Class Discussion Questions – Individualism v. Holism

Singer

1.  What are the basic outlines of Singer's argument that animals deserve equality of moral consideration?   Note:  it is important to  understand how Singer defines equality and moral consideration in order to understand his argument.

2.  How do you evaluate his grounding of equal moral consideration in sentience? 

3.  What are the basic criticisms Singer levels at philosophers who have approached the “problem of equality’ by attributing intrinsic value to humans as humans?  Two of his parade examples are infant humans and permanently retarded humans.  Why?

4.   What are the classic criticisms of utilitarianism that opponents may apply to Singer’s argument?  E.g., difficulties in calculation, the problem of distributive justice, etc. 

5.  How does Singer’s argument relate to questions of intrinsic, instrumental, and systemic value that Rolston discussed in the article from last week? Regan’s argument?

Regan

1.  What are indirect duty views and why does Regan reject them?

2.  Regan rejects contractarianism.  Why?  How does his critique compare to Callicott’s critique of contractarianism?

3.  Why does Regan reject the cruelty/kindness and the utilitarian direct duty to animals views? (4-5). What do his cup and Aunt Bea examples illustrate?

4.   Why, according to Regan, should we focus on similarities between humans and animals as individuals?  What does it mean to be “an experiencing subject of a life”? (6)  Why should this be the basis for moral consideration?  How does Regan defend his rights view and its extension to animals? (6-7)

5.  In " How to Worry About Endangered Species,"  Regan opens with the statement:  “The rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals.   Species are not individuals, and the rights view does not recognize the moral rights of species to anything, including survival.   What it recognizes is the prima facie right of individuals not to be harmed, and thus the prima facie right of individuals not to be killed.”  He then offers an example likely to freak out conservationists including environmental holists.  Why would these folks find Regan’s statement and his example so troubling?   Why does Regan charge the Land Ethic and holism in general with ecofascism?  Should we pay attention to individuals rather than groups in determining who is morally considerable?  Why or why not?

Callicott

1.  What is Callicott’s account of the origin and development of ethics?  Is this account persuasive?

2.  Callicott argues that Leopold’s land ethic incorporated the views of Darwin, Hume, and Adam Smith.  What are these views and do you think he is right?

3.  How does Callicott describe the charge of ecofascism against the land ethic?   Does he accurately represent the views of Regan?  Why does Callicott hold that the land ethic does not imply what the critics charge? (71-72)

4.  Even if we grant Callicott that the land ethic involves membership in and duties arising from membership in many communities, what problems remain? 

5.  Has Callicott successfully solved the problem of conflict of duties with his second order principles?  Does he successfully deal with the Sartrean dilemma and the spotted owl dilemma?

6.  In his conclusion (75-76) Callicott asserts that the Land Ethic with the addition of his second order principles in neither ecofascist nor a “paper tiger” (Nelson).  Why are these the alternatives Callicott is worried about?    Has he successfully avoided both of them?  Would Regan or Singer be satisfied?

Singer, Regan, and Callicott

1.  What take do you think Singer, Regan, Callicott and Regan would each have on the overall Rolston’s development of intrinsic, instrumental, and systemic value?   On Norton’s weak anthropocentrism?

2.  Do you see any way to resolve conflicts between animal welfare/rights views and holistic environmental ethics?  Must animal welfare/rights views be individualistic?  Must environmental ethics be holistic?   Has Callicott created a successful both/and solution?