AFTER COMPATIBILISM AND INCOMPATIBILISM
by Ted Honderich
(Preliminary draft only)
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ABSTRACT: A determinism of decision and action, despite an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. Contra Searle, it certainly is not unsettled by our inner experience in deciding and acting. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and evidently so. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes and practices, at bottom certain desires. This project can run up against a kind of conviction owed to reflection on your life, autobiographical reflection. The conviction is that the mentioned desires, and in particular an attitude of holding yourself morally responsible for your past, despite the truth of determinism, may have some basis. We need to look for a radical idea in this connection, not the machinery of origination, as much of a departure as is the doctrine of Consciousness as Existence in connection with the problem of consciousness.
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Determinism can be taken as the family of views, a few of them conceptually adequate, that our decisions and the like and also the actions flowing from them are effects of certain ordinary causal sequences. These events are necessitated by the initial and subsequent causal circumstances that make up the sequences. Has this determinism been shown to be false?
Whether we actually experience its being false, which is to say become aware of its falsehood in the course of deciding and acting, has been disputed. From the 17th Century to a recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies1 some have said that we do indeed experience the falsehood. We learn or somehow get the truth that at least sometimes decisions and actions are not at all ordinary effects. It is part of our consciousness of deciding and acting that the decisions and actions in a sense could have gone the other way. Rather than being effects, they are originated.
To say they are originated may be to refer to some special mental or neural generative activity that others find obscure or factitious at best. It may be to say, better and much more cautiously, only that our decisions and so on come about in such a way that certain attitudes on our part may be in order, including certain hopes and our having the moral approval that is our being credited with a certain moral responsibility.
Against this, other philosophers have said or contemplated, from the 17th Century to a yet more recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies2, that what we ordinarily experience in deciding and acting is not that these things are not effects. It is that they are not effects of a certain kind. They are not effects of inhibiting, constraining or compelling causal circumstances -- causal circumstances in conflict with our desires, personalities or characters. As we suppose in these typical cases, there is nothing at all that is imposing our decisions on us. There is an entire absence of constraint. We know afterwards that in this clear sense the thing could have gone the other way. There was the freedom of voluntariness, as distinct from origination.
Whatever is to be said of this dispute about deciding and acting, of which more in a moment, there is a truth about the rest of our common experience, including our actual experience in science. It is that this experience leads us towards the view -- another determinism -- that all experienced events other than decisions and actions are effects of ordinary causal sequences. If this is so, we surely have good reason, a strong inferential base, for taking the same to be true of the decisions and actions.
Certainly with nature as we encounter it and also machines, and most importantly our bodies, we take it that in different ways or to different extents we know sequences of causal circumstances for the events in them. We have at least some evidence. No event in my autonomous nervous system is a real mystery, something of which there can be no ordinary causal explanation. No spoon levitates at breakfast. At work no lever or keyboard fails really inexplicably. We know enough of ordinary events outside of our deciding and acting to know -- what indeed our very language of causation expresses -- that they are effects of ordinary causal sequences.
Do you say that our experience of other ordinary events than our decisions and actions is one thing and our theory, particularly our Quantum Theory, is another? You may indeed, but without great effect on some of your hearers. We are not all overwhelmed by science put to philosophical purposes, or science when it becomes philosophy. After nearly a century during which the indeterministic interpretation of Quantum Theory might have been proved, corroborated, supported by direct and univocal experimental evidence, or what you will along these lines, it has not been. It has not even been made clear that the items that are said not to be effects are in the category of things said by determinists of the several kinds to be effects -- that is, events, individuals in a stretch of space and time as distinct from abstract entities or whatever.
It has become apparent that the indeterministic interpretation of Quantum Theory has a nature akin to that of a philosophical theory, or indeed just is a philosophical theory. I have in mind a theory that is at a certain distance from experience, and experimental data and also mathematics, and must aspire instead to the essence of philosophy. That is a kind of logic, which is to say greater conceptual adequacy -- higher standards than ordinary of clarity, consistency, completeness and so on. That a theory may fail dismally in the aspiration, first of all on account of self-contradiction, as the indeterminist interpretation of Quantum Theory does, does not remove it from the class of philosophical or would-be philosophical theories.
About the truth of determinism, it is worth remarking, too, that the supposed micro-indeterminism based on Quantum Theory would likely not much matter if it were a fact. It would likely be consistent with the determinism of decisions and actions, a macro-determinism related to the macro-determinism of neuroscience.3
For the purposes of this paper, determinism of decisions and actions will be an assumption. This paper does not assume, with Searle in the recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, that causation works upwards or simultaneously with brain and mind in deciding and acting, but does not work sideways or across time. That is, the paper does not assume that Quantum Theory as interpreted does not relate numerically different if simultaneous macro-events in choosing and acting, but does relate earlier and later ones. The paper does not assume, either, that our brains and minds jump back and forth between Quantum Theory as interpreted and causation, depending on whether we are deciding something or, on the other hand, just thinking, seeing or remembering something. This, to my mind, is a dog's breakfast.
What most moves me to that intemperateness, perhaps, is that there can be no doubt whatever that certain desires are in play with respect to determinism and freedom. They are the stuff of attitudes of hope, moral approval, and so on. This is rightly allowed by acute libertarians as Kane.4 They are deep desires, sometimes with religion in them, and they are more in play than desires in some other parts of philosophy. To speak generally, we want a certain freedom and the dignity it gives us, and it seems we want them more as retirement approaches. When suddenly it turns out that an interpretation of Quantum Theory, until now supposed to be a perfectly general theory of reality, can be understood as operating in so friendly and local and inconsistent a fashion as to satisfy a philosopher's deep desire, it is possible to wonder, to vary the metaphor, which is the dog and which is the tail.
To revert now to our experience or consciousness of deciding and acting, and our reflection on it, we have one regiment of philosophers informing us that we just know determinism is contradicted by it, and we have another regiment informing us that what we know, in typical cases, is that constraint and the like is no part of the deciding and acting. The first regiment says we just know we were free in their preferred sense, having to do with origination, and the other says we just know we were free in their preferred sense, having to do only with voluntariness. Or both regiments hedge their bets a little by saying that we know most importantly is that we were free according to their idea rather than the other.
These contentions can come to seem silly. In moving and after moving my finger to the left rather than the right, or in and after voting for the Left rather than the Right, I can have either idea about my experience. I can have either idea this very moment about moving my finger. So can you and anybody else. What could Incompatibilist Philosopher conceivably say to stop me having the Compatibilist idea of voluntariness? It's true, certainly. What could Compatibilist say to stop me having the Incompatibilist idea or orgination? It's no contradiction, and it can come to me even if I take determinism to be true. For these ideas it's a free country, isn't it?
Is Incompatibilist's proposition, or Compatibilist's, actually the thriller that we have his idea more often? Does Incompatibilist's reduce to the seeming philosophical scandal that his idea about us accords to us something he wants as a person, some ascendancy or elevation? Is Compatibilist's proposition really that the claim of our voluntariness is the only claim as to freedom that he is his conventional clear-mindedness finds reassuring?
That we all have or can have both ideas of freedom and, so to speak, be supported by them, has seemed to me patently true. That is to say that both of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism are false. This conclusion is as well confirmed by reflection on other things than our experience of deciding and acting. We have what can be called whole structures of culture that not merely give evidence of but are informed by our all having one or the other of the two ideas.
We have retributive punishment, based on an assumption of the origination of offences by offenders, and we have preventive punishment, which requires no such assumption. What lies behind the two practices or impulses are other things as confirmatory in themselves of our all having both ideas of freedom. These are two kinds of moral attitudes in each of holding people responsible and crediting them with responsibility. In a sentence, I can disapprove of you morally for being the kind of person who willingly did that awful thing, and I can disapprove of you, differently, for not having done otherwise given the past and present as it was.
It is as true that social and legal structures of individual rights ordinarily have to do with ensuring only the voluntariness of actions by individuals. What the framers of bills of rights have in mind, obviously, is to secure that we are preserved from certain constraints and compulsions. On the other hand, while we have no significant structures for the preservation of origination, since this is not within our power, we do in our lives give about as important a place to origination. It is one large assumption about us that enable us to separate ourselves from the rest of conscious life, what used to be called the animal kingdom. It is a part of what has lately explained the willingness of England to cure cows of an ailment bearable to them and harmless to us by killing them.
It is indeed a second assumption of this paper, then, that both Incompatibilism and Compatibilism are false.5 The supposed problem of consistency dividing the two regiments collapses into nothing as soon as it is seen there is no single concept of ours in this neighbourhood about which a question of its consistency with determinism arises, but two concepts, one of which patently is inconsistent with determinism and one of which patently is not. Incompatibilism and Compatibilism are answers to a question with a false presupposition, that we have but one conception of freedom or one important conception, and they themselves presuppose or assert that falsehood. Exit the question, and exit Incompatibilism and Compatibilism. In which case, what is our real philosophical situation?
Evidently the two concepts enter into and are bound up with attitudes and practices with fundamental places in our lives. So evidently there is a remaining problem of determinism and freedom. It has seemed to me to be the problem that results from taking determinism to be true, or from contemplating its truth, the resulting problem of giving up or contemplating giving up what is inconsistent with it, the attitudes and practices bound up with the idea of origination, at bottom certain desires.6
The possibility can come to mind, incidentally, that this real problem has in fact been the concern of at least some Compatibilists who have purposed to be proving to us, one more time, that voluntariness by itself is our only idea of freedom or our only significant idea. One way in which you can try to give up an idea or belief and what goes with it is to try to persuade yourself that you don't actually have the idea or belief. You are more likely to fall into the strategy out of an exessively intellectual orientation to our existence.
In any case, the real problem of determinism has seemed to me the given kind of practical problem. It is the problem of how to do something, the problem of how to accept the frustration of deep desires, those bound up with origination. We want the content of certain hopes, which is to say futures in a sense open as distinct from being only a matter of agreeable necessity. We want a confidence that our inquiries of various kinds, our pursuits of knowledge, are in a way unlimited as well as unfettered. So with the life-stuff of our non-moral attitudes to others -- personal attitudes. By attention to these, Peter Strawson moved the philosophy of determinism and freedom towards an awareness of the various attitudes that have come to seem to be its actual subject-matter.7
Others of these attitudes are indeed part of morality. We want to persist in the retributive attitudes, essentially desires for exactly the distress as others, as an end rather than a means. Many of these desires are civilized, not at all at the level of barbarism of the death penalty. The mention of that point of American-Chinese agreement is a reminder that the real problem of determinism has seemed to be not only that we have certain desires, decent or indecent, but also have practices in which to act on them.
The practical problem is not to be solved by a kind of collapse, the response of dismay to determinism. This, in short, is a kind of concentration on the particular kind of hopes, confidence in beliefs, personal feelings and so on that are inconsistent with determinism. For a start, there is no rationality in persisting in dismay when something else may be possible. Also this response will not be a settled one. Nor is the practical problem solved by another response to determinism, intransigence. This is a kind of concentration on the kind of hopes and so on that is consistent with determinism. For a start this response is also unsettled, vulnerable to the other one.
It has been my own recommendation that the best response to determinism is something called affirmation.8 This consists in perceiving and valuing the life consistent with determinism, perceiving and valuing certain attitudes, relationships, and structures of culture, amd thereby giving up the life inconsistent with determinism. The response is usefully parodied as a case of looking on the bright side, and is indeed a part of a philosophy of life.
This affirmation recommends itself, but it can be supposed that particular means or strategies can also be of use in connection with it. One is a kind of satisfying naturalism in other than the current philosophical sense -- naturalism where that is what can be called taking up membership in nature, maybe Nature. Another means, requiring no sensibility or poetry, is contemplating escape from certain of the feelings inconsistent with determinism, notably the special guilt and failure associated with our images of origination in connection with our own actions.
None of this is likely to be successful, essentially because of the strength of our desires. It has seemed to me that success in the project of affirmation will be owed, in the end, to nothing other than plain and settled belief in determinism. That remains rare, a lot rarer than contemplating the truth of determinism -- taking it as something in need of being considered. It has seemed to me that we or most of us, and perhaps more of our successors, will succed in the response of affirmation only when we really believe of the things we dearly want that we do not and cannot ever have them.
Thomas
Nagel in an account of determinism and freedom9 remarks that he
changes his mind about the subject every time he thinks about it, and others
may at least be tempted to this carry-on, as I have lately been. A question can
be raised in your mind about such an attitudinal view as the one just outlined
and the project of affirmation, or about Compatibilism. My concern is the
attitudinal view and the project. The principal point is that a question can be
raised in your mind about it by way of reflective attention to your own life. A
question can be raised, that is, by indulgence in autobiographical thinking or
writing, at any rate if your life has had in it actions and so on such that you
would think better of your life and yourself now if they were missing.10
It can seem impossible not to feel responsible in a certain way for what you have done. This is to disapprove morally of yourself in a certain way, at bottom to have certain desires of several kinds, where this does seem to carry with it an image or idea of the initiation of your actions that is inconsistent with determinism. You are not saved from this self-doubt, self-accusation or just guilt by the thought that you seem to be wanting your past to have been inconsistent with determinism. Rather, you are stuck with the thought, aren't you, that it seems that it was inconsistent with determinism? That there seems to be this fact about your past? It is certainly of relevance that it is now mainly an unhappy and self-diminishing fact, not something wanted.
There is a considerable difference between this and our supposed experiencing of determinism as false in the course of an episode of deciding and acting, our having that awareness as part of the consciousness of deciding and acting. This latter sort of discovery is certainly described in such a way as to suggest that we learn the indeterminist fact from within this stretch of experience, without giving attention to things outside of it, including other such stretches of experience. Nagel preceded Searle in such a supposition, associating it with what is called subjectivity rather than objectivity, the view from somewhere rather than the view from nowhere.11
This supposition cannot be right as it stands, or very close to right, sinced it offends against the fact that causal inquiry and causal reasoning is in an essential way general, as all clear and arguable accounts of it agree. My conclusion that event E was the effect of circumstance CC just is the conclusion that given CC, whatever else had been happening, E would still have occurred. My conclusion, thus, has to do with other situations of inquiry than this one, often spoken of as counterfactual situations, but in fact only counterfactual with respect to the present situation.
Similarly, my conclusion that E was not an effect, not necessitated by any circumstance, is the conclusion that there was no circumstance such that whatever else had been happening, E would still have occurred. This too is about more situations than this one. In short, any conclusion about determinism or indeterminism and oneself will have to rest on autobiographical reflection rather than some kind of introspection within the experience of deciding and acting as it passes.
Reflection on your past, then, a run of events, can and does test determinism, and, as I say, can give rise to a kind of conviction about responsibility that seems to be inconsistent with determinism. This conviction or whatever is worth distinguishing from Incompatibilism in several ways. For a start, it does not exclude or diminish the large fact of our conception of freedom as voluntariness. Also the conviction about responsibility rests as necessarily on voluntariness as on something seeming to be inconsistent with determinism.
That is not the end of the story about autobiographical reflection, but only half of it. Very likely your dealings with your past are not all of them judgemental, not all of them concerned with moral or other disapproval or approval. Often, if you get started on this reflection, what you want is just to understand. The aim is explanation, not judgement.
And, to come towards the point, the terrible fact is that you can deal with your past life in this way and fall into no doubt whatever that everything that happened did have an explanation in the ordinary and indeed the only real sense. That is, it was an ordinary effect. Indeed you can increase your conviction of the truth of determinism. That, at any rate, has been my experience. This is owed, presumably, to nothing arcane, but just to your coming to more knowledge about a subject-matter, maybe reading your diary and putting together facts.
So, here is seeming contradiction. The contradiction is not the sort owed to a lot of disputable premises. It is not weakened, to remember Nagel, by the consideration that the proposition of indeterminism is in the important sense more subjective than the proposition of determinism. In fact, whatever prompts attention to the proposition of indeterminism, it seems simply as true or false as the proposition of determinism.
This flat contradiction is near to the one announced some time back, by Kant, also as a result of something about morality.12 Kant did not respond in the Compatibilist Way of course, by giving up the proposition of indeterminism and and going on about freedom as being only voluntariness. Rather, he announced that he would have both of the determinism and the indeterminism. both of determinism and origination, by putting them in different places. Determinism in or for the phenomenal world, indeterminism in the noumenal world.
This Higher
Compatibilism, entirely at odds with ordinary or mundane Compatibilism, seems
hopeless. A distinction between two worlds is of course possible, and has a
number of philosophical versions, several of them less metaphysical than
Kant's. But there seems no hope whatever of locating indeterminism and freedom
significantly in only one of them, and certainly no hope for taking it out of
the experienced world entirely. In any case, since what is undetermined and
free must in some sense turn up in both worlds, it is hard to see that the
contradiction is actually escaped.13
Is it conceivable that some philosophical idea as radical as Kant's can have a better hope of dealing with the seeming contradiction? In particular, to come to the crux, is it conceivable that we can by some idea or other persist in certain attitudes, which do indeed seem tied up with the obscure and factitious machinery of origination -- persist in the attitudes without recourse to the machinery of origination and consistently with determinism?
There is a whiff of philosophical scandal about this, akin to the scandal contemplated earlier in connection with Incompatibilist. Still, it would be agreeable if such an idea had come with me to the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference. It has not. The rest of my contribution consists in little more than some clarifying of the extent of radicalness needed, and something about freedom and consciousness.
What is it for you to be aware of this room now? More generally, on the assumption that consciousness divides into perceptual, reflective and affective parts, what is it for you to be perceptually conscious? Two sorts of general answer are given, and also given with respect to the other two parts of consciousness. One sort of answer, if you will allow a quick but enlightening parody, is that perceptual consciousness is cells. It is neural activity. This is the old physicalism that now includes Functionalism and Cognitive Science With Philosophical Ambition. The other answer is only more disgraceful in terms of the physicalist conventionality of our current Philosophy of Mind. It is not often given openly, but is implied by the increasing resistance to the idea that consciousness is cells. This other answer, not much parodied, is that consciousness is non-physical stuff in heads.
It is possible to be attracted, as I am, to a quite general physicalism -- the view that somehow all that exists is physical. It is possible to be attracted too, likely by way of the seeming fact of some or other special subjectivity of consciousness, to the intolerable idea that perceptual consciousnessness is indeed funny stuff in heads. You might think this situation is rather like what we have been considering, attraction to both determinism and origination. It seems to me possible that the situation with perceptual consciousness can be resolved by a radical view of this consciousness.
What is it, really, for you now to be aware of this room? It is for the room in a way to exist. That answer can be shown not to be merely a rhetorical way of saying no more than that you are aware of the room. It is not a non-analysis. Rather, the claim that your perceptual consciousness consists in a kind of existence of a world consists in the claim that there is a certain state of affairs, certainly not in your head. It is things, reasonably called chairs and the like, being in space and time and dependent both on another world, roughly speaking the relevant atoms, and also on your neurons in particular. The world in question is anterior to the physical world, the one dependent both on atoms and crucially on all of us, above all our shared perceptual apparatus.
You are not likely to be persuaded of this doctrine, Consciousness as Existence, by a few words delivered on the wing.14 My lesser aim to indicate something of the order of differentness of thought that seems needed if we are to make a better escape from three centuries of impasse in the philosophy of determinism and freedom. In the doctrine about perceptual consciousness, a general physicalism is in a way held onto, and the mystery of non-physical stuff in the head absolutely abandoned. But what attracted us to the stuff in the head, its recommendation, is delivered to us by other means.
Above all, we are offered a real subjectivity, something clear on this subject -- i.e. your world of perceptual consciousness, different from the shared physical world. Given the history and state of the philosophy of determinism and freedom, is it not clear that only so significant a departure from the cart-tracks, and maybe one's own recent tracks, has a chance?
It may well have occurred to you, incidentally, although this was not my official intention, that a way forward with determinism and freedom will have to do with the nature of consciousness. Despite not actually having a conception of consciousness, Searle thinks this, and so, after all, there may be one thing in his piece that is right. Surely no question of freedom could arise about just exactly a physical world -- a world in which we are present only as we are conceived in the current physicalism of the Philosophy of Mind -- or for that matter, were conceived in Hobbes's materialism in the 17th Century. However, there seems no way forward in the particular doctrine of perceptual consciousness that has been mentioned, Consciousness as Existence. It will have added to it accounts of reflective and affective consciousness, perhaps in terms of the existence and ranking of possible worlds.
To finish up here, let me add, for the one or two open-minded graduate students of our age, and for all of us, another indication of the extent to which they should think of abandoning the philosophy of determinism and freedom as we have and have had it and starting up again in this new millenium.
A causal circumstance, as you know, is a set of events that necessitated an effect. We typically isolate one of those events and say it caused the effect, or indeed was the cause of the effect -- as against another mere condition of the effect, another event in the causal circumstance. This could be the human action in the set, and will hardly ever be the presence of oxygen, and in general is the event that most interests us or the event that it is in our interests to isolate.
Suppose you now set about explaining something in a life, perhaps a pattern of it or a culmination of it, and you take that pattern or culmination to be the effect of a causal sequence, this being a sequence or past array of causal circumstances. You can now do the further thing of isolating a cause in each of the causal circumstances or maybe just some of them. This gives you what can be called a causal line within and from the beginning of the sequence to the the pattern or culmination. It may be that this is much of what is had in mind by Alasdair MacIntyre and other philosophers who speak of a narrative in connection with a life.15
There is a
problem about isolating a single condition in a causal circumstance and
dignifying it as the cause. The problem, a paradox if you will, is that in a
clear sense this cause is no more explanatory of the effect than any other
condition in the causal circumstance. All are required or necessary conditions.
But the cause seems to be exactly that -- more explanatory. That is exactly
what is conveyed by calling it the cause. Evidently there is the very same
problem about a causal line. In a clear sense it cannot be more explanatory
than any other chosen succession of items or states, say presences of oxygen.
But it is more explanatory, isn't it?16
What this comes to is that the culmination of a life, say, is a matter of plain determinism, but there seems also to be the possibility of some kind of explanation of it that is different in kind. Some kind of departure from determinism, or unexpected addition to it. At any rate there is a problem or paradox here. The putative explanation would be consistent with determinism, indeed within it, but different in kind. I have wondered, entirely unsuccessfully, if the thing is worth reflection in connection with determinism and the attitudes in which we can find ourselves persisting. But I offer it here as another indication of the extent to which we should start out anew with determinism and freedom.
It may be that we shall get nowhere. If so, I myself shall go beyond Compatibilism and Incompatibilism only to the attitudinal doctrine and the project of affirmation. Sticking to this will have to involve something like seeing what presents itself as a certain moral attitude to oneself and one's past is in fact moralism, indeed a kind of moralized self-abuse. It will not be perfect contentment.
NOTES
1. J. R. Searle, 'Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain', Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 2000 ('Mind the Gap' issue).
2. Honderich, 'Mind the Guff', Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 2001.
3. These various sceptical thoughts about the indeterminist interpretation of Quantum Theory and its use in defence of freedom of origination are set out more fully, along with other thoughts of the same tendency, in my A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 304-334. They are abbreviated in How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 61-67.
4. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996)
5. A Theory of Determinism, pp. 379-487; How Free Are You?, pp. 80-106
6. A Theory of Determinism, pp. 488-496; How Free Are You?, pp. 107-112
7. P. F. Strawson Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968)
8. A Theory of Determinism, pp. 496-612; How Free Are You?, pp. 112-129
9. The View From Nowhere (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986)
10. Honderich, Philosopher: A Kind of Life (London & New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 395-399
11. The View From Nowhere, pp. 113-124
12. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, Macmillan, 1950), p. 300, p. 477.
13. Cf. R. Walker, Kant (London, Routledge, 1978), p. 148.
14. Honderich, 'Consciousness as Existence Again', Philosophy of Mind: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 9, ed. Bernard Elevitch (Bowling Green, Bowling Green State University, Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000). Also in Theoria, No. 95, June 2000.
15. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London, Duckworth, 1981), Ch. 15.
16. Philosopher: A Kind of Life, pp. 399-415