Anna Peterson’s "In and of the World? Christian Theological Anthropology and Environmental Ethics"

1) Peterson says that in her essay, she will be focusing on "practical religion." What is the significance of a focus on "practical religion?" What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach?

2) For Peterson, the most important issue in reconciling Christianity with environmental concerns is that of theological anthropology. She says, "Any attempt at a Christian environmental ethic must come to grips with the ways that claims about God shape claims about humans, and the ways that claims about humans in term shape understandings of nature" (238). Key to Christian understandings of humanity is the distinctiveness of humans from the rest of creation by virtue of their possession of an eternal spirit or soul (239). Does this fact alone doom Christianity to a vicious anthropocentrism? Does it lead to a devaluing of nature, especially if what is seen as defining each person is their relationship to the sacred, invisible and removed God rather than to other people and their environment?

3) Peterson notes the influence of Platonic ideas within Christianity, and talks about the relationship of Christianity to gnosticism and to the Manicheans. She says that ultimately, when pushed, Christianity rejects such extreme dualism (characterized not just by the separation and distinction of the soul and the body, but of their active hostility to each other), but that these ongoing conversations are proof of the ambivalence within Christianity of embodiment. Is such an assessment accurate? How does the interaction between Christianity and the Gnostics embody the sorts of interaction that she is looking for with her emphasis on "practical religion?"

4) Christian orthodoxy holds that God created the world, and that the world is good. This is in contrast to the Manichean Demiurge who was responsible for the creation of the material realm. On the other hand, humans are the only creatures that were given an eternal spirit. It is this tension that is at the root of Christianity’s bodily ambivalence. The question is, "What is the place of humans, as both physical and spiritual creatures, in the created world?" (242) How do Augustine, Luther, and Niebuhr all seek to answer this question? Are any of the views similar to those that we have seen in our study of Judaism?

5) Peterson notes that Roman Catholic theology has viewed the created world in more positive terms, with more continuity between the material and the spiritual. Thomas Aquinas drew heavily from Aristotle. How much of this difference can be attributed to the Neo-Platonism of early Christianity versus the Aristotelianism of the Medieval Scholastics?

6) Many Christian re-evaluations of nature have gone forward through feminist theology, and the attempt to "think through the body" (247). For McFague, thinking through the body occurs on two different levels. First is to see ourselves as a spirited body. In other words, to see our body, not just as the container of our soul, but as "the shape or form of who we are" (248). Such a model is a "fully incarnational model, in which all dimensions of human beings are embodied" (248). On the other level, she wants to re-envision the earth as the body of God. Thus God is also understood as fully incarnational, not just the incarnation of God becoming flesh in Jesus Christ, but also God becoming matter in the creation of the world. McFague links the less than fully incarnated views of mainstream Christianity with the docetic heresy. What are some of the implications of such a radical view of the incarnation? Does this reappropriation of the Christian tradition work? Why or why not?

7) McFague, Jung, Ruether, and Berry all try to link theological anthropology to contemporary science. What are the potential benefits and pitfalls of such an attempt? Do you think Christians could accept the ""common creation story" of evolution?" (250) Do you think scientists could accept the attempt "to remythologize the new creation story from a Christian perspective?" (251)

8) Stewardship ethics seek to hold onto both human distinctiveness as well as human limits (252). This is done by retaining "a privileged place for humans while placing human power in the context of responsibility and dependence" (253). Is such an attempt still anthropocentric? Or is it theocentric, like many of the advocates of stewardship ethics claim?

9) Peterson says, "Theocentric revisions of stewardship ethics aim to avoid both arrogance and fatalism, two dangers of thinking in terms of an ethic of control" (255) Are they able to avoid these two dangers?

10) Does an emphasis upon human distinctiveness support a view that nature is to be viewed merely in terms of resources and according to a utilitarian ethic as George Kehm contends? (256)

11) Must some relationship between God and nature, independent of God’s relationship with humanity be shown for an appropriate Christian environmental ethic to be established? (Santmire proposes this on 256) Is cooperation a better model than stewardship, even if stewardship emphasizes responsibility and dependence?

12) How well does God as the "disinterested valuer" fill an "axiological void?" (257) Is Callicott right in seeing stewardship ethics as a promising approach?

13) Does a stewardship ethic most accurately model our relationship with nature, that is, does the reservation of a special place of responsibility get support from the power that we have to do damage?

14) What is the relationship between religious ethics and philosophical ethics? What are the benefits and pitfalls of deriving an ethic from within each of these spheres of thought?