Wolf Reintroduction: How the Wolves Came Back

The Debate Over Reintroduction

In 1973, shortly after Congress passed the ESA, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Rocky Mountain gray wolf as an endangered species. In accordance with the newly passed ESA, listing the gray wolf as an endangered species mandated that the government make every possible attempt to recover the population in the Rocky Mountains ESA (Endangered Species Act 1973). Just two years after the gray wolf was listed, the federal government formed the Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team (Fischer 1995).

The team finished a preliminary recovery plan in 1980 (United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team 1980). The resulting document was very general and did not make any specific recommendations regarding reintroduction of wolves. It set a vague time frame for the recovery of populations by stating that wolves will be restored to areas "where viable populations do not now exist" (United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team 1980:20). The 1980 Recovery Plan failed to address the substantive concerns surrounding the proposal to reintroduce wolves. The team neglected issues such as where to reintroduce wolves, what the goals for populations should be, and how the government will handle livestock depredations (United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team 1980). Because of the recovery team’s lack of progress, the newly hired director of the endangered species programs in Montana and Wyoming, Wayne Brewster, designated Bart O’Gara as the new recovery team leader in 1981. Brewster revamped the entire committee, assembling scientists and agency representatives who possessed experience with both wolves and politics (Fischer 1995). With its new members and leader, the Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Team began to answer some of the questions their predecessors shied away from. They started by designating places where wolves could be reintroduced. They recognized that any land chosen for recovery must be large, livestock-free, and public. Following these criteria, three recovery areas became apparent as prime choices: Glacier National Park and the Bob Marshall Wilderness regions in northwestern Montana, the Frank Church-River of No Return and Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Areas in central Idaho, and the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem in Wyoming (Fischer 1995).

The team’s next task was to develope a plan for how federal agencies could most effectively manage the 3 choice areas to promote the recovery of wolf populations (Fischer 1995). However, copies of the plan were distributed by an unofficial member of the committee to government officials in the states of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, along with his incorrect and "alarmist" interpretation of it (Fischer 1995). The reading of the plan that government officials first saw asserted that "federal agencies planned to curb logging, mining and grazing on public land--all on behalf of the wolf" (Fischer 1995:52). Western politicians were not pleased. They expressed their extreme discontent over the discussions of wolf reintroduction. The wolf wars began.

Over the next few years, negative interactions between wolf opponents and proponents were common. Wolf meetings held in rural areas of the involved states gave the public a chance to react to steps taken by the recovery team. One meeting held in Grangeville, Idaho, illustrates the amount of education needed before the rural public accepts the wolf reintroductions: "The superintendent of the local grade school set the tone by pleading with [Idaho Senator Larry] Craig to stop wolf recovery now. He pointed out that many of the local school bus stops were in remote areas, so local children might become wolf fodder" (Fischer 1995:53). But the facts are that there is not a single verified case of wolves ever harming a human in the wild in North America. Wolves try their best to stay away from humans. Even when wolf populations were high during the early years of the bounty programs, there were no verified cases of wolves ever harming humans. Even the young children who stole pups from dens, in some cases while the adult female was in the den with her pups, never suffered any harm. However the mythology surrounding wolves continues to be accepted as reality. Fearing wolves because of a concern for human safety illustrates the negative effects of wolf symbolism.

During the wolf reintroduction hearings and discussions, Congress was busy working on its own endangered species tasks. As a response to extreme disapproval of reintroductions in some areas, Congress proposed that any animals being reintroduced could be designated as experimental populations. The experimental population designation allows for more flexible management protocols. That is, under the experimental population clause, it is permissible to kill problem wolves. Killing a wolf without the experimental population designation violates the ESA (Endangered Species Act 1973). In 1982, the experimental population amendment passed (Endangered Species Act 1973). Within a few years the experimental designation made possible the reintroduction of red wolves to certain areas on the east coast. Ultimately, this designation allowed ranchers to, albeit unwillingly, accept the wolf reintroductions.

As the debate over wolf reintroduction continued, the rancher’s opposition to wolf recovery centered around two fundamental issues. First, they were concerned about wolf predation and whether or not they, personally, would be able to "manage" depredating wolves. Second, they were concerned about their rights to federal lands--probably their biggest concern. A rancher from Dillon, Montana, expresses his fear, "We are more worried about the land grab with the wolf than we are depredation" (Lamp 1995:10). Ranchers, loggers and other industrial interests that utilize federal lands were concerned that the lands they were accustomed to using would be restricted from further use because of the wolf. Neither this concern regarding land use rights nor the concern over depredation could be answered easily.

With the beginning of the Reagan administration, interest in environmental issues, especially wolf reintroduction, began to lag. Governmental money and priorities shifted away from wolf recovery. For a time, it looked as if wolf reintroduction would be set aside indefinitely. However, environmentalists had other ideas. In part to keep the debate alive despite funding cutbacks, some environmentalists decided to sample public opinion regarding the restoration of wolves to Yellowstone National Park. In 1985, a graduate student at the University of Montana, David McNaught, completed a survey of local public opinion. His study found wide public support for wolf reintroduction. Seventy four percent of the park visitors he surveyed agreed that wolves would improve the overall Yellowstone experience. Further, 60% of visitors surveyed felt that if wolves are unable to return to Yellowstone on their own, they should be reintroduced (McNaught 1987). Many other public opinion studies garnered similar supportive results (United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service 1994).

Further targeting public education and support for wolves, Defenders of Wildlife, an environmental organization dedicated to the protection of wild species, brought the exhibit "Wolves and Humans" to Yellowstone National Park and Boise, Idaho. Designed by the Science Museum of Minnesota, "Wolves and Humans" took 5 years and $1 million to create. The exhibit included computer games that simulate wolves catching prey and a large central display of 10 mounted wolves surrounding simulated freshly killed prey. The wolves were placed in many traditional postures including submission, dominance, scent marking, howling, and feeding. The exhibit even offered a howling booth where participants could test their howling skills. If the visitor’s howl was realistic enough, they received a response howl (Fischer 1995). "Wolves and Humans" opened in Yellowstone National Park in June of 1985. It attracted over 215,000 visitors and greatly increased public awareness of both the reality of wolves and the potential for wolf recovery. Partially in response to the exhibit, park employees began to openly support and advocate wolf reintroduction. Even the newly appointed Park Service Director William Mott expressed his support for wolf reintroduction.

First released in 1983, but not finally approved until 1987, the second, revised recovery plan advocated wolf recovery in three selected areas (northwestern Montana, central Idaho, and the Yellowstone Park area), established a recovery goal of 10 breeding pairs in each area, and a "system of controlling wolves based on dividing each recovery area into distinct zones of protection" (United States Fish and Wildlife Service 1987). Environmentalists joined together and issued as many copies of the plan and their comments to as many people as possible. They put pressure on the recovery team to answer their criticisms. Overall, environmentalists supported the plan, but thought that it had two exceptionally weak points. First, the recovery plan permitted delisting the wolf when only two of the three recovery areas met recovery goals. Second, the plan recommended natural recovery, rather than reintroduction for the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (United States Fish and Wildlife Service 1987).

In March of 1984, the recovery team met to decide the fate of the reintroduction. Each member of the team had an opportunity to speak. After each member had a chance to speak, the recovery team voted on whether or not wolves should be reintroduced. When the final vote was counted, 6 members of the recovery team favored wolf reintroduction to Yellowstone National Park, while 5 continued to oppose assisted recovery (Fischer 1995).

Later, the Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf Recovery Team issued a new and final draft of the recovery plan. Released in October 1985, the plan advocated natural recovery for northwestern Montana and central Idaho, and reintroduction for Yellowstone National Park. It specified that the wolves be reintroduced as an experimental population, under the amendment to the ESA. The plan received much written comment, and this time, 85% of written public comment received by the Fish and Wildlife Service was positive and supported wolf reintroduction (Fischer 1995).

A high-ranking Fish and Wildlife administrator had to sign the recovery plan to make it official. Finding high government support was not an easy task. Carl Haywood, head natural resources staffer for Idaho Senator Jim McClure, began attending the heated recovery plan meetings. McClure was not regarded by environmentalists as an ally. He had introduced bills in the past that restricted spending on grizzly bears, forest management and wolf reintroduction. Nevertheless, McClure eventually extended his support for wolf reintroduction through Haywood’s attendance at the recovery plan meetings (Fischer 1995). Environmentalists wondered why McClure would back such a controversial issue, especially when some of his closest supporters were members of the livestock industry. Perhaps McClure understood that wolves are coming back whether we like it or not, and that reintroduction under the experimental population clause is more flexible than the full protection afforded by the ESA to naturally recolonizing wolves (Endangered Species Act 1973). Whatever the reasoning, McClure became a helpful wolf advocate.

The controversy continued. While the recovery plan awaited official signatures, wolves continued to make their presence in Montana known. In August 1987, wolves killed 8 adult sheep and 1 lamb in Browning, Montana, several miles from where they killed a 900-pound steer a few months previously. Wolf proponents then had an opportunity to show their ability to deal with problem wolves to the satisfaction of the livestock industry. The Animal Damage Control located and killed the wolf suspected of making the bulk of the kills. However, the ranchers who lost animals were not satisfied. They lost significant numbers of cattle and believed they deserved compensation. Hank Fischer of Defenders of Wildlife thought he found a solution.

Fischer understood the ranchers’ concern and urged the Defenders of Wildlife to create a wolf compensation fund. However, the Board was reluctant to commit to financial responsibility for wolf depredations (Fischer 1995). Fischer argued that was precisely the point. Ranchers were unwilling to accept the uncertain financial situation of having wolves around. If Defenders of Wildlife would accept financial responsibility, the recovery efforts could move ahead. Fischer suggested that Defenders of Wildlife conduct an experiment. He proposed that they compensate the Browning ranchers to ascertain the effectiveness and desirability of the compensation program. Defenders of Wildlife agreed to set up a permanent wolf compensation fund if the results from the test compensation were positive (Fischer 1995). In September of 1987, the Defenders of Wildlife sent checks to the ranchers who lost stock in the Browning incidents.

The wolf wars continued. The Wyoming congressional delegation asserted that it would never support wolf reintroduction. The director of the National Park Service continued to support the reintroduction. Just after the Browning incident in August 1987, the acting regional director of the Fish and Wildlife Service in Denver signed the second, revised recovery plan. His signature made the plan official. Acting on the plan and finally moving the reintroduction process ahead, Utah Congressman Wayne Owens introduced a bill to reintroduce wolves on September 30, 1987.

In 1988, Ed Bangs was hired by the Fish and Wildlife service to head the wolf recovery project. His foremost objective was to establish the Fish and Wildlife Service as a credible source of information on wolves. In response, Bangs developed a wolf recovery road-show that he took across the country, hoping to inform people about the truth of wolves and wolf recovery. In the five years between 1988 and 1992, Bangs and his staff presented the wolf recovery road-show to over 14,000 people (Fischer 1995).

Bangs solved his first wolf-livestock crisis in the fall of 1989. Wolves killed a calf in a small town in Montana. Bangs directed the Fish and Wildlife Service response (Fischer 1995). Agents from the Service caught the four wolves responsible for the depredations and relocated them to Glacier National Park. Only one of the four survived. The surviving female went on to mate and have pups in the Ninemile area the following year. The depredations stopped for a while, but by the following spring, several calves were killed near Marion, Montana. Ranchers demanded action.

The Fish and Wildlife Service and Animal Damage Control planned to trap, radio-collar and relocate the problem wolves. However, when trapping efforts failed, in large part due to the efforts of wolf and animal rights activists, agency personnel were forced to track the animals by helicopter. The helicopter was unable to get close enough to the wolves to dart them with tranquilizers. As a result, a wolf was killed. The depredations ceased.

The compensation fund proposed by Defenders of Wildlife in response to the Browning depredations was a success however, and the organization created a permanent Wolf Compensation Fund. The fledgling fund paid the Marion ranchers a total of $5,500 for the market value reimbursement of their losses. The total livestock loss to Marion ranchers was two cows and thirteen calves. The compensation fund did its job. "Local ranchers were satisfied; their problem [was] corrected, their livestock losses covered. None told the newspapers that in the future, they’d shoot wolves on sight. No one questioned whether the Fish and Wildlife Service would swiftly remedy any wolf attacks on livestock that might occur later" (Fischer 1995:118). Although unfortunate, the Marion incident put the wolf advocates to the test. They lived up to their promises. Wolf reintroduction gained credibility.

After Congressman Owens offered his official and high-ranking support for the wolf recovery plan, the next step was to write an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that any activity significantly affecting the quality of the human environment must be preceded by an EIS (National Environmental Policy Act 1969). Wolf reintroduction certainly falls into that category (Fischer 1995). The Yellowstone wolf EIS presents a special case because the Wyoming delegation prevented both the Reagan and the Bush administrations from starting an EIS. By halting the EIS, opponents of the reintroductions hoped to stall progress toward wolf reintroduction. Wolf advocates had to persuade Congress to disregard the wishes of the Wyoming congressional delegation.

The wolf advocates began to seek funding for the EIS. After much lobbying, the House passed an appropriations bill in June 1988 granting $200,000 for the research and writing of an EIS. However, the bill emerged from the Senate radically changed. Money for the EIS was redirected to a study to of how the Yellowstone wolf reintroductions would affect the local economy, game animals, grizzly bears, and livestock. The studies became known as "Wolves For Yellowstone?" The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service were designated as responsible for performing them.

Because the Senate cut funding for an EIS, Utah Congressman Owens presented another bill. In May 1989, he introduced legislation directing the Park Service to create an EIS on the Yellowstone wolf reintroductions within two years. His legislation helped to develop support and visibility for wolf recovery (Fischer 1995).

At the same time, Idaho Senator McClure circulated and rallied support for his own wolf reintroduction proposal. His proposal called for natural recovery in northwestern Montana and reintroduction to both Yellowstone National Park and central Idaho. His bill carried one major flaw in the eyes of wolf advocates: it delisted the wolf as an endangered species before the reintroductions were to take place.

McClure lobbied for support of his bill. He continued to promote and revise the plan. Eventually L. David Mech, one of the world’s foremost wolf biologists, gave McClure’s plan his "stamp of approval" (Fischer 1995:126). However, McClure’s friends in the livestock industry did not understand or support his actions regarding wolf reintroduction. In 1990, McClure announced plans to retire at the end of the year. He slated his final order of business as passing his wolf recovery bill.

Meanwhile, in May 1990, the first two volumes of "Wolves For Yellowstone?" were printed and released (United States Fish and Wildlife Service 1990). The studies provided a scientific justification for promoting wolf reintroduction. The scientists research concluded that wolf reintroduction would minimally affect the livestock industry, grizzly bears, and ungulates. The researchers also concluded that wolf reintroduction might actually bolster the local economy by attracting tourists to the region (Fischer 1995). The "Wolves For Yellowstone?" report gave scientific support for wolf reintroduction to Yellowstone National Park.

In September 1990, McClure called a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests regarding his wolf recovery plan (Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf Restoration Act 1990). McClure intended to build enough support for his bill to move it through the approval process. Many people testified at the hearing, including conservationists and those speaking on behalf of livestock interests. The general consensus was that, although support existed for the reintroduction of wolves, it did not exist for McClure’s recovery plan. The plan died. In its place, Congress appropriated $375,000 for the creation of a 10 member Wolf Management Committee. The committee was to include members from all aspects of the debate. They were given until May 15, 1991, to submit to Congress a final report suggesting actions regarding the wolf reintroductions.

In December, Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan, Jr. named 10 representatives to serve on the Wolf Management Committee. He selected the directors of the state wildlife agencies in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, the regional forester of the Northern Region of the Forest Service and regional directors of the Park Service and Fish and Wildlife Service, a representative for sports persons' groups, one for the livestock industry, the Director of the National Wildlife Federation’s Rocky Mountain office, and a representative from Defenders of Wildlife. On January 23, 1991, the Wolf Management Committee held its first session. After the very first meeting, it was apparent that the team was divided--5 to 5 (Fischer 1995). The team debated continuously toward the deadline.

Over time, the debates worked themselves into votable proposals. On April 10, 1991, the group decided that the best way to make decisions out of debates was to put specific issues up for vote. They first voted on whether the wolf should be removed from the endangered species list before the reintroductions would take place. The vote was 5 to 4 in favor, with 1 abstention. Congress had directed that any votes made by the Wolf Management Committee must pass 6 to 4 in order to be approved. The move to remove wolves from the endangered species list prior to reintroduction failed.

Next, John Mummer, the Forest Service Regional Forester, offered a tentative plan aimed at moving the reintroduction process along. He suggested extending the experimental population areas to include all of Montana except for the northwestern part of the state immediately surrounding Glacier National Park. He also proposed a sharing of wolf management responsibilities between state and federal agencies. The final tenet of his proposition permitted private landowners to shoot any wolves caught in the act of killing livestock (Fischer 1995). This came to vote immediately and passed, 9 to 1. However, by the time of the next meeting, support for the proposal waned, and its passage was revoked.

Even with the Wolf Management Committee at a relative stalemate, the reintroduction process moved ahead. In May 1991, another bill appropriating funds for a Yellowstone Wolf Reintroduction EIS passed the House and later, the Senate. Congress appropriated $348,000 for the research and writing of an EIS in November, with work on the EIS slated to begin in 1992. Suddenly, the EIS was a reality.

Meanwhile, as the EIS committee was being formed, Defenders of Wildlife secured permission to set up a "voting" booth in Yellowstone National Park. Visitors were asked to cast a vote according to how they felt about wolf reintroduction in the park. The volunteers at the booth answered visitors’ questions and concerns. The Fish and Wildlife Service conducted opinion polls of its own by sponsoring local public meetings where people were given the chance to voice their support or concerns. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service hosted 34 public meetings. Twenty-seven of these meetings were held in Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana. The remaining 7 meetings were held in cities across the country (Fischer 1995). However, wolf reintroduction opponents weren’t happy. Opponents felt the federal services biased these public meetings in favor of the wolf. They wanted official public hearings, where people could vent their frustrations.

In response, the Fish and Wildlife Service decided to hold a total of 6 formal public hearings in Cheyenne, Wyoming; Helena, Montana; Boise, Idaho; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, DC (Fischer 1995). The hearings were scheduled for August 1992. Both sides rallied their forces.

Although the hearings were called for by opponents of reintroduction, they actually worked in favor of the advocates. At the Helena hearing, approximately 60% of those who spoke were in favor of reintroduction (Fischer 1995). Nationwide, wolf reintroduction to Yellowstone National Park enjoyed approximately 80% support. Clearly, wolf reintroduction had public backing.

During the late summer of 1992, the reintroduction process was nearly halted. In August, a park visitor filmed a large black animal that clearly appeared to be a wolf. Following that incident, a wolf was shot south of Yellowstone National Park (Fischer 1995). These sightings were significant because the reintroduction process can proceed only if the animal to be reintroduced is indeed extinct in the area. In addition, the reintroduced wolves would most likely be considered an experimental population. Discerning the difference between wolves receiving full protection and wild wolves could be difficult. However, in spite of the evidence of wolves, experts concluded that is was not possible that a viable breeding population of wolves could already exist in Yellowstone. They contended that the wolves seen were dispersers, not members of a pack (Fischer 1995).

During the commotion over wolves in Yellowstone, work toward the EIS continued. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and supporting agencies drafted an EIS in July 1993. The EIS addressed and considered the consequences of nearly all possible options from natural recovery to reintroducing wolves under the full protection of the ESA. The draft EIS presented a "preferred alternative" that allowed no land use restrictions, required state and federal agencies to share responsibility for wolf management, and permitted private landowners to kill any wolves on their property in the act of killing livestock (United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service 1993). During the period of public comment, support for wolf reintroductions became even more evident. The Fish and Wildlife Service received more than 160,000 comments regarding the Wolf Reintroduction EIS. This is more response than the Fish and Wildlife Service ever received concerning any EIS in the entire United States (Fischer 1995). The booth set up by Defenders of Wildlife yielded results greatly favoring reintroduction. They received input from citizens of all 50 states, and even from 25 foreign countries. Out of 70,000 comments and votes, all but 2,000 favored wolf reintroduction (Fischer 1995).

However, many people opposed the strategy proposed by the draft EIS. Environmental extremists argued that it did not protect the wolves enough. They wanted the wolves to be reintroduced under the full protection of the ESA. A lawyer for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund claimed, "It’s not a wolf-saving plan, it’s a wolf-killing plan" (Fischer 1995:154). Livestock interests also opposed the plan. The Farm Bureau argued that the Fish and Wildlife Service was attempting to reintroduce the wrong wolf subspecies. Although they would never support reintroducing any subspecies of wolf, the Farm Bureau hoped this line of reasoning would require a legal halt to the wolf reintroductions (Fischer 1995). However, these extremists, on both sides, could not disrupt the compromise that the majority finally agreed was workable. Reintroduction was underway.