Begging the Question, Objections, and Evidence

Lee Pike

Occasionally, an interlocutor, in the midst of debate, is accused by her adversary of forwarding an argument that commits the fallacy of begging the question. Supposedly, the fallacy is one means by which persuasive arguments may be cleaved from unpersuasive ones. This paper elucidates difficulties with considering begging the question as a fallacy. Specifically, I examine begging the question in relation to valid arguments (which are of course deductive) employed in persuasion contexts. I begin with a seemingly innocuous analysis of begging the question provided by Robert Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (F & S-A). F & S-A analyze begging the question with respect to the concepts of objection and evidence. I demonstrate that if we limit ourselves to logically contradictory objections and logically demonstrative evidence (as defined in the paper), then all valid arguments beg the question. In closing, I discuss how the results of our investigation might affect the prospects of considering begging the question as a fallacy.