W.V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches. 3rd ed. Eds. Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003: 502-511. originally published in W. V. Quine. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969: 69-90
(Although
Quine is now dead you can see him on youtube: W. V. Quine you tube video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iZvycU3I9w
1. How do you read the very first sentence of the article in the light of the whole article?
2. Why is set theory in mathematics a problem for epistemology? If you know something about math, do you think he is right that “mathematics reduces only to set theory and not to logic proper”?
3. What distinguishes the categories “conceptual” and “doctrinal” in math and in epistemology? Why does Quine argue that the two must be separated in the end?
4. Quine offers his take on some of the history of analytic epistemology. What are his key conclusions about its progress and dead-ends?
5. Quine doesn’t think we have made much progress Hume’s skepticism (especially about induction). How does skepticism motivate Quine’s own project?
6. Why does Quine talk about “naturalized” epistemology? What does he mean by this label?
7. Why turn to psychology? And, why is this not circular according to Quine? Further, what does Quine mean by “psychology”?
“However, such scruples against circularity have little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations. If we are out simply to understand the link between observations and science, we are well advised to use any available information, including that provided by the very science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand.”
8. Why from time to time does Quine talk about human language? About translation? Does the idea of translating a whole theory rather than individual sentences make sense? Why or why not? And, what is an “observational sentence “? What is the role of a community?
9. Why does Quine think all we have to go on is sensory stimulation? Do you agree? What does Quine think we can do with sensory stimulation?
10. Quine seems to advocate studying how science actually works. For example, “Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned that to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect.” (506) He also talks about science as an institution or process and as involving a community. (508, 510, for example) Why is this important to his argument? To the development of philosophy of science (for those of you who took that course)? What do you make of his x-ray tube example? (510)
11. At the very end, Quine seems to introduce a grab bag of new ideas. Why does he say "epistemology now becomes semantics" (511)? Why is this both shocking and not shocking to "old Vienna" (I take this to mean logical positivists) Why pop in "evolutionary epistemology" in the very last paragraph?
12. How overall, do you see Quine’s naturalized epistemology differing from other types of epistemology with which you are familiar? Does it seem useful? If so, for what purposes?
13. Christopher Preston in our reading for the following week will make use of Quine. Speculate on how someone concerned with developing an environmental epistemology which takes seriously a wriggling body interacting in particular spaces might use Quine.
There are some discussion questions for Quine and Haraway together at the end of the Haraway reading and discussion questions. And, here they are again:
Discussion on Quine and Haraway
1. Given their different historical and social contexts, it seems remarkable that Quine and Haraway both focus on studying the knower and how the knower actually goes about knowing. They also want to look at how science works. What key points of agreement do you find between Quine and Haraway? Points of disagreement? What do you think Quine would make of Haraway's idea that we should picture the objects of knowledge as actors/agents?
2. What do you see useful in each for the development of an environmental epistemology?
Helpful Background Reading
Richard Feldman, “Naturalized Epistemology” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/
Robert J. Fogelin, “Aspects of Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology” Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 19-46.