Two Conceptions of Analyticity

Mike Waters

Tracing back to roots in the Eighteenth century, a division emerges in 20th century philosophy. A defining feature of neo-Kantianism is a continued role for the 'a priori'. A set of statements, or assumptions, whose truth is independent of any particular facts of the world, form the logical core of our semantic system. These assumptions then serve as the framework which allows for scientific inquiry. The Naturalist side of this division, stemming from Hume, rejects the role of the 'a priori', arguing that all judgements have roots solely in empirical evidence.

An important chapter in this debate is exhibited in Rudolf Carnap's exchange with W.V. Quine. Carnap's defence of analyticity within linguistic frameworks is challenged by Quine's attempted rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. My paper will attempt to make sense of Carnap and Quine's accounts of analyticity, and Quine's claim to have dissolved the boundary between the analytic and synthetic. In doing so I take it that we learn much about the background debate in neo-Kantian and Naturalistic conceptions of inquiry and experience.