DAVID HUME 1711-1776 Scottish

Hume in Solomon, Martin, Vaught 211-220, 225-227, 231-32 and this excerpt omitted from the textbook:  Hume Treatise Excerpt.  Look up "Hume-David" and "is/ought dichotomy" in Angeles. For more background, please see Rachel Cohon , "Hume's Moral Philosophy" in the SEP at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/

I. Looking Out the Window Examples

 

 

 


II. Background

A. Two Keys to his Ethics:

1. Source of Morality is Sentiment not Reason - Can't Derive an "ought" from an "is"

2. Morality determined by sentiments of approval (or disapproval) arising out of sympathy for ourselves and others (what will lead to happiness for society including ourselves)

 

 

B. Early faith in reason led to skepticism about Reason's ability to know.

1. Empiricism

2. Skepticism

3. Morals do have a basis in the emotions/passions.

 

C. Comparison and Contrasts to Previous Philosophers

1. Contra Hobbes - Human nature not basically selfish

2. Like Aristotle: Human nature as essentially social. Concentrates on moral character and the traits or virtues that make us agreeable.

3. Similar to Hobbes and contra Aristotle, Plato, Augustine et al - the Good is relative

 

 

 

III. Passions provide Motives for Virtuous and Vicious Actions, Not Reason.

A. Morality not determined when reason shows relationships such as resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, or proportions in number, etc.

l. Example of Oak Tree and Parricide

 

2. Example of Incest, Animal and Human

 

B. Morality not in any Matter of Fact

1. Example of Willful Murder

 


2. Systems of Morality that jump from IS to OUGHT (Fact/Value)

 

 

C. Outline of No Ought from Is Argument (See Solomon, Martin, and Vaught 225-227)

 

Factual Premise: Ten children were (is) killed. They are dead.

Value Premise: Killing children is abhorrent. (Based on Passions)

Conclusion: The children ought not to have been killed -or-the killer ought to be punished -or- killing children is wrong.

Searle's Counter-example from Solomon, Martin, and Vaught, 226 - italics and bolding mine:

a. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.

b. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.

c. Jones placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.

d. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.

e. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

 

 

IV. Sympathy and Sentiments of Approbation: Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense

A. Disinterested Sentiments are Source of Morality

1. Disinterested Approbation

 

2. Pleasure resulting from the consideration of a character or a motive. A pleasure determined with disinterest. Ex. - Good qualities of an enemy.

 

 

3. Virtue

 

B. SYMPATHY

Our approbation and disapprobation are based on sympathy for self and others.

1. Strings Wound Up

 

2. Sympathy and Surgery Example

 

C. Sympathy for What is Useful and Agreeable

And a Key is Benevolence

"Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and THAT a PART, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men. "  Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section II - Of Benevolence, Part II. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm#2H_SECT2  Accessed 9-22-10

 


1. Precursor of Utilitarianism - benevolence, happiness, justice, and utility

 

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V. View of Human Nature, Virtue, and Self-Love Extended

“Virtue, Approval” from Conclusion Section IX of the Inquiry 244-45 and "Of Self-Love: Appendix II" of An Inquiry, on pp. 252-56 of Solomon, Martin, and Vaught.

A.  Part 1 –

1.  Personal Merit – “possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others” (244) – “natural as a shadow cast by the sun” (244)

“false religion” – “Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues” (244) – don’t benefit self or others

2.  Origin of Morals – “some sentiment common to all mankind” (245) leading to “applause or censure” (245)

What we do just for ourselves vs. what we share in common humanity – (246)

B.  Of Self-Love – Appendix II – Benevolence and Self-Love

What are his key objections?

1.  People can have both selfish and benevolent motives

2.  “contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced, notions” (253)

3. Animals have kindness

4.  Love Between the Sexes – Mother for Child

5.  We desire various objects without regard for interest and then find pleasure in them.  We naturally desire “another’s happiness or good, which, by means of rthat affection, becomes our own good and is afterwards pursued form the cominted motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment” (255)

C.  Reason as Phronesis

VI. Moral Relativism Revisited

A. Problem

B. Mitigated by

1. appeal to disinterested 3rd parties

2. natural, common human sympathy for self and others – benevolence and self-love

VII. Strengths and Weaknesses

 

 


VI. Moral Relativism

A. Problem

B. Mitigated by

1. appeal to disinterested 3rd parties

2. natural, common human sympathy for self and others 

 

 


VII. Strengths and Weaknesses