

**REPORT ON THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT PROJECT:  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL JUSTICE  
PROTESTS, 1999-2001**

**By  
Patrick Gillham  
University of Idaho  
[Gillham@uidaho.edu](mailto:Gillham@uidaho.edu)  
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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The purpose of Global Justice Movement Project is to outline the contours of the U.S. branch of the Global Justice Movement and to explain different levels of group participation in protests that occurred between 1999-2001. The protests examined took place in Seattle in 1999 against the WTO, and in Washington, DC in 2000 and 2001 opposing the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Specifically, this report identifies how social movement organizations' attributes like location of a group's headquarters, annual revenue, level of bureaucratic formalization, and issues related to elite ties and dependence on mass memberships influenced organizational involvement in these protest episodes. Data for the study was acquired from a survey delivered to a sample of 204 organizations involved in at least one of the three protest episodes.

The *central findings* reported here are that 1) local groups are more likely to be involved in core organizing roles than are outside agitators, contradicting claims made by the media and

local authorities; 2) organizations with greater access to resources (money, formal structure, and paid staff) are more likely to play key roles and be involved across a greater number of protest episodes; and 3) organizations linked to elites and with mass memberships are not directly co-opted by those wishing to moderate the movement. These findings suggest that groups wishing to engage in sustained protests may benefit from a predictable resource base and organizational infrastructure, and that the establishment of elite ties does not necessarily lead to organizational co-optation.

## INTRODUCTION

This study examines the involvement of U.S. social movement organizations (SMOs) in global justice movement (GJM) protests against the WTO in Seattle 1999 (Sea99), and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, DC in April 2000 (DC00) and September 2001 (DC01).<sup>1</sup> Each of these protests represents a “contentious episode” consisting of many different protest events including marches, blockades, teach-ins, and rallies (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

SMOs are formal groups that work toward the social change goals and efforts of a broader social movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In general, SMOs span a continuum from professional organizations with paid staff, large memberships, and significant foundations and donor support to small grassroots groups relying on volunteer labor, a narrow and informal

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<sup>1</sup> The September 2001 Mobilization for Global Justice protests in Washington, DC were significantly altered due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While most events were cancelled, several new anti-war events were organized in their place.

membership, and an indigenous resource base. In the GJM, examples of SMOs include larger advocacy groups like the Sierra Club and labor unions, moderately sized organizations such as Global Exchange, and smaller groups like local chapters of Earth First!.<sup>2</sup>

SMOs also vary in their overall protest strategies and tactics. In terms of the GJM, some groups seek to reform international governmental organizations (IGOs) like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while others want them abolished. SMOs are involved in protests as part of a repertoire of actions (Tilly 1978). For some SMOs, protest involvement fits alongside education and lobbying activities. These groups view protest engagement as strategically useful at times and counter-productive at other times, depending on the circumstances. Other SMOs see public protest as a democratic end in itself, resisting the expansion of global capitalism promoted by IGOs and Western governments dominated by corporate interests. From the perspective of these groups, engagement in protest is necessary in order to resist these institutions that have spiraled out of control.

### **Organizational Involvement**

The focus of this report is organizational involvement in protest episodes. It examines both the roles that SMOs play within protest episodes and the number of episodes in which SMOs participate. Roles include whether a group organized, sponsored, or participated in a protest event within an episode, or endorsed a protest episode by signing an electronic petition.

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
<sup>2</sup> Affinity groups are typically the smallest and most informal SMOs involved in the GJM. They are underrepresented in this study for several reasons, including the practical difficulty in identifying a population of groups from which to draw a sample.

These roles can be conceptualized as a set of concentric circles with the more important roles in the center (see Figure 1).

*SMO Roles*

*Organizers* are those groups primarily responsible for planning, coordinating, and recruiting the participants and funding necessary to ensure that a particular event within an episode occurs.

**Figure 1. Division of Labor in Organizational Roles for Contentious Episodes**



*Sponsors* provide money, the legitimacy of their name in supporting an event or larger episode, and additional people to help organizers successfully carry out an event. *Participants* supply an individual or members of their organization to perform scripted parts for a particular event as determined by the organizers (e.g., speaker at a teach-in, picketer at a rally, or people attending a march dressed in costumes). At the periphery are *endorsers* who sign electronic-petitions supporting any one of the contentious episodes. In many cases, groups were involved in multiple

roles and/or events within and across the episodes analyzed here.<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of clarity, when groups played more than one role, only the highest ranking role occupied within an event is acknowledged.

### **Outside Agitators, Resource Mobilization and Co-optation Theses**

This study explores three competing explanations for a group's level of involvement in mass demonstrations. One explanation is that the most important actors, or those that fill organizing and sponsoring roles, are alienated *outside agitators*. This perspective is often articulated by police and city officials where protests occur, as well as in mainstream media accounts. Implied is the notion that established SMOs will unlikely participate in contentious protests since they are relatively satisfied with the political process. Only the most disenfranchised outsiders will be involved in central mobilizing roles and in numerous episodes like those witnessed in Seattle and Washington, DC.

In contrast, the *resource mobilization* perspective suggests that access to human, organizational, and monetary resources provide organizations with the social and financial capital necessary to fill central roles and to persist across episodes. Important resources include money, people, knowledge, skills, and organizational infrastructure (Cress and Snow 1997; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Savvy, professional, and often well-paid leaders promote their organizations' goals and accomplishments to individual members, foundations, and potential donors. The most effective SMOs are those able to secure predictable

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<sup>3</sup> The justification for ranking roles by their importance is as follows. While participants and endorsers may be just as committed to the goals of a movement as organizers and sponsors, they are less essential to guaranteeing the success of an event and/or episode. This is because participants can be easily replaced with other participants, and an episode would likely have occurred regardless of who signed or did not sign the electronic petitions.

resource flows necessary for advancing their organizations' agendas, which may include participating in mass protests. From this perspective, groups with sufficient human, organizational, and monetary resources will be more likely to play important roles across protest episodes than are less resourced organizations.

Lastly, the *co-optation perspective* argues that groups with ties to elites or mass memberships are easily co-opted and thus less likely to engage in contentious protests. From this view, some groups seek close ties with elites in order to secure resources. Elites distribute resources with the understanding that those SMOs receiving their aid will not engage in activities that undermine privileged interests. Thus, despite intentions to promote social change, groups with elite ties end up moderating their behavior so that they may secure or maintain steady revenue streams. In a similar fashion, the typically conservative constituents in mass membership organizations, like unions, often disapprove of controversial activities that challenge public order. Thus, in protest episodes where elite interests are jeopardized or when the public order is disrupted (both of which were true during the protests analyzed here), the co-optation thesis suggests that SMOs closely aligned with elites or SMOs possessing mass memberships will be less involved in contentious protests (Piven and Cloward 1979).

A carefully designed research project was required to examine which of these perspectives best explains organizational involvement in the Seattle and Washington DC protest episodes. The basics of this design are described in the next section.

## STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Social movements are hard to study because it is difficult to identify participants, especially individuals. In addition, even after identifying participants one seldom knows whether those identified are representative of a larger population of individuals or organizations involved in a movement. Identifying a cross-section of organizations can be challenging, since only the most visible groups—those who release press statements or receive media attention—leave much of a trail for contacting after a protest episode is over. To address some of these difficulties, this study relies on a two-stage research design involving data acquired through fieldwork and a national survey of U.S. SMOs involved in the GJM. The first stage entailed compiling a list of SMOs involved in the three protests under investigation. In the second stage, a survey was delivered to a stratified random sample of 204 SMOs selected from the list compiled in Stage 1.

### **Compiling List of SMOs, Sampling Procedure and Survey Delivery**

This study focuses on SMOs involved in at least one of the GJM protest episodes that occurred in Seattle and Washington DC between November 1999 and September 2001. In Stage 1, a list of all organizations involved in at least one of the episodes was compiled from protest documents (such as flyers, event calendars, and press releases) acquired at each episode location and from websites used to help mobilize the protest episodes (e.g., website for the Mobilization for Global Justice).<sup>4</sup> This method resulted in the compilation of a list containing over 2800 U.S. and International organizations that were involved in at least one of the three episodes (see Table 1).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The Mobilization for Global Justice website is [www.globalizethis.org](http://www.globalizethis.org).

<sup>5</sup> Individuals not directly associated with an SMO and entities that were clearly not SMOs (e.g., distinct governmental organizations, schools and universities) were removed from the list.

**Table 1. Nation/Continent where SMO headquarters are located for all organizations involved in at least one contentious episode<sup>6</sup>**

Nation/Continent	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
U.S.	1388	48.4%	48.4%
Canada	162	5.7	54.1
Latin America	203	7.1	61.2
Europe	650	22.7	83.9
Asia	252	8.8	92.7
Africa	83	2.9	95.6
Middle East	50	1.7	97.3
Australia & New Zealand	65	2.3	99.5
Oceania	3	.1	99.7
D/K	10	.3	100.0%
Total	2866	100.0%	

In order to narrow the scope of the study, only U.S. SMOs were analyzed. As noted in Table 2 below, of the 1388 U.S. SMOs identified, their involvement varied across episodes. Between 12.9% and 36% of all organizations in the population were involved in just one of the protest episodes in any capacity. Less than 5% were involved in both the first and second protests, while close to 7% participated in the second and third episodes. Fewer than 1% were involved in the first and third episode and only 3.5% were involved across all three episodes.

**Table 2. Population of U.S. Organizations and Sequence of Episode Involvement in Any Capacity**

Episode Involvement	Frequency	Percent
Sea99	497	35.8%
DC00	500	36.0
DC01	179	12.9
Sea99&DC00	64	4.6
DC00&DC01	90	6.5
Sea99&DC01	10	0.7
All 3 Episodes	48	3.5
Total	1388	100.0%

<sup>6</sup> Rather than listing frequencies for North America, the U.S. and Canada were separated in order to highlight the number of U.S. organizations involved in the protests. Organizations headquartered in Mexico are incorporated into Latin America.

Stage 2 of the data collection entailed surveying organizations involved in the protests. To easily administer the survey, a stratified random sample of 204 SMOs was selected from the population of U.S. groups.<sup>7</sup>

The survey consisted of 52 questions and was pre-tested on activists familiar with different types of SMOs and the global justice movement itself. Surveys were sent by e-mail or U.S. Postal Service depending on the available contact information. Of the 204 organizations with legitimate contact information 141 (69%) responded to the survey.

### **Measures of SMO Involvement**

The level of SMO involvement in protests is measured in terms of 1) the roles that SMOs played within a particular episode, and 2) the number of protest episodes in which an SMO participated in key roles. This information was garnered from the protest flyers used to construct the list of organizations from which the sample was drawn.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Initially, 215 organizations were selected, but the number of cases was dropped to 204 after 11 cases were determined to have no contact information or to be phony organizations. Since few organizations were involved in more than one episode and to ensure sufficient representation for statistical analyses, the sample was stratified by episode involvement. Ten percent of the cases were randomly selected for U.S. organizations involved in only one episode; 25% of the cases were selected for organizations involved in either Sea99 and DC00, or DC00 and DC01; and 100% of the cases were selected for organizations involved in either Sea99 and DC01, or all three episodes. This stratification scheme ensured that SMOs involved in more than one episode were fairly represented. Statistical analyses were then mathematically weighted to account for the stratified sampling, enabling some generalizations to the population of organizations involved in the protest episodes. The dissertation from which this report derives provides more detailed statistical and qualitative analysis and is available from the author upon request, [gillham@uidaho.edu](mailto:gillham@uidaho.edu).

<sup>8</sup> A weakness of the study is that it does not specify the actual tactics used by organizations during the protests. Thus, involvement does not measure how disruptive a group actually is, a point I return to in the conclusion. Another weakness is related to use of flyers for identifying group involvement. Some SMOs may have been involved, but were overlooked because the researcher did not get copies of all flyers distributed during the protest episodes, or a group was not listed on a flyer, even though it was involved in an episode.

*Role involvement*

Table 3 shows the different roles played by organizations in each episode.<sup>9</sup> The Seattle episode has the greatest combined percentage of organizers and sponsors, likely because the mobilization had been planned for over a year, allowing a greater percentage of organizations the time needed to build cooperative networks, organize events, raise money, and collect other necessary resources. In contrast, the demonstrations against the IMF and World Bank in 2000 were mobilized very quickly, occurring just five months after the Seattle protests, perhaps creating problems for organizations needing more lead time before becoming involved in organizing or sponsoring events. Roles played in DC01 are relatively balanced, though the fact that protests were cancelled a few weeks before the episode was scheduled to occur exclude those organizations that may have joined the contentious episode at the last minute.<sup>10</sup>

<b>Table 3. Percent SMOs Primary Role Involvement Within Each Protest Episode (N=135)</b>			
	<u>Episode</u>		
	<b>Sea99</b>	<b>DC00</b>	<b>DC01</b>
Primary Role	Percent	Percent	Percent
Organizer	47.2	15.2	24.3
Sponsor	20.4	28.9	32.9
Participant	9.7	10.9	22.3
Endorser	22.8	45.0	20.6
Total	100%	100%	100%

<sup>9</sup> The number of cases in Table 3 (N=135) are less than 141, indicating that six respondents were excluded because of missing data. In the tables that follow, the number of cases varies for the same reason.

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted that late joining groups would likely have been involved in lower order roles since they would not have time to become more centrally involved. In addition, late joiners from outside of Washington DC would have been constrained in finding affordable space at such a late date, making it hard for them to organize activities.

*Number of episodes*

Role involvement can also be described as the number of episodes that an organization is involved in as an organizer, sponsor, participant, or endorser. As shown in Table 4, most SMOs were involved in only one protest in any role capacity. Just under 12% were involved in two episodes and less than 4% were involved in all three.

Number of Episodes	Percent
1	84.7
2	11.8
3	3.5
Total	100.0%

It is also useful to identify SMO involvement across episodes in the more important roles of organizers and sponsors. Table 5 reveals that over 45% of the SMOs were not involved in any of the three episodes as an organizer or sponsor, instead contributing more peripherally as a participant or endorser of electronic petitions. Nearly half of the organizations were involved in only one episode in a core capacity, while less than 2% of all organizations were involved in all three episodes in a core organizing or sponsoring role. This suggests that a small core of organizations were fully engaged in organizing the series of protest episodes, with most other groups being only modestly involved in central roles or not involved in this capacity at all. The cadre of fully engaged organizations might be best considered as protest mobilization specialists whose organizing efforts allow the majority of the GJM's SMOs to concentrate on other activities between protest episodes.

Number of Episodes as Sponsor or Organizer	Percent
0	45.9
1	45.2
2	7.4
3	1.5
Total	100.0%

### **Factors Impacting Organizational Involvement Across Protests**

Before moving to a more detailed analysis, it is important to identify several factors that might have an influence on the level of involvement across the protest episodes. The factors selected are those that proponents of the outside agitator, resource mobilization, and co-optation theses suggest are important in predicting involvement or the lack of involvement. These include demographic characteristics like a group's headquarters location, age and annual revenue; organizational factors such as level of formalization and professionalization; and potentially co-optive influences such as possessing links to elites and being a membership organization.

*Headquarter location* is the place that an SMO lists as their mailing address on a website, protest event flyer, or e-petition.<sup>11</sup> *Age* is measured in years after an organization's founding.<sup>12</sup> *Annual revenue* approximates the total amount of funds a group took in from all sources in 1999

<sup>11</sup> In cases where organizations are chapters of a larger organizational structure, then the location of the local chapter was used. If no identifying features were evident, then the national headquarters was used.

<sup>12</sup> Respondents that did not know the founding year were asked to estimate how long a group had been in existence. For this and other factors (or "variables" in social science parlance), non-responses to the survey were supplemented with information from Associations Unlimited's *Encyclopedia of Associations* and the online database *GuideStar*.

or during the first year that the group operated if it was founded after 1999.<sup>13</sup> *Formalization* is measured using an index derived from the “yes/no” responses regarding whether an organization possesses IRS nonprofit tax status, is incorporated, has a governing board, uses a written budget, and has paid staff. *Professionalization* of organizations is measured by a ratio equal to the number of paid staff divided by the number of volunteers working five or more hours a week. For this factor the higher the ratio the greater the organization’s level of professionalization.<sup>14</sup> *Elite linkage* is measured based on whether an SMO sent a delegate to the WTO ministerial.<sup>15</sup> *Membership* was derived from a survey question asking whether the respondent’s organization had a formal membership.

On the next page, Table 6 shows the anticipated influence of each factor as predicted by the individual theses. The outside agitator thesis, predicts that groups involved in more protest episodes and in central roles will be headquartered further from the protest episode. Such groups will also be marginalized from mainstream society and thus are younger in age, possessing lower

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<sup>13</sup> This variable was categorized ordinally such that 1 = “less than \$1,000”; 2 = “between \$1,000 and \$5,000”; 3 = “between \$5,001 and \$15,000”; 4 = “between \$15,001 and \$25,000”; 5 = “between \$25,001 and \$50,000”; 6 = “between \$50,001 and \$100,000”; 7 = “between \$100,001 and \$200,000”; 8 = “between \$200,001 and \$500,000”; 9 = “greater than \$500,000; and 10 = “refused”; and 99 = “don’t know.” For respondents who left the survey question blank or answered “don’t know,” revenue for 1999 was acquired from the IRS Form 990 available in the *GuideStar* database.

<sup>14</sup> It was initially thought that *decision-making* would predict behavior. Field research and anecdotal evidence suggested that organizations varied in the implementation of decision-making strategies, with most groups favoring a particular kind of decision-making style over another. SMOs emphasizing egalitarianism and a flat organizational structure were typically observed making decisions by consensus, while more bureaucratic organizations relied more often on leaders to make decisions. Surprisingly, decision-making style had no effect on roles played or sequencing of involvement and is excluded from this report’s final analysis.

<sup>15</sup> This factor was derived from a list of over 750 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that had planned to officially to attend the WTO Ministerial. To attend, these groups had to apply several months in advance. Such organizations ranged from the Sierra Club’s national office, the Mott Foundation, and the United Methodist’s General Board of Global Ministries, to industry lobby groups like Business Software Alliance and the Grocery Manufacturers of America. The WTO made the list publicly available before the WTO meeting in 1999, perhaps to portray an image of transparency. While organizations were listed, there is no easy way to know whether they actually attended. NGOs also attended the World Bank and IMF meetings, but no list of these attendees was made available despite repeated requests by the researcher.

annual revenues, less formalization and less professionalization. In addition, groups involved in protests will tend to have no links to elites nor consist of mass memberships.

**Table 6. Outside Agitator, Resource Mobilization, and Co-optation Theses Anticipated Impact of Demographic, Organizational, Potentially Co-optive Factors on Level of SMO Protest Involvement**

	<b>Outside Agitator Anticipates that:</b>	<b>Resource Mobilization Anticipates that:</b>	<b>Co-optation Anticipates that<sup>16</sup>:</b>
<b>Factors</b>			
Headquarter location	Further away, more likely involved	Closer, more likely involved	No effect
Age	Younger, more likely involved	Older, more likely involved	Older, more likely co-opted
Annual Revenue	Lower revenue, more likely involved	Higher revenue, more likely involved	Higher revenue, more likely co-opted
Formalization	Less formal, more likely involved	More formal, more likely involved	More formal, more likely co-opted
Professionalization	Less professional, more likely involved	More professional, more likely involved	More professional, more likely co-opted
Elite linkages	No links, more likely involved	Has links, more likely involved	Has links, more likely co-opted
Membership organization	No membership, more likely involved	Membership organization, more likely involved	Membership organization, more likely co-opted

In contrast, resource mobilization would predict that SMOs most likely involved in protest episodes and occupying organizing and sponsoring roles will be headquartered near a protest episode since familiarity with a place and existing local networks are important informational and relational resources. Older SMOs will be more likely to participate in central roles since they are more established and in possession of steady resource streams. Steady resource flows allow the flexibility needed to decide what activities to engage in besides daily organizational survival. Organizations with higher annual revenues would be able to use money to secure other resources like paid staff, office and meeting space, and equipment needed to

<sup>16</sup> Remember that the term “co-optation” suggests that a group will be less likely involved in subsequent protests due to undue influence placed on the organization by an elite patron or conservative membership base.

organize protest events. In addition, organizational infrastructure such as formalization and professionalization would aid organizations wanting to be involved in mass protests. More formalized organizations (i.e., possessing IRS nonprofit tax status, incorporation, a governing board, a written budget, and paid staff) may also be at an advantage, since decision making about protest involvement and the relegation of related responsibilities may be more easily and efficiently made than for less formalized groups. Groups that are more professional (i.e., have a large ratio of paid staff to volunteers), may be better able to engage in protest episodes since related planning activities can be integrated into a regular work schedule, something difficult for volunteers to do who might only work on activities related to a protest episode for a few hours a week as they juggle other responsibilities. Similarly, professional SMOs may be able to free up employees to be involved extensively in planning a protest as part of their paid employment, while organizations dependent on volunteers would only be able to organize protests when their members have spare time. Elite linkages could prove helpful too, providing SMOs with legitimacy that might be useful for gaining other resources for engaging in protests. Mass memberships would provide a steady resource base, some of which could be used for protest involvement. The advantaged posed by access to these different resources would benefit those organizations receiving them, and hinder those without them.

Finally, the co-optation thesis would predict that organizations which are more established and mainstream, with linkages to elites, and possessing mass memberships are more likely to withdraw from subsequent protests and from important roles, especially after the contentiousness of the Sea99 episode. This is because involvement in post-Seattle protests would threaten elite interests. Thus older, wealthier, formalized, and professional SMOs, as well

as those who sent a delegate to the WTO, and organizations with a mass membership, should be involved in fewer protests.<sup>17</sup>

Combining the data from the protest flyers and survey allows testing of the central question whether the outside agitator, resource mobilization, or co-optation perspectives best explain SMO involvement in the GJM protests. Before returning to this question, the next section identifies general characteristic, attitudes, and the status of organizations involved in the protests. After reporting these observations, the section concludes by showing that the resource mobilization perspective best explains increased levels of involvement in the contentious episodes.

## **FINDINGS**

This section shows that the resource mobilization perspective best explains the different levels of involvement in the protest episodes analyzed here. The analysis considers the influence of SMO headquarter location, annual revenue, level of professionalization, degree of formalization, sending a delegate to the WTO, and being a membership organization on level of involvement. The data convincingly shows that the resource mobilization perspective is the best predictor of organizational involvement. Outside agitation does not occur as suggested by conventional wisdom and there is little support for the co-optation thesis. Before explaining these findings, a brief sketch of general SMO characteristics, attitudes and organizational health is provided.

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<sup>17</sup> The larger study from which this report is drawn includes a more complicated analysis that accounts for the possibility that more established and mainstream organizations with elite ties and mass memberships might withdraw after Sea99 then try to reclaim the GJM for elite interests by returning during DC01. This thesis is unsubstantiated by the data.

## General SMO Characteristics

The survey data suggests that the types of SMO involved in the GJM are diverse, ranging from human rights, solidarity and social justice groups (14.4%) to anti capitalist organizations (2.9%) and church and religious societies (2.8%) (see Table 7).

Organization Type	Percent
Human Rights, Solidarity & Social Justice	14.4
Democracy & Civil Society	13.2
Peace, Anti-Nuclear, Anti-Militarism	10.5
Art, Entertainment, & Non-News Media	10.4
Environment & Animal Rights	10.0
Domestic & Civil Rights	9.2
Unions & Labor Rights	6.8
Agriculture, Food Safety, Health	6.5
Development, Trade, International Debt, Economic Globalization	6.2
Anti-Capitalist	2.9
Churches & Religious Societies	2.8
Other/Multi-Issue	7.2
Total	100.0%

The geographic scope of organizational activities also covered a broad spectrum. Table 8 located on the next page shows that 38% of the organizations emphasize an international or global focus to their activities. The percentage of organizations decreases proportionately to the narrowing of geographic scope with the exception that 20% of the organizations were concerned with city or countywide issues, indicating that a sizeable proportion was concerned with local issues.

Geographic Scope	Frequency	Percent
Neighborhood w/in a city	4	3.1%
Citywide or countywide	28	20.6
Region w/in a state	10	7.4
Entire state	10	7.7
Region several states	10	7.4
U.S.	20	15.0
International or global	53	38.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

### **SMO Perception of IGOs and Effectiveness of Protests, and SMO Status**

There is not a unified voice among the groups regarding IGOs. As reported in Table 9, most SMOs expressed major discontent with the central institutions of global capitalism. Over 80% of those surveyed believed there was a need to significantly reform or abolish the WTO. Seventy percent thought the same about the IMF and World Bank.

	<b>WTO (N=122)</b>	<b>IMF/WB (N=125)</b>
<b>Attitude</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Needs minor reform	0.1	0.0
Needs significant reform	45.0	48.9
Should be abolished	35.3	26.0
Other	15.1	18.5
D/K	4.4	6.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

In terms of the importance of the protest episodes, most organizational representatives believed the GJM protests had been somewhat to very effective in building the movement

(95.6%) and educating the general public about global issues (86.8%). Respondents were less confident that the protests had effected change among the IGO targets. Table 10 shows the differing levels of effectiveness perceived by respondents on these different factors.

	<b>Building GJM (N=129)</b>	<b>Educating Public (N=129)</b>	<b>Promoting Changes (N=128)</b>
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Very ineffective	0.0	1.4	9.5
Somewhat ineffective	1.9	9.3	38.5
Somewhat effective	52.6	59.6	38.0
Very effective	43.0	27.2	6.2
D/K	2.4	2.4	7.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

The GJM has remained relatively robust despite the September 11 attacks. At the time of the survey in 2003, almost 65% of organizations reported that they were operationally stable. Only 4.5% of organizations had disbanded. The remaining groups were either in hibernation or experiencing some difficulties (see Table 11).<sup>18</sup>

<b>Status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Stable	64.4
Difficulties	25.8
Hibernation	5.3
Disbanded	4.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>18</sup> This is a notable achievement given concerns that donations to nonprofit organizations might decline due to “donor fatigue” following the outpouring of resources to the Red Cross and other agencies who responded directly to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks (Greene et al. 2001; Hu 2001). This is also an accomplishment for groups without nonprofit status who witnessed the U.S. branch of the GJM falter and partially morph into an anti-war movement in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

## **Outside Agitation, Resource Mobilization, or Co-optation?**

We now return to the question about which thesis best explains SMO involvement in the protest episodes. In order to address this question, the following analysis examines the impact of SMO headquarter location, age, revenue, level of formalization, degree of professionalization, presence of elite ties, and membership on protest involvement. This analysis primarily supports the resource mobilization perspective.

### *Headquarter Location*

The outside agitator thesis predicts that geographically distant and alienated organizations are more likely to participate across protest episodes and in key roles. For now, I'll focus on geographical location as indicated by where an SMO is headquartered. The analysis tends to refute the outside agitator thesis, although it does reveal mixed results for the Seattle protests. In Sea99, there seems to be two clusters of groups involved based on SMO headquarter proximity to the episode.

The first cluster includes SMOs headquartered in the Seattle metro area that were involved primarily in organizing, sponsoring, and participating roles during the first episode. As reported in Table 12, over 50% of the organizers and 33% of the sponsors in Sea99 were from Seattle. Participant organizations were also likely to be from Seattle, with 40% headquartered in the Emerald City.

	Role Played in Sea99				Role Played in DC00				Role Played in DC01			
	O <sup>b</sup>	S	P	E	O	S	P	E	O	S	P	E
<b>Headquarters</b>	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Seattle Metro	51.7	33.3	40.0				12.5					
Bay Area Metro	6.9		40.0	14.3	10.0	5.0	25.0	6.3				
DC Metro	20.7		20.0	21.4	80.0	80.0	12.5	12.5	57.1	100.0	100.0	16.7
NY Metro	6.9											33.3
Other Western City		16.7						18.8				
Midwestern City	10.3	16.7		21.4		5.0		18.8	14.3			
Other Northeast City	3.4	33.3			10.0		25.0	12.5				50.0
Southern City				14.3			25.0	15.6	28.6			
Southwest City								15.6				
D/K				28.6		10.0						
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

<sup>a</sup>. Blank cells = 0%. <sup>b</sup>. O = Organizer, S = Sponsor, P = Participant, E = Endorser of E-petition.

The second cluster involved in Sea99 were outsiders, primarily from Washington DC, the Northeast, and the San Francisco Bay area. The Washington DC SMOs split their involvement almost equally (around 20%) between the central role of organizing and the more peripheral roles of participating and signing electronic petitions. Groups from the Northeast (excluding New York City) were as likely as Seattle SMOs to sponsor Sea99 events, but played only a small part as organizers and no part at the periphery. San Francisco-based organizations were most evident as participants, accounting for the same percentage of involvement in this role as did SMOs from Seattle. These findings suggest that, while SMOs from around the country played important roles in Sea99, local SMOs were the most prominent cluster.

The pattern of local organizations playing central roles across protests is even stronger in DC00 and DC01. For example, as noted in Table 12, for DC00, 80% of organizers and 80% of

sponsors came from metro Washington, DC.<sup>19</sup> In DC01, nearly 60% of the organizers and *all* sponsors and participants were from the nation's capital.

Another pattern that stands out is that SMOs involved as electronic endorsers tended to be headquartered further away from the location of the episodes, suggesting that while some organizations wanting to attend episodes were prohibited in part by the distance, they found a way to make their discontent known by signing e-petitions.

These findings clearly suggest that local organizations played central roles in the DC episodes. While there are exceptions in Sea99, local organizations more often played key roles in all three episodes, undermining the claims that outsiders are the central actors. Later in this section, the other claim of the outside agitator thesis, that more alienated groups are central actors, will be scrutinized as well.

#### *SMO Age, Revenue, Formalization, and Professionalization*

The analysis above looked at organizational involvement across all possible roles. In order to narrow the remaining analysis further and to rely on less complicated tables, the rest of the report focuses on involvement in the core roles of organizer and sponsor.

According to the findings here, age of organization, annual revenue, level of professionalization, and level of formalization all influence involvement in key roles as predicted by resource mobilization. For example, findings in Part A of Table 13 show that organizations

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<sup>19</sup> The involvement of groups from Seattle dropped off significantly. Serving closer to the periphery as participants, Seattle SMO, for example, provided speakers at teach ins, workshops, and rally's to recount the "Battle in Seattle" that had occurred only months before.

older than eleven years are much more likely to play core roles in one, two, or three episodes than are younger organizations.

<b>Table 13. Age of organization and Annual Revenue (2001) by Number of Episodes Participating as Sponsor or Organizer</b>					
	<b>Percent involved as sponsor or organizer in number of episodes</b>				
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A. Age of Organization (N=135)</b>	%	%	%	%	%
< 4 Years	52.9	47.1	0.0	0.0	100
4-10 Years	62.0	32.0	4.0	2.0	100
11- 20 Years	25.0	53.6	17.9	3.6	100
> 20 Years	32.5	55.0	10.0	2.5	100
<b>B. Annual Revenue (N=136)</b>	%	%	%	%	%
< \$1,000	85.3	11.8	2.9	0.0	100
\$1,000-\$25,000	48.4	45.2	6.5	0.0	100
\$25,001-100,000	33.3	59.3	7.4	0.0	100
> \$100,000	20.5	61.4	13.6	4.5	100

Further supporting resource mobilization, Part B of the same table shows that as annual revenue increases, organizations are more likely to be involved in key roles in a greater number of episodes. Levels of professionalization and formalization show a similar pattern as noted in Table 14. Groups with higher levels of professionalization are involved in more episodes as sponsors or organizers than are organizations with no, or low-to-moderate levels of professionalization. The same pattern holds true for SMOs with high levels of formalization.

	<b>Percent involved as sponsor or organizer in number of episodes</b>				
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A. Level of Professionalization</b>	%	%	%	%	%
None	70.0	26.0	4.0	0.0	100
Low-to-Moderate	36.8	57.9	5.3	0.0	100
High	30.3	51.5	15.2	3.0	100
<b>B. Level of Formalization</b>	%	%	%	%	%
None	70.0	26.7	3.3	0.0	100
Low-to-Moderate	60.0	37.8	2.2	0.0	100
High	21.7	61.7	13.3	3.3	100

Besides supporting the resource mobilization perspective, these findings also undermine the assertion made by the outside agitator thesis that alienated organizations are more likely to be involved in central protesting roles. Rather than marginalized SMOs (i.e., younger, less-resourced, unformalized, and unprofessionalized) taking leading roles in protests, the findings show the opposite is true. Older SMOs with greater revenue flows, higher levels of formalization, and higher levels of professionalization are more likely involved in central roles, signifying that the stability associated with being integrated into the organizational mainstream allows for greater opportunities to organize and sponsor mass demonstrations. The co-optation thesis is the final perspective considered for explaining SMO involvement in protest episodes.

#### *Elite Ties and Mass Membership Organizations*

As discussed earlier, the co-optation perspective suggests that SMOs with ties to elites and/or consisting of mass constituencies will avoid engagement in confrontational protests. This would seem especially true after a contentious episode like Sea99. Implied in this perspective is

the assertion that groups not directly linked to elites and those without formal memberships have greater latitude and flexibility to engage in disruptive politics. The data does not appear to support this thesis. Instead, SMOs with elite ties are more likely to be involved in central organizing roles in more protests than are those without the ties. Membership appears to have no bearing either way.

Ties to elites are evident in that 15% of SMOs involved in the protests also sent a delegate to the WTO ministerial (see Table 15).<sup>20</sup> They included groups like Greenpeace and Global Exchange. Membership organizations were much more prevalent than those that sent ministerial delegates. As noted in Table 15, over 66% of the groups reportedly had official members. Many of these were union-based SMOs and national environmental groups.

<b>Table 15. Percent SMOs Sent Delegate to WTO Ministerial and Percent Membership Organizations</b>	
	Percent
Sent Delegate to WTO	15.1
Membership Organization	66.4

The impact of elite ties and membership is evident in Table 16. The logic of the co-optation thesis would suggest that the Seattle protests effectively challenged elite interests, making SMOs that sent delegates to the WTO ministerial more likely to distance themselves from further protests to avoid becoming alienated from elites whose interests were threatened in the streets of Seattle.

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<sup>20</sup> Groups that sent delegates to the WTO ministerial had to go through an official registration process and extensive security check.

<b>Table 16. Sent Official Delegate to WTO Ministerial and Membership Organization by Number of Episodes Participating as Sponsor or Organizer</b>					
	<b>Percent involved as sponsor or organizer in number of episodes</b>				
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Total</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>&amp;</b>
<b>A. Sent Delegate to WTO (N=135)</b>					
Yes	19.0	61.9	14.3	4.8	100
No	50.0	42.1	7.0	0.9	100
<b>B. Membership Organization (N=136)</b>					
Yes	46.7	44.4	6.7	2.2	100
No	43.5	45.7	8.7	2.2	100

The data does not support the co-optation thesis. As noted in Table 16, SMOs sending delegates were more likely to be involved as organizers or sponsors in any number of protest episodes. Over 60% of the SMOs who sent a ministerial delegate were involved in a key role for one episode, which is a 20% greater involvement than for those who did not send a delegate. More telling is what happened regarding involvement in two and three episodes. SMOs who sent WTO delegates were twice as likely to organize or sponsor events during two episodes, than were organizations who did not send delegates. There is an even greater gap between the two groups of SMOs involved when involvement in three episodes is compared. These findings suggest that just the opposite happened than is predicted by the co-optation thesis. Organizations with ties to elites were consistently involved in more protest episodes in key roles than were SMOs without such ties.

Another test of the co-optation theses entails identifying the effects of formal memberships on involvement. If co-optation occurs as predicted, organizations with mass

memberships should be less likely involved in key roles across protest episodes than nonmember organizations. Like elite ties, the influence of membership provides no support for the co-optation thesis. As indicated in the lower part of Table 13, there is very little difference between membership and non-membership SMOs in terms of the number of episodes they were involved in as sponsors or organizers.

### **CONTROVERSIES AND CLARIFICATIONS**

Perhaps the most controversial finding here is that co-optation does not occur with the more resourced SMOs, and those with links to elites and/or having a mass membership base. Interviews with global justice SMO leaders supports this finding by suggesting that organizations avoid co-optation by diversifying funding base. Several SMOs involved across all three episodes noted that they did not allow any patron or funder to have excess influence on the organization and its strategies and tactics. Clarification is needed to find out whether organizations became involved in less confrontational tactics following the Seattle protests. It is possible that, while organizations with higher revenues, age, formalized and professionalized structures, elite links tended to be more involved in subsequent protests, the degree of their involvement may have declined across episodes in terms of using less confrontational tactics.

In addition, clarification is needed regarding headquarter location and involvement, especially in Seattle. This analysis showed two clusters of organizations involved in the Seattle protests. The most important cluster included Seattle SMOs, though a cluster of outsider SMOs from San Francisco, Washington, DC, and the Northeast were also vitally involved. Further analysis should specify whether the second cluster contained more marginalized SMOs. If the

second cluster contained mostly well-resourced organizations (i.e., SMOs with higher revenues, and a formalized and professional structure), then another version of the outside agitator thesis may prove useful in understanding the involvement of some organizations in protest episodes. For example, that a few well resourced organizations specialize in mobilizing large scale protests, regardless of where the episodes occur.

## **CONCLUSION**

This research shows that organizations with greater access to resources and possessing a basic level of organizational infrastructure are involved in more protest episodes and in central roles than are SMOs with less resources and organizational infrastructure. Organizations that take steps to ensure steady resource streams do not necessarily become pawns of the elite. It appears that a minimum level of organizational infrastructure is important for organizations wishing to play consistently key roles in protest episodes. While resources do not negatively impact involvement in the number of episodes, they may have a co-optive impact on the level of disruptive tactics employed by SMOs. This question will be addressed in a subsequent study.

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