Monism v. Pluralism Discussion Questions

Before we begin our discussion, what was most confusing about these articles?   Are there areas we should clear up before we can proceed?  What struck you as most interesting or surprising?

1.  How does Callicott define moral monism and moral pluralism?  What are the key reasons he prefers monism to pluralism given his definitions.

2.  How does Light define moral monism and moral pluralism intially?    What distinctions does he go on to make between types of pluralism?   Between the questions he thinks these types are trying to answer?   What are the key reasons he prefers metatheoretical pluralism  to monism?

3.  How do their differing definitions shape their positions?  How would you outline in the simplest terms possible the argument of each article?  What do you see as the two key strengths and weaknesses of each?

5.  Where do Callicott and Light agree?  Where do they disagree?

6.  Do you see the monism/pluralism debate as a key debate for ethics in general (in addition to a key debate for environmental ethics)?  If so, how or where have you seen this popping up?  Examples? 

7.  In the two articles Callicott and Light bring up the role of philosophers, the nature of philosophy, and how the subdiscipline of environmental ethics should best move forward.  What do they say and imply about these issues?  Have you seen them elsewhere in your study of philosophy?   What is your take on them? 

8.  Where do you come down in the debate?  Why?

On specifics of each article:

Callicott:

A.  On p. 113 Callicott writes:  “Here finally is the crux of what I think is wrong with moral pluralism.  It severs ethical theory from moral philosophy, from the metaphysical foundations in which ethical theory is, whether we are conscious of it or not, grounded.”   Callicott also writes on p. 115, “Moral pluralism, in short, implies metaphysical musical chairs.”   Unpack these statements. 

In order to do so, it is important to determine what Callicott means by “ethical theory”, “moral philosophy”, and  “metaphysical foundations” ?    Do utilitarianism and Kantianism rest on the metaphysical world views that Callicott says they do on pages114-115?  Does ethics rest on “myths” or “comprehensive conceptual systems that fully embrace our ever-growing body of empirical knowledge, scientific theory, and self-discovery” (116) or “world views”?  What would be the iff that defined a “myth” or “system”?  Do you think Callicott is right?  Why or why not?

B.  At the end of the article, Callicott presents his own nested view, what he calls “a communitarian moral philosophy consistent with and embedded in the larger evolutionary world view outlined in The Origin of the Species.” (121)  This is the same view he put forth in "Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism” which we read last week. Is this truly a monistic system?  By what definitions of monism and pluralism?   Does it avoid the weaknesses Callicott attributes to pluralism and maintain the strengths he associates with monism?   Why does Callicott think folks relate his “moral sentiments” approach to emotivism and relativism and thus rejected?  Does the association with HUME hurt or help his case?  What are the typical criticisms  philosophers offer to Hume’s ethics?  Does the association with sociobiology hurt or help his case?

Light: 

A.  Light writes, “My argument will be that Naess does indeed articulate, or at least suggest, a pluralist form of environmental philosophy which avoids the foibles of pluralism which Callicott fears:   the descent, or headlong rush rather, from pluralism to moral relativism and deconstructive postmodernism.  I will also argue that the best frame within which to evaluate arguments for moral pluralism is to pay attention to what embracing such a position does for bridging the gap between environmental theory and practice, rather than to what such a turn to pluralism means in a more abstract sense.”  (p. 275)  After reading the whole article, how would you translate Light’s words into clearer, simpler sentences?

B.  What is Naess’ pluralist form of environmental philosophy?  How does it avoid sliding from pluralism to moral relativism and deconstructive postmodernism according to Light?  In what sense is it pluralist?  How does a discussion of Naess reframe the monism/pluralism debate?  Is Light’s choice of Naess as a key example strategic?  See especially pages 282-87.  Note that Light closes his section on Naess with the following quote from Naess: “’The richness and diversity of philosophical and religious ultimate premises suitable for action in the ecological crisis may be in itself considered part of the richness and diversity of life forms on Earth.’” (287)  Light then adds, “Metatheoretical pluralism is thus the activity of environmental philosophers who wish to emulate the patterns of the objects of their concern.” (287) 

C.  According to Light, why does Callicott think his “communitarian” version of the land ethic “gets the advantages of pluralism without its problems” (276)?  What does Light think Callicott has missed about the “original questions” the pluralists raised? (277ff)  What does Light mean by “pluralism as a kind of compatibilism”? (278)   By metatheoretical pluralism (278-79)?  What points does Light make with his example of two hypothetical communities on pages 279-80?