Singer Reading Questions

Peter Singer, “All Animals are Equal” from Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds.   Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162 at http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/singer02.htm  I use the page numbers resulting from printing the file as a pdf.  This essay was originally published in 1974 in Philosophic Exchange.  Became basis of chapter in Animal Liberation.

1.  Singer begins his essay with a comparison with black and women’s liberation movements.  Why does he make this move rhetorically?   What does he want the comparison to do for his case against specieism?

2.  What is the “basic moral principle of equality” (p. 1)?   Why constitute it on equality of consideration according to Singer?  He gives two reasons we should not base equality on factual equality?  What are these?  (pp. 1-3)  What are his (implied or explicit) definitions of morality, equality, and consideration?

3.  Singer writes, “. . . the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact.  Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact.  . . . . The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans:  it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.” (3)   He proceeds to quote utilitarians Bentham and Sidgewick that we must consider each individual’s good equally.  He cites Hare and Rawls as among those who also adopt equality of consideration of interests, albeit on different bases.   Is equality of consideration of interests simply a foundational presupposition or can it be grounded in reasons in your view?  How does equality of consideration of interests allow for differential treatment?   Is that good or bad in your view?  Why?  Consider the examples of pregnancy or mental retardation for humans.  Is Singer a prescriptivist? 

4.  Singer grounds the “right” of equality of consideration in sentience, the ability to suffer and enjoy (or to experience happiness).  To have interests, a being must be able to suffer and enjoy.  A stone has no interests, a mouse does.  If a being suffers and enjoys, we must take its interests into account according to Singer. He writes, “This is why the limit of sentience, . . . , is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.  To mark this boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way.  Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color?” (pp. 4-5).  Why should sentience rather than rationality sentience be the marker?   Why is it any less arbitrary if it is less arbitrary?  What beings does this include who rationality would exclude?   What assumptions does he make about the nature of morality?

5.  Singer holds most humans are speciesists, that is, they allow the interests of their own species “to override the greater interests of members of other species.” (5)  He offers the examples of eating animals (including industrialized agricultural practices), experimenting on animals, and speciesism in philosophy.  Why are the first two of these examples of humans overriding the greater interests of members of other species in his view?  Do you think his utilitarian calculus in these cases is correct?  What model of the average or ideal human moral agent does he assume?

6.  What is at issue in his discussion of description and prescription on the top of page 7?

7.  What are the basic criticisms Singer levels at philosophers who have approached the “problem of equality’ by attributing intrinsic value to humans as humans?  Two of his parade examples are infant humans and permanently retarded humans.  Why?

8.  Now that you have finished the reading, what are the basic outlines of Singer's argument that animals deserve equality of moral consideration?

9.  What are the classic criticisms of utilitarianism that opponents may apply to Singer’s argument?  E.g., difficulties in calculation, the problem of distributive justice, etc. 

10.  Should we pay attention to individuals rather than groups in determining who is morally considerable?  Why or why not?

11.  How does Singer's argument relate to questions of intrinsic, instrumental, and systemic value?