The dominant strategy in this phase was that of legal actions by the communities against the oil companies to pay adequate compensation for damages to their property… The second phase was characterized by peaceful demonstrations and occupation of flow stations to get the oil companies to pay ‘adequate’ compensation or to fulfil their promises to provide certain amenities and to employ indigenes of the community…the oil companies responded by calling in the police and military.  The intervention of these state operatives often resulted in destruction of lives and property…The resistance thus assumed a desperately militant formed in the third phase… mid 1990’s to 1998…characterized by the militant strategy of forceful occupation and shutting down of flow stations, kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of tug boats and other vessels belonging to the oil companies… The fourth phase is the demand for resource ownership and control.

A number of issues are discernible from this reference.  Firstly, militia conflicts in the Niger Delta emerged over a decade, but perhaps were unnoticed, or did not attract serious attention because it did not significantly affect oil production.  Secondly, militia conflicts emerged because of the failure of the state to address the objective conditions that set in the agitations in the first place, and the state’s violent responses to protests in the Niger Delta.

This clearly suggests the need to adopt useful strategies of conflict resolution and peace building.  This research examines these strategies by analyzing the following two questions.

(i)                 What role can mediation play in the resolution of media conflicts in the Niger Delta?

(ii)               What strategies can mediation adopt to enhance the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis?

Theoretical Setting

Although men have different interests that are incompatible, they are required to live collectively, if individual interests must be achieved.  This necessarily draws men into conflict as they struggle to achieve their interests, thus making conflict an inevitable component of social existence (Ndu, 1998:1-3).  This makes conflict resolution an important activity of man, as peaceful and harmonious existence depends on it.

Thomas Hobbes makes this clearer in the Leviathan where he draws attention to the necessity of peace for human survival. The pursuit of individual interest in the state of nature set in violence that limited freedom and inhibited the realization of mans interest and survival. The restive condition in the state of nature made man to establish a social contract in other to form civil society. In society, man realizes peace which ensures his self preservation through the law. (Sabine and Thorson, 1973; Mukherjee and Ramaswamy, 2006).

It is noteworthy that conflict differs in form and intensity, from place to place and from time to time (Anikpo, 1998:7).  Thus, an understanding of conflicts requires knowledge of the particular conflict system (Bassey, 2002:1).  But what is conflict?  This question has elicited several answers – the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups (Francis, 2006:20); a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, cited by Otite, 2001:1); actions taken by contending parties, towards the achievement of incompatible interest (Orluwene, 2008:346).

It is clear that conflict is the opposition between individuals and among groups that results from the pursuit of incompatible interests.  It can manifest as quarrel, fight through litigation, exclusion, isolation, and destruction of lives and property.  Conflict is blamed on three essential factors – psychological, socio-psychological and sociological factors (Bassey, 2002:1). Numerous theories or approaches have emerged from these– structural conflict theory; realist theories; biological theories; frustration – aggression theory; physiological theories; economic theories; human needs theory; systemic theories; and relational theories (Ademola, 2006:35-60).

Each of the following has been characterized as specific causal factors of conflict:

(i)                 Conflicting interpretation of rights and responsibilities, resulting from differences in values or ethical principles;

(ii)               Differences in ethical values and principles among individuals, groups and corporate bodies;

(iii)             Changing values and principles, particularly changes in individual values before corporate values;

(iv)             Differences in values, resulting in different interpretation of factors (Olokesusi, 1996:7-8).

The successful resolution of conflicts thus requires a clear understanding of the causal factors.  Boulding (1977:84) has noted that the occurrence of conflict is not important, but how conflicting parties deal with it.  Dispute resolution is however predicated on the proper contextualization of the issues in contest.  Thus, it is important to examine the context of the militia conflicts in the Niger Delta.

Understanding Militia Conflicts in the Niger Delta

The paradox of poverty in riches is widely seen as the objective condition that has induced the conflicts in the Niger Delta (Akinbuwa, 2008; Ibaba 2007; Aaron, 2006).  Nigeria’s oil and gas industry that accounts for over 80 percent of national revenue is concentrated in the Niger Delta.  Oil has generated huge sums of money for Nigeria. For example, the country received the sum of $509, 555. 00 million as oil revenue between 1960 and 2006 (Nafziger, 2008: 153 – 154). The graph below demonstrates the trend of oil revenue inflow.

Figure 1

But the oil revenue has not impacted positively on the people of the Niger Delta. The United Nations Development Program reported in 2006 that access to education is limited. For example a population of 3, 700 people with a land mass of 14 square kilometres have only one primary school. Similarly, at the post primary school level one school serves a land area of 55 square kilometres with a population of 14, 679 people. In the area of primary health care, one health facility serves a population of 9, 805 people with 43 settlements and a land mass of 44 square kilometres. For secondary health care, a land mass of 583 square kilometres or 48 settlements are serviced by one health facility (UNDP, 2006: 27 – 34).

Corruption at all levels of governance is largely blamed for this condition. Enweremadu, (2008: 450) has noted that:

Budgetary appropriations are often systematically structured to enrich those who control state power. A common way of doing this consists in concentrating huge public expenditure on over priced white elephant projects with little or no relevance to public welfare, but which usually offers unlimited opportunity for officials to line their pockets through kick backs paid by contractors.

The result is that only a little fraction of budgeted funds trickle down to the common people. The situation in the Niger Delta is made worse by environmental degradation and land take for oil industry activities. Oil spills and gas flare destroys marine life, kills vegetation, crops and economic trees, and reduces the nutrient value of the soil and crop yield.

Studies have shown that gas flare reduces crop yield within six hundred meters form the flare site. The loss in yield in 10 percent within one kilometre, while it is total(100 percent) loss if it is two hundred meters aware from the flare point( Salau, 1993). The combined effects of oil spills and land take for oil production activities have also led to the fragmentation of farmlands and reduction of the bush fallow period from three to five years to one to two years in affected communities (Adeyemo, 2002; Ibaba, 2004). The implication is reduced nutrient value of the soil and crop yield.

The backlash is productivity losses and occupational displacement (Opukiri and Ibaba, 2008). Rural economies in the Niger Delta are based on fishing and farming. Displacement has encouraged rural-urban migration, but because of the crisis of the Nigerian economy, those who migrate to the urban area lack employment and alternative sources of livelihood.  This, in addition to increasing independence of individuals, poor social relationships and increasing competition for resource among the people have led to social disorganization . The consequence is the loss of group control over individuals and the emergence of deviant behavior (Ikporupko, 2003)

Another important contextual factor includes the condition of the oil producing communities. These communities are impacted by a number of factors including:

(i)                 The politics of derivation in revenue allocation, and the resultant alienation of the Niger Delta people from adequate share of the oil wealth;[2]

(ii)               The failure of the oil companies to respond to their corporate social responsibility;

(iii)             Accountability and transparency failures in governance at all tiers of government (federal, state and local government) and the resultant corruption; and

(iv)             The difficult geographical terrain of the Niger Delta makes the provision of development infrastructure to be very expensive.

The grim reality of poverty, unemployment, hunger and deprivation has induced political consciousness that has brought to the fore the present condition which vitiates the hope and vision for a better life.  This has set in frustration and pent up anger that provides a fertile ground for conflicts to erupt.  The structural conflict theory and the frustration aggression theory express this point. The two theories emphasize that when achievement is below expectations, and it is attributed to an individual or organization, it results to frustration and anger, and the agent deemed to be responsible for the failure becomes an object of attack (Ibaba, 2007:3).

Thus, the protests and attacks against the oil companies and the federal government are located in this context.  Psychology teaches that when frustration is not resolved, it leads to worries, anger and ultimately violence (Ibaba, 2005:26).  The inability of the Nigerian state to resolve the issues that set in the frustrations of the people turned the initial peaceful protests into violence.  State violence and repression, as evidenced by the destruction of Odi in Bayelsa State for example, induced the people into armed organizations in pursuance of the struggle for sharing into the oil wealth.

In November 1999 about 5000 Nigerian soldiers, equipped with sophisticated weapons such as armored cars and rocket launchers (Eseduwo, 2008; 498) invaded Odi community. The troupes attacked the community in response to the killing of eight men and officers of the Nigerian Police force by some armed youths based in the community. At the end of the reprisal attack Odi, the second biggest town in Bayelsa State was totally destroyed. Only three schools (two primaries and one secondary, a building housing the local branch of First Bank and some churches remained as landmarks that a community once existed. (Bayelsa Voice, 25 11 99)

It is noteworthy that when agitations turns to the use of arms, there is always a tendency to illegally exploit natural resources to raise funds for the procurement of arms.  This therefore encouraged illegal oil bunkering that is presently internationalized.  The use of armed political thugs in elections also helped to lay the foundation of militancy in the Niger Delta. (Joab-Peterside, 2005:30-51).  The backlash is the hostage takings and the instability in the region.

Militia groups, armed groups that are engaged in the insurgency in the Niger Delta are presently well organized with efficient command structures.  Discussions on the challenges their activities have thrown up is limited to insecurity and disruptions in oil production.  Importantly however, they engage in other activities that create a dilemma for the government in the choice of appropriate strategies for the resolution of the conflicts.  These activities include:

(i)                 The provision of security for the host communities of militia groups;

(ii)               Their use by government of the Niger Delta States[3] and oil companies[4] to secure oil operations;

(iii)             The provision of basic social amenities to host communities of militia groups.

Militia groups who make money through payments from government, and oil companies, and proceeds from illegal oil bunkering now use part of their funds to provide water, electricity, medical care and educational scholarships. This has strengthened the solidarity between the militia groups and the communities.  Examples include Olugbobiri in Bayelsa State, and Okerenkoko in Delta State. Clearly, this does not make the use of force, a useful option in the resolution of the conflicts.  This calls for peaceful initiative or approaches.  This paper advocates the use of mediation.  The next section examines this issue.

Resolving Militia Conflicts through Mediation

Mediation is a conflict resolution tool that involves a third party.  In this context, the intervening party is the mediator, who has limited or no authority in decision-making but can facilitate the voluntary resolution of disputes (Moore, 1965:15; Dokun, 2005:183-186; Ojielo, 2001:76-119). Although Adjudication and Arbitration are also useful interventions in conflict, they appear unsuitable for the resolution of militia conflicts in the Niger Delta. Table one below captures the three approaches to conflict resolution.

Table 1

Adjudication, Arbitration and Mediation: A Comparison.

Source: Adapted from Kleiboer, cited by Godongs, 2006: P. 132

Adjudication and Arbitration places emphasis on law based outcomes, and this limits their usefulness. The laws governing the Nigerian Oil Industry (the Petroleum Act, 1969, the Land Use Act 1978, the Oil Pipeline Act, 1966 and the Nigerian Constitution) are part of the factors that have triggered the Niger Delta Conflict. (Nna 2001, Kaiama Declaration, 1998).

The laws have been blamed for disempowerment and unsustainable exploitation of resources (Ibaba 2005, World bank, 1995) that have set in the grievance. Thus, law based intervention can hardly lead to the compromise that is a fundamental requirement for the resolution of the crisis. The win-lose posture of Adjudication and Arbitration may worsen the conflict.

The oil laws places the ownership and control of oil and other resources in the Nigerian Federal Government. But because the State is privatized and personalized (Aaron, 2006^b), these laws have been used to the advantage of those who wield State power,[5] and this explains why the abolition of the laws is widely seen as part of the solutions to the conflict. For example, the Petroleum Act “vests the ownership of the onshore and offshore revenue from oil resources in the Federal Government. Similarly, the Oil Pipelines Act requires Oil MNC’s  to seek permission from the Federal Government (through the Directorate of Petroleum Resources) before oil pipelines can be laid. Although the law made provision for the people to make claims and objections, this right is taken away by the Land Use Act which has confiscated all lands and placed it under the control of the Nigerian State.

The backlash is that the people lack the power to grant permission to the Oil MNC’s to use their land. Significantly, they even lack the right to negotiate the payment of compensation for damaged properties, as compensation rates have been fixed by the Federal Government. This suggest that the use of Arbitration or Adjudication will increase discontent as the win- lose outcome will not tackle the grievance that triggered the conflict. But because Mediation emphasizes compromise among disputants, it is more likely to enhance the resolution of the conflict more than Adjudication or Arbitration.  The use of mediation is enhanced by the following factors:

(i)                 Disputants must have the desire to resolve the dispute;

(ii)               Conflicting parties must be willing to meet to discuss and negotiate their interests, and differences;

(iii)             Disputants must be capable to express the issues involved in the conflict;

(iv)             The mediator must provide an enabling environment for negotiation; and

(v)               Conflicting parties must be willing to keep their promises and agreements (Godongs, 2006:142).

It is not in doubt that these conditions can be met in the Niger Delta despite the intensity of conflicts as parties to the conflict have shown willingness to build peace. For example the Federal government released from jail Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) who was standing trial for treason as a condition for the cessation of attacks and dialogue by Niger Delta Militants. Similarly, MEND has recently been involved in the release of hostages kidnapped by other groups in the region as a demonstration of willingness to dialogue with the Federal government.

This makes mediation an appropriate approach for the resolution of militia-based conflicts. Mediation can play the critical role of creating the avenue for negotiation by all stakeholders in the Niger Delta – the federal, state and local governments; the oil companies, militia groups, chiefs and elders, women groups, youth groups, ethnic associations; environmental right activities, and faith based organizations.  Presently, the people have lost faith in the federal government, and are contemptuous towards the oil companies.  This certainly impedes the resolution of the conflicts.  Still, mediation can create an enabling environment for dialogue, negotiation, and settlement.

To achieve the goals of resolving the conflicts, the approaches and strategies of mediation should focus on a clear identification of the stake holding parties to the dispute; appropriate representation of all groups or interests that have a stake in the outcome; tackling fundamentally different values and assumptions; establishment of boundaries and time horizon for agreements; balancing costs and benefits on agreed issues; and a clear determination of compensation actions (Olokesusi, 1996:21). the identification of a wide range of policy options such as increase in the derivation fund, abrogation of oil and land laws such as the Petroleum Act (1969) Land Use Act (1978) and Oil Pipelines Act (1966), effective environmental management and compensatory rewards such as roads, scholarships, payment for damages, improved healthcare and social services (Olokesusi, 1996) are noteworthy.

By and large, the strategy of mediation will be to end the objective conditions that have led to the conflicts and violence.  The target areas of agreement should include: the infusion of large sums of money into the development of the region; the guarantee of transparency and accountability in governance at all three tiers of government and community governance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; environmental protection – pollution prevention/control and sustainable exploitation of natural resource by the government and oil companies.

Furthermore, development of the production capacities of the rural communities, free education policy at all levels of education, at least for 15 years; free skills acquisition and entrepreneurial training for at least 15 years; Committal to infrastructure development; the suspension of militia activities by the militia groups and the granting of Micro-credit finance to rural entrepreneurs in the Niger Delta are also essential.

A crucial cause of poverty in the Niger Delta which fertilizes the ground for conflicts is the lack of capital by small and medium scale enterprises (SME) operators. Thus the granting of loan facilities to this group of persons, particularly on the basis of cooperative societies will enhance the development of production capabilities. However this requires the removal of obstacles to accessing credit such as the requirement for collateral. The use of certificate of registration of cooperative society will be effective as the condition for granting credits.

It is important to note that if the representatives of all stakeholders have the capability to commit the groups they represent to keep faith with agreements; it will go a long way to guarantee conflict resolution in the Niger Delta.

All stakeholders in the Niger Delta agree that infrastructure development, economic empowerment and environmental management are central to ending violence in the region. Similarly, there is consensus that the peace process should be funded with the oil wealth. The fundamental point of difference is what should be the percentage of the oil wealth that should be retained in the Niger Delta.

For example in the 2005 political reform conference, the Niger Delta shifted ground and settled for 25 percent derivation, whereas representatives from other parts of Nigeria insisted on 17 percent having conceded  to add four percent to the existing 13 percent. Again this highlights the point that mediation can ensure peace in the region.

However, the challenge appears to be who should be the mediator? And who should appoint the mediator? The experience with the botched Niger Delta summit show that the people of the Niger Delta will accept a mediator appointed by the Federal government provided they have faith in the individual/ institution. To achieve peace therefore, the Federal government, the state governments in the Niger Delta and Civil/ Militia groups in the region should open up channels of communication to work out agreements on a mediator and the process of mediation.

In Rivers State for example, the state government following agreements reached with stakeholders, established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The commission has succeeded in reconciling some communities that were locked in the conflicts. This suggests that the establishment of such commissions with the mandate to address the issues in dispute is a likely means of mediation.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that mediation is a useful technique that can help facilitate negotiations to end militia conflicts in the Niger Delta.  The paper highlights the context of the conflicts and blames the root cause on alienation and the resultant frustration.  Agitations emerged to protest alienation, but the violent response of the government to the hitherto peaceful protests only served to instigate greater violence.

The emergent militant activities have created instability and strengthened the solidarity between militia groups and their host communities.  Militia groups have become benefactors as they have taken over the duties of government by providing social amenities in their host communities. This reality necessitates the use of mediation in the resolution of the conflict.

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