The Bunker Hill Mine Superfund Site at Kellogg, Idaho

A brief summary of the history and health effects to residents of the Silver Valley

by Katherine Aiken, Associate Professor, History, University of Idaho, 1998

The Bunker Hill Case is a particularly vivid example of the conflicts of values and ethical problems that occur in a modern technological society—between the individual and the corporation, between production and preservation, between the local community and the nation. Perhaps most acutely, it illustrates the dilemma of the limits of personal responsibility in social contexts as well as the American propensity to seek technological and communications solutions to environmental problems. What happened at the Bunker Hill Site?

The Bunker Hill lead smelter operated from 1917 to1982 in the town of Kellogg (1980 pop. 3417) in Idaho’s Panhandle, between Washington and Montana. At the time of its closure the company had employed over 2000 workers. Located in an area known as the "Silver Valley" for its large number of mines, Kellogg lies on the Coeur d’Alene River, which flows into Lake Coeur d’Alene at Harrison, Idaho, on the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation about 40 miles downstream. Lake Coeur d’Alene is presently a large recreation area and an important watershed along the western side of the Bitterroot range. The Bunker Hill Company began operating in 1885 and was one of the principal influences in the economic development of the inland region (Wilson 1981; Magnuson 1968; Wallace Miner 1917). During the 1970s, as the nation's second largest smelter, Bunker Hill produced nearly one-fifth of the processed lead in the world and one-fifth of the nation’s lead and zinc (James 1972). In the period from 1965 to 1981 more than 6 million pounds of lead were released into the air from the smelter (Woodward and Clyde Consultants and Terrographics 1986). When the smelter opened in 1918, the company immediately found itself at odds with individuals in the community, and workers eventually found that they had to choose between an intangible threat of harm to their health versus the immediate harm of job loss.

The Bunker Hill executives chose this small Idaho town for the smelter over alternative locations in Portland, Oregon, or on the Puget Sound, in part because Kellogg’s isolated location meant that fewer people would be affected by the smoke and fumes from the plant. But, precisely because of this isolation, the local population became economically dependent upon the company for its livelihood, a situation which would, arguably, cloud the judgment of some workers about their health and the environmental risks from the smelter. Publicly, the Bunker Hill Company took the view that the smoke was a "nuisance," that "worker hygiene" could reduce or eliminate individual risk, and that the whole problem was one of "public relations" and later of "economic freedom." Privately, in their internal correspondence as early as 1918, company officials acknowledged that the smelter posed a health risk to the workers—their physicians told them that controlling the dust and fumes in the plant would be much more effective in preventing health risk than simply warning workers to keep themselves clean. But the company chose to emphasize the individual responsibility of the workers to maintain personal cleanliness. They continuously issued oral and written warnings, many of which were published in their newsletter, the Reporter. From the very first year of its operation, residents of Kellogg complained about the dust from the smelter. Over the years local ranchers claimed the emissions were causing livestock and vegetation deaths, and the company paid damages for some of these (Burrows 1981; Keely 1976). By 1923, the company sought a technological solution to the emissions problem—they added a baghouse to the smelter, which was built around the smelter and fitted with large cloth bags that would catch the emissions of dust and smoke and allow some of it to be reprocessed (Engineering and Mining Journal 1939); these were only partially successful in controlling emissions. The company also sought legal shelter in contractual language, exempting the company for damages from land and air contamination in sales of housing to their workers and land to local residents.

By the 1930s, citizens in the region and the state were becoming aware of lead pollution in Lake Coeur d’Alene (Coe 1929a, 1929b, 1930; Coeur d’Alene River and Lake Commission 1933; Ellis undated; Rabe and Flaherty 1974; Casner 1991). In 1933, a state-appointed commission reported that the lead was dangerous to fish and wildlife and called for installation of settling ponds to control the lead debris—but these were not built until 35 years later in 1968. Also from the 1930s through the 1950s, the workers themselves protested the conditions in the plant through their union organization, but nothing changed. During World War II and in the decade following, production increased, the company employed more and more workers, and Kellogg and adjacent communities, such as Smelterville and Pinehurst, enjoyed economic security and prosperity. The workers, though, continued to complain of "absolutely unbearable" and "very dangerous" conditions. Finally, in 1961 an anonymous group of them wrote a public letter to Idaho Governor Robert E. Smylie. They claimed that the health of the community was imperiled and demanded an investigation. Kellogg residents tended to side with the company, believing nothing new would be found (Kellogg Evening News 1961a, 1961b). However, the letter received broader media attention (Spokesman Review 1961), and such attention increased as years passed. Bunker Hill treated these concerns as a public relations problem and downplayed concerns about serious health or environmental risks. They launched an advertising campaign to "project an image of environmental awareness." Privately, they acknowledged that it would be more and more difficult to control the emissions because the plants were growing older and the company was continually trying to increase production despite the ageing equipment.

In 1968, Bunker Hill’s profit margin was high. Gulf Resources Corporation effected a hostile takeover of the company that shifted decision making away from Kellogg to Houston, Texas. Gulf spent a great deal to acquire Bunker Hill and stepped up production to recompense for the outlay, inevitably increasing emissions at the same time. Local apathy about the pollution began to wane and at the same time national interest in environmental problems increased. The Bunker Hill Public Relations Director took to the road and made numerous public appearances to promote the company's pollution control efforts (Kellogg Evening News 1970a, 1970b, 1970c). During that time the company spent a considerable amount of money on waste disposal to prevent pollution of the Coeur d’Alene Lake and River system. A wastewater treatment plant was built at a cost of $1 million, and water quality improved; the Public Relations Director declared that the pollution problems would be solved within a year (Spokane Daily Chronicle 1970).

Bunker Hill was one company among the many across the country that failed to see the enormous social, economic, and environmental costs that were being externalized to be paid by future generations. But in the wake of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) and a flurry of other publications about poisoning of the natural environmental, the nation and its leaders began to call for and pass legislation to institute corporate responsibility for these costs. In that same year, 1970, while Bunker Hill still hoped to deal with its problems through public relations efforts, Congress passed the Clean Air Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were established. Almost immediately, Bunker Hill began to complain about governmental "interference" and the hardships of new federal regulations (Bunker Hill Reporter 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1971). The company was later named in the Watergate investigations as giving illegal campaign contributions, apparently to influence EPA decisions (Woodward and Bernstein 1972). In line with national concern, Kellogg area residents were now more concerned about air pollution than any other issue, including wages (Greater Shoshone County, Inc. 1970).

Concern about lead poisoning in workers and their families prompted the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to study lead in the air, soil, and vegetation; a screening program for Kellogg residents was initiated. The study indicated that lead levels in Kellogg were higher than those in El Paso, Texas, where the federal government had conducted another well-publicized study. The State agency requested a considerable amount of information from Bunker Hill; the company complained publicly in letters to the agency that the data were too time-consuming to provide; the agency regarded Bunker Hill as uncooperative. OSHA conducted investigations in 1973 and required respirators for smelter workers. Privately, company officials were concerned enough about health effects to request a secretive study. In what can only be regarded as a breach of medical ethics, the company commissioned a urine study of the area children without their parents’ consent and without informing them (North Idaho Press 1981). In internal correspondence, plant managers began to focus more and more on "the ‘economic stress’ of environmental expenditures and standards" and their strategy was to try to "bring all facilities into compliance with meaningful standards and [to] contest any unreasonable application of the regulations" (Bunker Hill President, J. H. Halley, quoted in Aiken 1994).

In September 1973 a fire burned two of seven sections of the Bunker Hill baghouse and part of its roof. The company’s decision to continue operation meant that lead emissions from the plant tripled in the months that followed. The company tried to use the other five sections to control emissions and hurried to make repairs, but there were construction delays and a shortage of the necessary cloth bags. Final repairs were not completed for six months. During that time, the price of lead rose from $286 per ton in January 1973 to $479 per ton in October 1974 (Shoshone County Lead Health Project Report 1975), and it is likely that Bunker Hill continued operation, knowing that emissions had significantly increased, in order to profit from the increased market price. Only a month after the baghouse repair was completed, two children were hospitalized for lead poisoning, and investigation showed a fourfold increase in lead levels around the smelter over the preceding two years (Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 1974, 1975). In the same month, Bunker Hill paid area residents compensation for the deaths of at least nine horses (Burrows 1981; Keely 1976). Idaho State officials became alarmed, and Bunker Hill embarked on another public relations campaign to demonstrate environmental awareness by planting trees and claiming efforts to control further emissions from the plant. Privately, they admitted that "pollution controls were not up to standards, and that OSHA standards were not being met and workers were being leaded" (Aiken 1994).

The company continued to fight efforts of federal and state agencies to investigate health concerns, heading off an attempt by the Centers for Disease Control to study the area children (Centers for Disease Control 1986). Instead, they agreed to co-sponsor and finance the Shoshone Lead Health Project and hired the same physician who had earlier conducted the urine tests of area children without parental consent. But this time blood tests were done and the study was public. In January 1975, the project director reported that of the 172 children living closest to the smelter, 170 (98.2 percent) had dangerously high lead levels above 40 µg/100ml (Shoshone County Lead Health Project Report 1975), and 45 children had levels above 80 µg/100ml; one child had the highest blood lead level ever reported (Shoshone County Lead Health Study Interim Report 1975). The investigators pointed to more than simply smoke and fumes as causes of injury. Mine and smelter tailings had been used for years as landfill and to sand icy streets in winter, and this was as much part of the cause as continued plant emissions. Bunker Hill continued to pursue a "public relations" policy; it hired two public relations firms to publicize and gain media attention for its efforts at pollution control: the company also began to purchase houses within a half-mile radius of the smelter, burned them and bulldozed the waste, brought in new topsoil, and attempted, with little success, to revegetate the area; the flue systems were cleaned, repaired, and sealed; the baghouse was upgraded. Company officials began to complain publicly and in their company newsletter, the Reporter, that government officials were overreacting and the company was being victimized and singled-out by EPA (Allen 1976; Tate 1975). Area residents were reportedly pleased with the company’s progress (Tate 1974), even though EPA had cited Bunker Hill in June 1975 for failure to control smelter dust (US/EPA 1975).

By now, Kellogg residents were divided on the extent of the danger, but tended to support the company, which was the major employer in the area. When it was discovered that the grounds of Silver King High School--located just across from the smelter--were heavily contaminated, the school board voted to close it at the end of the year. However, the citizens demanded a vote, claiming the lead danger to the children was unsubstantiated; they voted 996-131 to keep the school open (Tate 1981). Six months later, only three of the 20 children with the highest lead levels returned for followup examinations (Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 1975). In 1977, nine children sued Bunker Hill for $20 million for health problems due to lead poisoning that occurred in 1973 (Coeur d’Alene Press 1977). Although Bunker Hill vigorously opposed the suit initially, in 1981 the company eventually paid a $2 million settlement to a family whose three children had been "leaded" (Idaho Statesman 1981a). Kellogg residents regarded the settlement as a "rip-off" (Idaho Statesman 1981b). In north Idaho, 4,337 people signed a petition protesting the characterization of Kellogg as an undesirable place to live. Reporters from the Boise paper, the Idaho Statesman could find no one in Kellogg who agreed with the plaintiffs’ claim for damages against the company; residents instead placed the blame on the parents for not practicing basic hygiene (as had been promoted in the company newsletter for so many years).

In June 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the EPA ambient air quality standard for lead of 1.5 µg/m3, whereas Bunker Hill and other lead producers had held that 5.0 µg/m3 was the most reasonable standard that could be met. Bunker Hill spent over $20 million for pollution control (Gulf Resources 1979) and still could not comply. Its executives then decided to provide only the minimum data necessary to comply with regulations. The State of Idaho, EPA, and OSHA escalated regulatory efforts, sometimes issuing conflicting demands. Gulf Resources Chief Executive Officer Robert Allen complained bitterly to EPA, to Idaho and Texas senators and congressmen, and to company employees that the current "unchecked" governmental regulation was leading to loss of economic freedom. Finally, in early 1982 Gulf Resources closed the mine and smelter and over 2000 people lost their jobs. The parent company did promise to clean up the site (Fisher 1981); the EPA designated the 21 acres surrounding the smelter as a Superfund Cleanup Site, but there is an ongoing legal battle over who is responsible (Bond 1990; Rauve 1991; Massey 1991a, 1991b; Taggart 1993; Spokesman Review 1991a, 1991b, 1992). Today, Coeur d’Alene Lake still contains the deposits of heavy metals left by the mine, and the Coeur d’Alene tribe, whose lands abut the lower half of the lake, were so concerned about this lake pollution as well as pollution from other sources that they filed a claim for ownership of the lake. They are asking local farmers and landowners to put forward a cooperative effort to return the waters to a purer state (Lewiston Morning Tribune 1993).

Could more scientific knowledge have helped Bunker Hill remain in business and Kellogg workers keep their jobs? Suppose that Gulf had redirected its advertising funds towards research to control smoke stack emissions? Lead has been a known poison for centuries. Suppose the company had funded an open, rather than a defensive, health study before selling housing near the plant? What are the concerns and which solutions should local communities pursue in mitigating the pollution that still exists from old sources and continuing ones? These and many other questions remain unresolved today.