Virginia Held - "Care as Practice and Value"  Chapter 2 from The Ethics of Care:  Personal, Political, and Global

Reading Advice: The first part of this reading can be somewhat overwhelming in that Held reviews many people’s definitions of care.  I would recommend reading the conclusion entitled “Caring Relations” on pp. 42-43 first.   This tells you what Held's own position is. Then read the whole chapter through from the beginning.  The chapter focuses on definitions.  As you read, pay attention to the many definitions of care as well as the definitions of practice and value.

1.  As Held notes people have been developing and operating with a definition of care for over twenty years since the discussion of an ethic of care emerged.  They have also pointed to various examples of what they take care to be.  In her first two sections, entitled "Taking Care" and "Some Distinctions", Held outlines some basic concerns and distinctions that pop up in our common use of the phrase taking care and in writings about the ethic of care.  What are these distinctions and concerns?   She notes that she will use the paradigms of "taking care of children and those who are ill and caring strongly about how those without adequate food are to be fed" (31).  However, she holds caring relations go far beyond these contexts.  What do you think the strengths and weaknesses might be of an ethic that takes these examples as paradigmatic?  Or, to ask the question another way, what do these examples allow us to see and what might they obscure?

2.  In the section "Some Distinctions" on pages 31 - 36 Held reviews the definitions and conceptions of care in a number of thinkers.  These involve such issues as whether care requires a certain attitude/intention or an emotional bond, whether care is a form of labor, what role relationships play in care,  whether care is about meeting needs, what the care relationship requires, whether care is a virtue,  the roles of the carer and the cared for, etc.  Held also offers her critiques of various views.  Which of the issues struck you as most important for a conception of an ethics of care?  Why?  Held also raises the issue of the relation between justice and care.  She ends this section with an extensive quotation from Sara Ruddick.  What key points does Ruddick make?

3.  The next section is entitled, "Care as Practice".  How does Held define care as a practice?  Why does she insist it must be seen in terms of caring relations?    What does she mean (and not mean) by "practice"?   How does she see justice and care and their interrelationships?   Why does Held think that a  justice perspective is tied to individualism?   Unpack her claim, "Relations of care seem to me wider and deeper than relations of justice. (41)" What are some of the specific examples she uses throughout this section of the chapter?

4.  The conclusion of the chapter is "Caring Relations" on pp. 42-43.   This is a summary of her view.  Outline the key points of her view.   Which points seem strong and which weak?  Why?

5.  How do you see Held expanding upon Gilligan's work in the piece we read?   Where are her concerns different from Gilligan's?

6.  Where would you put Held on a continuum between liberal and cultural feminism?   Or, to ask a related, but different question what elements of liberal feminism as an ideal type and cultural feminism as an ideal type do you detect in Held?

7.  If you have some experience with philosophical ethics such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, or virtue ethics, how do you see Held's notion of care as practice and value challenging or enriching philosophical ethics?  Would a utilitarian or Kantian see an ethics of care as truly ethical?  Why or why not?  Some of this is discussed in other chapters of the book.  Joan Tronto in her review of the book in Hypatia offers much appreciation as well as raising questions.  I thought one passage from her review was interesting from the point of view of how philosophical ethics often proceeds:

A final set of questions emerges from one example in the text, designed to address the question of partiality. Held considers the example of a teacher whose commitment to his own young child conflicts with the commitment he feels to his students and explores how deontologists, utilitarians, and care theorists might look differently at this question of partiality and impartiality. The point of the example is that morally impartial positions are not the only important ones; thus “This makes care ethics a challenge to liberalism as a moral theory, not a mere supplement” (100). But the example is, to some extent, curious. It seems to operate within the kind of philosophical framework and argument that Held wishes to avoid. Despite the fascination of such examples, moral life is not usually about throwing a switch and sending the trolley car careening into either our loved ones or a group of Nobel laureates, or about a young teacher throwing the switch between devotion to child versus devotion to students. Every day, over time, and throughout a life, we have the chance to redirect our efforts in keeping with our values. But the difficult task is to be attentive to the moral nature of our daily activity and the need to make these constant reassessments. What care, as a value and practice, requires is such reexamination. Once we make a commitment to taking the concerns of care seriously, then the elements of the “moral framework” will shift. So, while I do not want to exaggerate the centrality of this one example and argument, I think it does provide us with a caution about how to make moral arguments. When Held argues that the importance of partiality in this decision demonstrates the importance of the care approach, she may convince her impartial interlocutors, but such arguments may somewhat limit how the care perspective can help us to perceive moral questions innovatively. What those fuller elements of moral life will look like when described in detail is the task still ahead of us. (Joan Tronto, Hypatia.  Winter 2008, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 215).

If you are interested, our library does own the book from which this chapter is taken.   Our Religion and Philosophy database also contains several reviews of the book including Joan Tronto, Hypatia  Winter2008, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p211-217 at   http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:6138/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rlh&AN=27728693&site=ehost-live ;  Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Philosophy East & West. Jul2008, Vol. 58 Issue 3, p403-407 at http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:6138/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rlh&AN=32732762&site=ehost-live ; Cheshire Calhoun, Ethics 119 (October 2008): 184–189 which will be available online at UI in October 2009 (12 month embargo).